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This thesis is a case study of Great Britain’s colonisation of a few indigenous, contiguous 
peoples of the Western Lower Niger from 1884 to 1914. These are the Itsekiri, the Western 
Ijo, the Urhobo, the Isoko and the Ukwuani of present-day Delta State of Southern Nigeria. 
These case studies were used to ascertain whether, between treaty diplomacy and conquest, 
which was the central means employed by Great Britain in the colonisation process. The 
existing standard historiography of Great Britain’s expansion in Nigeria had often 
emphasised the theme of violence in Great Britain’s relations with indigenous peoples, 
leaving out totally or paying scant attention to instances of treaty-making. This dissertation 
challenged this long-held narrative of force as a general means of empire-building by Great 
Britain in Nigeria. This gap in the standard historiography engendered an understanding of 
the legal background of European colonialism, bringing out the influence of legal Positivism, 
the creation of hierarchies of sovereignties, of civilized and uncivilized societies, and how 
these concepts were used by Europeans to justify empire-building. The practicalities of Great 
Britain’s use of treaties for colonisation in other areas before the Scramble were highlighted, 
to indicate, the deployment of legal tools for territorial acquisition and colonisation. The 
combination of treaty-making, the role of men on the spot, driving the colonial process, and 
indigenous conditions were reflected on within the context of this dissertation to argue, in the 
face of the available evidence that, Great Britain’s colonisation of the case study areas was 
mainly through treaty diplomacy and not by military conquest as was the case with some 
other Nigerian groups. This research adds to recent historiography that explored previously 
under-investigated aspects of the age of empire; that in some cases in the course of 
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Figure 1 Political Map of Africa showing the geographical location of Nigeria
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Nigerian historians pay little or no attention to the important and extensive use of treaty-
making used during Britain’s colonization of Nigeria. Instead, the depiction of the encounters 
between Great Britain and the various indigenous peoples and polities of Nigeria is depicted 
as a violent process in which the imperial power imposed its will on indigenous societies 
through force of arms or threat of its use. The dominant scholarly narrative is often a tale of 
British aggression and the dogged resistance by local people to alien domination.
2
 
However, historical records for this region of Nigeria indicate otherwise. There is 
evidence that officials of Great Britain often resorted to negotiating treaties of protection, 
containing capitulation clauses, specifically as a way of achieving a non-military form of 
imperial penetration and hegemony. Furthermore, many indigenous groups, for a variety of 
reasons outlined in the ensuing chapters, actively embraced such treaties. While such treaties, 
once concluded, served as tools in a first step towards colonizing indigenous groups, the use 
of treaties was often a very successful form of non-violent colonisation. By examining the 
treaty content and what is known about the negotiations surrounding these treaties, scholars 
gain a much better insight into the ways Africans and British participants engaged with the 
process and with each other, offering a much more complex depiction of power relations, 
especially in the early period, than current scholarship allows. Africans cannot be seen 
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merely as victims of British violent conquest but as individuals negotiating with British 
representatives. Examining those British representatives is also important; these men on the 
spot acting as imperial ‘bridgeheads’, were engaged not only in treaty-making but also 
making efforts to establish good relations with the indigenous peoples through knowledge 
and recordings of their systems as a specific project. ‘Bridgeheads’ were individual British 
subjects and imperial officials; men on ground connecting the spheres of influence with the 
metropole, and driving the imperial process.
3
John Darwin has underlined the importance of 
such sub-imperial agents as key to Great Britain’s empire-building endeavour.
4
 Often, their 
early relations with indigenous groups served as foundations for later imperial expansion.
5
 
According to Darwin, Britain’s Atlantic empire was a series of early informal coastal 
settlements annexed through cession treaties with sub-imperial agents such as consuls, 
settlers, traders, missionaries, and the military playing significant roles in a mix of multiple 
interests accentuated by the metropole and local conditions.
6
 Despite this knowledge, the 
focus of most accounts concerning British expansion in Africa has been mainly on the theme 
of conquest and resistance, ignoring instances of non-violent colonisation through diplomacy.  
Thus, in this study, the role of men on the spot acting as early bridgeheads in Great 
Britain’s relations with the study groups are explored within the broader narrative of British 
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encroachment into the hinterlands in the wake of the Scramble for Africa.
7
Historians of the 
British colonisation of India have long recognized the ways that such men (they were almost 
always men) documented the ethnography and geography of indigenous areas as part of a 
form of peaceful empire-building, one which hinged on imperial imaginations and quest to 
know more about the cultural basis of the indigenous peoples and societies. Such knowledge 
gathering was firmly part of the British imperial enterprise in Nigeria as well, but an 
enterprise which, while not entirely peaceful, deviates considerably from the current Nigerian 
scholarship of violent conquest.
8
Moreover, the factor of indigenous agency in the European-
African encounter has also been downplayed. The narrative is often one of the colonized as 
passive participants in the process, even though in some instances, as was the case with some 
of the study groups, the people openly welcomed British officials to their domains. This 
reinforces views by some scholars that local conditions in the peripheries and indigenous 
collaboration also engendered colonialism.
9
 
 In this vein, this study challenges the dominant view by historians of Nigeria which 
places premium on a few instances of Great Britain’s use of military conquest as a blanket 
ascription for British expansion in Nigeria in general. Employing a distinctive case study 
approach, and grounded in primary sources, this research addresses the gap inherent in the 
historiography of the place of treaty-making, knowledge gathering and indigenous agency in 
                                                          
7
 K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political 
History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); Obaro Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations 
and the European Presence 1884-1936 (London: Longmans, 1969). 
8
 James Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2015); Tony Ballantyne, ‘Colonial Knowledge,’ in Sarah Stockwell (Ed), The British Empire: 
Themes and Perspectives (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008); Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
9
 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004); R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperialism (London: MacMillan, 1961). 
4 
 
the process of Great Britain’s colonisation of the Itsekiri, the Western Ijo, the Urhobo, the 
Isoko, and the Ukwuani indigenous groups [see, figure 2] of the Western Lower Niger of 
Nigeria from 1884-1914. These case study groups of Nigeria are geographically contiguous 
in the Western Niger Delta, and shared many cultural and political connections, but were also 
largely politically independent, and somewhat viewed by the British ambiguously. Thus, this 
study is essentially an enquiry into the encounters and interactions between formal and 
informal imperial agents of Great Britain and indigenous populations in the case study 
groups during the Scramble for Africa. Between 1880 and 1914, the whole of West Africa 
barring Liberia fell under European domination, and existing African polities lost their 
sovereignty, independence and territories. More importantly, at the end of the process, 
European political, economic and religious influences permeated and became permanent 










                                                          
10
 See Urhobo Historical Society, available from: www.waado.org/nigerdelta/Maps/NgDeltaEthnic-Aweto.html 
6 
 
 In the Scramble for Africa, European powers adopted two main methods, namely, 
conquest and diplomacy. In the classical case of the annexation of Lagos in 1851, Great 
Britain employed ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ as a first step but still resorted to a treaty with the 
King of Lagos to concretise colonisation. This combination of show of force and treaty-
making was also the norm in earlier subjugation of other indigenous groups in the Eastern 
Delta long before the onset of the general Scramble of 1884/85.
11
As M’Baye and Adu 
Boahen have noted, this earlier phase of European encroachment into Africa generally relied 
on a combination of treaty-making, military invasions and occupations.
12
Notwithstanding 
this notion, Nigerian historiography has largely ignored the role of treaty-diplomacy by the 
British in its expansionary enterprise. 
The regions under review have also been largely absent from the grand narratives of 
conquest in the Lower Niger. Lacking the larger ethnic groups to the North and East, the 
Western Delta of the Niger River has been described as, a shatter region ostensibly on 
account of its ethnic diversity, political plurality and linguistic and cultural differences of its 
constituent indigenous groups.
13
 By 1914 when Great Britain amalgamated the two 
Protectorates of southern and northern Nigeria into a single Colony and Protectorate of 
Nigeria, and subsequently created the Warri Province, the five indigenous focus groups of 
this study, namely the Itsekiri, the Western Ijo, the Urhobo, the Isoko, and the Ukwuani 
                                                          
11
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became part of the new Warri Province.
14
Scholarship often lumps these groups in with each 
other, and with neighbouring conquests, such as in Benin.
15
 This dissertation, in contrast, 
focuses in depth on the region of the Western Lower Niger which hydrologically remains 
part of a maze of river systems forming the delta of the great Niger River, with its streams 
and creeks, radiating out of the main Niger at a point some 200 miles below the confluence 
and about 120 miles from the sea [see figure 2].
16
At this point, the Niger bifurcates into its 
two principal branches, the one to the east, which empties itself over a shallow bar at Akassa, 
called the Nun, and the western branch, that joins the Warri stream, below Burutu, entering 
the Atlantic as the Forcados.
17
This western branch of the Niger, including the Atlantic 
coastline and its hinterlands defines the Western Lower Niger. The events identified, 
discussed and analysed in this research are about the various peoples that occupied the 
Western portion of the Niger Delta, and their relationship with the Europeans, particularly 
with Great Britain, before and during the Scramble for Africa.  
The Research Context 
The silence and or little attention given to treaty-making and diplomacy in studies of Great 
Britain’s colonisation of Nigeria and on the Scramble for Africa in general is not attributable 
to a lack of source materials. Until this study, no effort has deliberately focused on 
                                                          
14
 TNA, C. O. 879/119/8, Report by Sir F. Lugard to the Colonial Office on the Amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria, 1919; A. E. Apena, A Socio-Economic History of the Western Delta During the Colonial 
Period, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Lagos, 1987; Kirk-Green, A. H. M., (Ed), Lugard and the 
Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record (London: Cass, 1968); Obaro Ikime, ‘Chief Dogho: The 
Lugardian System in Warri, 1917 – 1932,’ Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1965.  
15
 P. A. Igbafe, Benin Under British Colonial Administration: The Impact of Colonial Rule on an African Kingdom 
1897-1938 (London: Longman, 1979); Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest (London: 
Heinemann, 1977).  
16
 W. M. W. Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, 1965); M. Crowder, The Story of 
Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1965, P. 187). 
17
 B. L. Nyanayo, I. Daminabo, and E. R. Aminigo, ‘Environment,’ in E. J. Alagoa, T. N. Tamuno, and J. P. Clark 
(Eds), The Izon of the Niger Delta (Port Harcourt: Onyoma Research Publications, 2005); Arthur Glyn Leonard, 
The Lower Niger and Its Tribes (London: Macmillan and Co, Limited, 1906). 
8 
 
examining the central role of treaty-making and diplomacy in British relations with the case 
study groups of this research. Thus, in essence, the study argues against suggestions, mainly 
by historians of Nigeria, that use of force constituted the major approach employed by the 
British in colonizing the case study areas.
18
Instead, ‘Treaties’, diplomacy, and colonial 
knowledge were used to cultivate a soft power approach during pacification, legalization and 
eventual colonisation of these groups of the Western Lower Niger.  
In the general historiography of Great Britain’s colonisation of Nigeria, the attention 
given to the forceful removal and conquest of the likes of Jaja (1887), Nana (1894), the war 
on the Akassa (1895), and the Benin Expedition (1897), which were at best isolated 
instances, have unfortunately been applied as the standard British practice of empire-building 
in the Niger Basin.
19
However, the reality of Great Britain’s acquisition of the territories of 
the Western Delta which incorporates the study groups differs from the picture captured in 
the existing historiography. There are certain points that need consideration here. First, the 
sacking of a few indigenous potentates and polities such as Jaja, and the Benin kingdom by 
the military forces of Great Britain, does not warrant a blanket description of the use of force 
by Britain in the colonisation of the region. Clearly, it is not out of place to suggest that the 
tendency to generalize with a few examples of conquest emanated out of a deliberate or 
unintentional disregard of why the British and local Africans negotiated treaties with each 
other. The most cited case of imperial Gun-boat diplomacy, involving Nana of the Itsekiri, 
was more complicated, as demonstrated in chapter four, than currently recognized in the 
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19




existing historiography. The sacking of Nana’s enclave of Ebrohimi by British forces in 1894 
does not represent a prelude to the pacification of the whole of Itsekiriland.
20
Despite these 
isolated but prominent cases of the use of force by the imperial power to have its way with 
African leadership, evidence indicates that, Great Britain generally employed a combination 
of treaty-making and colonial knowledge of the people as means in the pacification of the 
groups of this study from a very early period in the age of empire.
21
Surprisingly, these treaty-




However, in recent years, innovative scholarship on the role of treaties in empire-
building has emerged outside of Nigeria. Several studies by historical and legal scholars have 
devoted ample attention to and analysed the place of treaty-making and use in the European 
expansionist enterprise before and during the Scramble.
23
In a recent study by Saliha 
Belmessous and others, the emphasis is on how European powers acquired sovereign and 
political rights over indigenous peoples and their territories through negotiated cession 
treaties. A recent Nigerian legal scholar recognized this, asserting that in the case of the 
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10 
 
British in Nigeria, it is a matter of historical record that they frequently resorted to treaties, 
often as a prelude to their mission of pacifying the natives.
24
 
This research builds upon this recent scholarship by Saliha Belmessous and others. In 
doing so, the study indicates that in the case of the Western Lower Niger, treaty-making and 
other forms of soft power diplomacy better explains British colonisation of the Itsekiri, the 
Western Ijo, the Urhobo, the Isoko and the Ukwuani. Despite how little the indigenous 
peoples understood the import of the contents of the treaties, once concluded, all subsequent 
actions taken by the imperial power in its relations with the study groups after treaty-making, 
were anchored on the political and sovereignty rights which the concluded treaties bestowed 
on the agents of the British.
25
 By examining the role of treaty-making and diplomacy, this 
research introduces a new perspective on the wider debates surrounding British colonisation 
of Nigeria, and the Scramble in general. 
As has been noted, a major shortcoming associated with the existing standard 
historiography of British colonisation of Nigeria remains the emphasis on conquest and little 
or no attention paid to non-military forms of acquisition of territories. However, it is common 
knowledge that European powers, and indeed Great Britain in particular obtained footings in 
various parts of the world through cession treaties and conquest. In the process of 
establishing footholds, the men on the spot acting as bridgeheads, often later played 
significant roles when advancing into the hinterland areas, through trade, missionary and 
consular activities. These dimensions of treaty-making, the roles of the men on the spot and 
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colonial knowledge forms the basis for the argument of a more diplomatic means of Great 
Britain’s colonisation of the case study groups. 
Methodology and Sources 
The investigation utilised a wide range of primary and secondary sources, mainly from 
British and Nigerian archives and libraries. Primary sources included archival materials from 
the National Archives at Ibadan in Nigeria, and from the British National Archives, Kew, in 
London. The most valuable data for this study remains the various treaties concluded 
between the agents of Great Britain and the kings and chiefs of the indigenous peoples. In 
particular, the British Archives was of utmost help being a digital Archive. The researcher 
was able to get the bulk of the treaties and other imperial era documents such as Consular 
Reports online after registration and payment of a checking and recording fee. The records 
from the British Archives are designated as Foreign Office documents and Colonial Office 
documents. In contrast, the National Archives Ibadan did not yield as much expected 
materials. The archive still operates manually, and it was impossible to get some materials 
from it even when such were listed on the catalogues. Consequently, in the course of this 
study, the researcher had to tap useful and identified archival sources from the NAI from 
other published works. In all, the materials from both archives turned out as indispensable 
source materials for this dissertation. However, it must be noted that relying almost solely on 
records of the colonial power in the absence of indigenous perspectives on treaty-making 
could be a limitation given that such colonial accounts could be hagiographic. To mitigate 
this, a close reading of the sources was embarked upon using the technique of reading against 
the grain to critically interrogate and assess the British texts to achieve acceptable 
interpretations. Altogether, the archival materials include, consular reports and 
12 
 
correspondences, the original treaties concluded between the agents of Great Britain and the 
study peoples, and colonial era intelligence and assessment reports on the peoples.  
In its encounter with the people of Nigeria beginning from the Slave Trade era, the 
British employed treaty-making with indigenous leadership to regulate relations and to later 
establish its hegemony in the age of empire. Within the context of nineteenth century 
European understandings, treaties were compacts between two sovereign states. However, as 
demonstrated in chapter two, the underlying positivist legal philosophy of the age of empire 
characterised most non-European states as lacking in sovereignty, and thus incapable of 
concluding treaties but could only do so when  Europeans extended sovereignty to non-
European states through recognition. The typology of treaties deployed by the British over 
time were three main types namely of peace/commerce, cession and protection treaties.
26
It 
must be noted that not all treaties translated to loss of territory and sovereignty rights. 
Clearly, the early treaties of peace/commerce with the Delta chiefs did not take away the 
political and sovereign powers of the potentates.
27
 However, the age of empire cession and 
particularly protectorate treaties with the ethnic groups of this study translated to taking 
certain sovereign rights from the protected to the imperial protector, and ultimately for the 
appropriation of their territories by the British.
28
Essentially as controlling instruments, the 
protection treaties are most relevant in understanding how Great Britain established and 
maintained control over the study areas.  
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These British treaties with the various people of Nigeria and several Scramble-era 
dispatches from officers on the ground to the home government were archived at the 
Nigerian national depositories at Ibadan and Enugu. These are available under the C.S.O 
Series in these archives. The National Archives, Kew, London, holds various documents 
pertaining to British interactions with the people of Nigeria, including, correspondences and 
diplomatic notes from pre-colonial times to independence in 1960. These are under the 
Colonial Office (C.O.) and Foreign Office (F.O.) Series. Other Primary materials, included 
government publications, biographical notes, traveler accounts, and other contemporaneous 
reports and publications such as newspaper reports, particularly the London Gazette, and The 
Times of London, and; the accounts of Consular Officials, such as those of Consuls Gallwey 
and Macdonald. In particular, traveler accounts complemented information derived from 
consular despatches and treaties. On the whole, these source materials illuminated the various 
relationships between the peoples of this study and Great Britain in the age of empire. 
Evidence from these primary sources constitute the raw material for establishing the central 
argument that  a combination of treaty-making and local Intel-gathering by imperial officials 
ensured a process of less violent colonisation of the territories of the Western Lower Niger 
by Great Britain in the nineteenth century.  
Another primary source most useful to this study is the colonial era intelligence 
reports of the various peoples of this study. While most were completed after the formal 
creation of the colony, Nigeria, in 1914, the records reveal a great deal about the local 
populations and how they were viewed by the British. As has been documented in India, the 
British commissioned writers to investigate the customs, mores, political and social systems, 
geography, religion, language and the general ways and means of the indigenous peoples, 
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largely in order to control them.
29
Before the interwar period, British officials had little 
knowledge of the ethnic compositions of the peoples they were dealing with, so, a conscious 
soft power approach became more consciously embedded within the colonial system, 
reflective also of, growing ideas of ‘indirect rule’, which was a system of governing the 
protectorates through native rulers, who after treaty-making became answerable to British 
officials.
30
The intelligence reports, while framed within this colonial and racial framework, 
still contain information which is valuable for the reconstruction of the early histories of the 
peoples of Nigeria.
31
 For this study, they are relied on in our understanding of the early 
histories, as well as pre-colonial social and political systems of the peoples in relation to their 
dealings with the officials of Great Britain in the contact and treaty-making episodes. 
Combined with other records about treaties and other accounts, a much clearer understanding 
of the negotiation process between locals and the British becomes evident, as well as a 
clearer understanding of each groups’ motivations. 
A framework adopted in this study is, to situate this primary research within the 
existing historiography of the Scramble and the wider use of treaties by European countries 
as a key mechanism of colonisation. European encounters with indigenous groups in the New 
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World, in Asia and later in aspects of Africa often involved instances of diplomatic 
encounters alongside aggressive use of force in other cases in the expansionary drive. Often, 
a desire to relate better with indigenous groups engendered the conclusion of treaties of 
friendship and peace, as was the case with indigenous groups in Canada [see chapter 3]. 
Furthermore, in most cases, such treaties served as trade concession instruments and 
generally gave legal backing to subsequent relations between the Europeans and the 
indigenous peoples on one hand, and also as a basis for warding off other European nations 
in terms of claims to territory. In the case of the protection treaties concluded with the 
peoples of this study, they were later relied on by the British for proclaiming protectorates, 
thereby giving Great Britain political and governance rights over the peoples and their 
territories. 
Situating the primary research within these larger frameworks help establish a more 
nuanced understanding of Nigerian colonisation and adds to the growing body of literature 
which centralizes the role of treaties. Belmessous has noted that treaty-making has rarely 
been taken seriously by scholars because they are seen as being created either through 
unequal power relations or in outright fraudulent circumstances.
32
However, such a dismissal 
ignores a large part of how Africans and the British actually negotiated and experienced the 
process of colonisation. There is still a need to understand that the practice of treaty-making 
was more than for mere commercial and political opportunism and the treaties were not just 
pieces of paper. However unequal participation might have been, Africans did partake in 
treaties and other soft power efforts by the British. Historians need to understand why and 
how these negotiations occurred. Doing a close reading of sources, and incorporating modern 
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theoretical work on ‘reading against the grain’ and ‘colonial knowledge,’ makes it possible to 
better understand this process overall, and about the use of force and more about the 
negotiation processes leading to the treaties. 
The study is cognizant of the fact that while the parties involved in the treaty-making 
episodes were not necessarily equally powerful, both the indigenous peoples and the 
colonizing British ‘bridgeheads’ demonstrated considerable agency, engaging with the treaty-
making process for a variety of reasons.
33
 What this reveals is, less about indigenous 
victimhood at the hands of violent imperialists. The discernible pattern of expansion was a 
process of peaceful negotiation, and slower, more subtle methods of coercion. 
More broadly, within the context of nineteenth century notions of international law, 
European powers used treaties as a legitimate means to appropriate indigenous sovereignties 
and acquire land.
34
 This is one of the tasks this study has dealt with in relation to the treaties 
of the officials of the Protectorates and the agents of the National African Company (later 
Royal Niger Company). Indeed, within this context, Akin Oyebode has argued that in 
anticipation of the Berlin Conference, the British embarked on a treaty-making frenzy in the 
Nigerian area, a process still poorly understood.
35
 It is this background of the legal 
ramifications of the treaties and their use that informs the chapter on the legal context of 
colonialism in this study. 
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Layout of Chapters 
Chapter one situated the study within the extensive historiographical debates surrounding 
European expansion and the age of empire in particular. Discussions of Great Britain’s 
colonisation of Nigeria cannot ignore the wider factors and forces both in Europe and Africa 
that defined and shaped the process. Considering the various motives for European/British 
imperialism and the significance of colonisation, the debate in the academic literature 
continues to highlight different strands of this epoch of human contact. Thus the chapter 
brings together and analyses existing perspectives and angles associated with Great Britain’ 
colonisation of Nigeria and the Scramble in general.
36
Specifically, the chapter interrogates 
and reviews the dominant perspective by historians of Nigeria on the theme of violent 
conquest as central to British expansion in Nigeria. It appraises the violence perspectives 
with a view towards indicating inherent gaps, so as to provide an alternate view in light of the 
evidence gathered for the study. 
Chapters two and three explain the legal context of colonialism, and the history of 
British treaty-making and its use for territorial acquisition. The understanding that the 
territorial acquisition enterprise of the European powers was a global trend influences both 
chapters and is important background if we want to understand the negotiations within the 
Niger Delta. In chapter two, the study draws on the discourse associated with the foundations 
of European political and legal thoughts before the age of empire, to discuss the theories 
employed to rationalize and legitimize expansion and expropriation of territories outside 
Europe. The underlying pseudo-legal doctrines of Naturalism, Positivism, and the concept of 
Discovery, espoused in earlier times, carried forward and applied to the age of empire forms 
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the core of the discussion. In the process, it brings out the legal and philosophical 
underpinnings behind the adoption of treaty-making and use by European powers in their 
relationship with indigenous peoples globally. Chapter three extends the discussion on treaty-
making and use by the British Empire before the Scramble. The treaty-making episodes of 
the British Empire in Canada and elsewhere are drawn on to argue that treaty-making was a 
practice carried forward and replicated in Nigeria in the nineteenth century. Understanding 
the legal and political dimensions of treaty-making and use by the British for colonial 
acquisition within the context of nineteenth century international law helps to place in proper 
perspective, both the forms of the treaties, and the reasons why treaties were utilized for 
territorial acquisition. 
Chapters four, five, six, seven, and eight all focus on the specific case studies of this 
dissertation. These chapters draw on the original treaties concluded between the indigenous 
leaderships and the British, examines the contents and texts of the treaties to demonstrate 
how the inherent clauses in them transferred political and sovereign rights from the 
indigenous peoples to the officials of Great Britain. Together, the five chapters make the case 
for the central role of treaty-making and other forms of soft power in the colonisation process 
and help to explain why some Africans participated in this process. These five chapters allow 
for an examination of the conceptual and theoretical issues addressed in the earlier chapters – 
the motives for British expansion, treaty making and use, and justification under international 
law- in the course of the expansionary drive of Great Britain within the context of this study. 
Specifically, chapter six draws out the role of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) in the 
colonisation process. Understanding how the British deployed a chartered company for 
colonial acquisition in the Niger Basin, akin to earlier practice in the form of the Hudson’s 
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Bay Company (HBC) in Canada, and the New Zealand Company (NZC) [chapter 3], 
reinforces this study’s central notion of treaty-making and peaceful colonisation of the study 
groups.
37
The five chapters deal with the real issue of the application of treaty-making regime 
by Great Britain in the appropriation of indigenous territories in the age of empire. The study 
concludes by highlighting the contributions of the thesis to the corpus of knowledge on 
treaties and peaceful empire-building and gives suggestions for further research. 
In summary, this study adds depth to our understanding of the events of British 
expansion in the Western Lower Niger and contextualizes this new knowledge within the 
wider Scramble for Africa and Great Britain’s treaty-making episodes in territorial 
acquisition globally. Ultimately, by focusing on the central place of treaty-making and 
peaceful diplomacy by Great Britain in the colonisation of the Western Delta, this study 
challenges notions that emphasise conquest as the chief ingredient of British imperialism in 
Nigeria. While military force was used on occasion, as described by Akin Oyebode, this 
should not deter us from examining instances of the use of diplomacy through treaties as a 
first step employed by the imperial power to pacify some groups, and clear the way for the 
trial of other means to achieve formal control.
38
 Investigating the treaty-making episodes 
helps to; shed light on why the indigenous peoples cooperated in the process. It would shed 
more light on their motivations to collaborate with the British, even though obviously, they 
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were unaware of loss of their rights to sovereignty and territory inherent in the treaties. This 
would also explain better some of the study groups’ later reactions and resistance to the 
existing imperialism they encountered. However, applying the theoretical construct of 
Empire as an intellectual and cultural project as Bernard Cohn
39
 did in the case of British 
India can be extended to the case studies here. It highlights colonisation as a distinct process 
involving the role of men on ground keen on knowing more about the indigenous peoples 
through collection and codification of their political, social and cultural systems for eventual 
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Chapter One: Historiography: Review of Literature 
 
Introduction 
The question of why European powers expanded into other climes has been well treated by 
scholars. The big conceptual theories about the motives for expansion, especially of Great 
Britain’s involvement in Africa exist in a generous and prominent mass of literature.
40
As 
such, this does not warrant any rehashing here, as the focus of this chapter is on the dominant 
narratives concerning the ‘how’ of Great Britain’s acquisition of territories in the Niger 
Basin. The activities of imperial agents prior to 1800 and the period of rapid colonisation 
from 1884 onwards, when the official mind in London shifted from informal sway to formal 
control, characterized Great Britain’s relations with the study groups. In the immediate 
period leading up to the Berlin Conference, Great Britain’s diplomatic activities around the 
coast and later push into the hinterlands of the Western Delta were conducted through 
imperial ‘bridgeheads’ – men on the spot, who engaged in trade with indigenous merchants 
in a collaborative atmosphere.
41
 The various engagements of officials and agents of Great 
Britain with the indigenous groups of this study were mainly cemented through diplomatic 
trade and cession agreements, even though the threat of force to sustain the process was 
readily available to the imperial agents. 
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 However, within the general histories of the Scramble, Nigeria has usually been 
presented as peripheral, compared to Egypt and Southern Africa, and the Western Delta as 
peripheral within Nigerian colonisation, with emphasis on the Eastern Delta. Even though 
scholarship on the Scramble in general is copious and includes varied perspectives on 
European motives and ways and means of expansion, little or no attention has historically 
been given to diplomatic collaboration between indigenous peoples and polities and the 
imperial power. Prominence is often given to violent conquest and references to agreements 
of any sort between the indigenous peoples and the alien power to illustrate the encounter 
process are given only brief attention in the historiography. Knowing and analyzing the 
various agreements helps to frame what happened in these specific case studies as part of a 
wider process, and a more diverse historiography. Also, a better understanding of both 
Nigerian national historiography and imperial historiography about the Scramble brings 
together two areas of research that have unfortunately increasingly been divided. The intent 
here is to have a proper grasp of existing narratives on  the ‘how’ of Great Britain’s 
expansion in the Western Delta, identify gaps in such general stories associated with the 
British-indigenous relationship in the Niger Basin in general, and relate the findings to the 
specific case studies of this dissertation within the period under review.   
1.1 The Theme of Conquest in Nigerian Historiography 
The threat of force was often easily available to imperial officials in their engagements with 
indigenous people. The trend by the dominant historiography, mainly by historians of 
Nigeria, has been to focus on this violence. In consequence, this has often portrayed Great 
Britain and her officials as active villains and the various peoples of Nigeria as passive 
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victims in the contact process.
42
Perhaps, no study by a historian of Nigeria better epitomises 
the conquest narrative than Obaro Ikime’s The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest.
43
 As a 
synthesis of several post-colonial studies on the theme of Great Britain’s expansion in 
Nigeria, 12 episodes of violent encounters between the British and indigenous groups are 
highlighted, including: Lagos, Calabar, Oyo, Ilorin, Brass, Benin, The Aro, The Tiv, Borno, 
Zaria, Kano, and Sokoto, each supposedly representing one of the former 12 states of 
precolonial Nigeria. These are used to demonstrate and generalize on how Great Britain 
achieved control of the whole of Nigeria through military conquest as a central means. For 
Obaro Ikime and others, it is usual, to think in terms of the many military expeditions 
mounted against the various peoples.
44
This book concentrates on these twelve, at best, 
randomly chosen and non-sequential, episodes as indicative of widespread and consistent 
violent acquisition. Subsequent historiographies after Ikime have similarly conceptualized a 




In specific reference to developments in the Western Delta, Elizabeth Isichei has used 
the sacking of Benin in 1897 and the overthrow of Nana earlier in 1894 to generalise that the 
violence of Great Britain’s colonialism affected groups which did not directly experience 
conflict with the imperial power. The case of a king of the small Western Delta state of 
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Issele-Uku was used to illustrate this. It was said that the king told a European visitor that if 
the king of Benin could not withstand the power of the imperial forces, it would be nothing 
short of madness for him to attempt to fight against the British.
46
Clearly, the import of this 
narrative was that smaller, less organised states realized the folly in fighting the British in the 
wake of the defeat of big and powerful states like Benin and others. Thus, even when 
violence was not directly used, the threat of it was crucial. The impression by this dominant 
conquest narrative that groups, which had peaceful relations with the British were 
undoubtedly influenced by the violent fates of others in the Delta, does not consider specific 
power dynamics in the Western Delta. As indicated in ensuing chapters, each case study 
group had its own peculiar experiences with the agents of the imperial power which 
engendered more of a less violent colonisation process. 
In a recent study, Toyin Falola and Michael Heaton have also characterised British 
expansion in Nigeria as one in which, in the end,  
‘the most common…tool of colonial expansion was the British willingness to use 
superior military might to subdue any opposition violently, and that by 1903 British 
predominance had been extended at the barrel of the gun to create the Colony and 
Protectorate of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria, areas which previously had existed as autonomous and independent 
states under indigenous leadership.’
47
 
In this account, only a passing reference was made to treaty-making and no elaboration of 
any form of indigenous collaboration with imperial officials. 
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1.2 Appraisal of the Nigerian Historiography 
There are certain problematics associated with the dominant Nigerian historiography of 
wholesale violent British colonisation. Perhaps most crucially, this view of British aggression 
against the polities and peoples of the Niger Basin by earlier and recent Nigerian 
historiographies as the standard means of Great Britain’s expansion in southern Nigeria, robs 
the indigenous peoples of their agency in the encounter and colonisation process with the 
imperial power.
49
It is also historically misleading. Obaro Ikime’s randomly selected episodes 
of indigenous wars with the British are not a true reflection of a twelve states structure to 
precolonial Nigeria. Nigeria was and still is a polyglot of more than 300 ethnicities. In 
relation to our specific case studies of the Western Delta, the closest precolonial polities were 
the Benin kingdom and Brass.   
Though, Benin had cultural and political ties with some of the case study groups, the 
1897 British Expedition against Benin, following the massacre of acting consul Phillips and 
his party cannot be taken as the basis for the pacification of all groups in the Western Delta to 
which Benin belongs.
50
 Importantly, it must be noted that, long before this episode of the 
Expedition, the British had embarked on treaty diplomacy with the groups of this study. As 
demonstrated in chapter 4, the first treaty with the Itsekiri was in 1884. Even in Benin, the 
British had earlier in 1892 concluded a protection treaty. More importantly, the groups of this 
study were not directly under the political control of the Benin kingdom. As such, the Benin 
episode cannot be used to ascribe a blanket generalization for other Western Lower Niger 
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groups despite the prestige and prominence of the Benin kingdom within the period under 
review. Clearly, this dominant Nigeria account made prominent by Obaro Ikime, privileges 
large indigenous political kingdoms within Nigeria, rather than the smaller, more complex 
political groups studied here. This is like how the Europeans viewed and understood the 
much larger and centralised polities, while ignoring smaller, but much more fluid 
decentralized groups which did not fit into European notions of statehood. 
 Second, Brass, an Ijo City State in the Eastern Delta, was far off and remains so from 
the Western Ijo of this study. The internal and external relations of Brass had little or no 
connections with the Ijo of the Western Delta. So, we cannot talk of the sacking of Brass by 
the British in 1895 after the City State had earlier attacked the headquarters of the Royal 
Niger Company (RNC) at Akassa, as a representation of the pacification of the Ijo as a whole 
in the Niger Basin. Thus, it is not appropriate to apply the general conquest narrative by 
Ikime and others across the board. Rather, from the evidence available, the prominent 
instances of indigenous wars with the imperial power were exceptional and specific cases. 
Larger parts of the Niger Basin did not experience or suffer the fate of conquest.  
With specific regard to the case study areas– the Western Delta, a discernible pattern 
was that Great Britain’s push into the Itsekiri country, the Urhobo, Western Ijo, Isoko, and 
Ukwuani territories was without major wars. As indicated in the ensuing chapters, post 
treaty-making developments were influenced by the shift from informal to formal control, so 
that, the need for effective rule necessitated the establishment of governance institutions. In 
the final analysis, within the central argument of this dissertation that Great Britain’s 
colonisation of the study groups followed a more peaceful trajectory, it must be understood 
that the various treaties concluded by officials of the imperial power with the indigenous 
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groups cleared the way for the introduction and trial of other instruments for eventual control 
and administration of the indigenous peoples and their territories. 
 This focuses only on European agency, and military conquest for Great Britain’s 
colonisation of Nigeria clearly does not give a complete and balanced story. In this vein, 
some recent studies have advocated for a closer look at the colonisation process through the 
prism of treaty-making diplomacy.
51
 A re-thinking on the standard narrative that Great 
Britain’s colonisation of Nigeria was achieved purely on the strength of the Maxim gun has 
been suggested. For these studies, to understand better the ease and speed with which Great 
Britain colonised the whole of Nigeria, attention must begin with treaty-making as both a  
diplomatic instrument, a non-military form of penetration and hegemony which together with 
the Intel-gathering endeavours of the imperial bridgeheads served as means for commercial 
and political manipulation by  officials of the imperial power, and which ultimately led to the 
sovereign capitulation of the indigenous polities and peoples. By investigating the encounters 
between Great Britain and the specific case studies in here, this dissertation covers that gap 
inherent in the dominant narrative which pays little or no attention to a less violent treaty 
based colonisation. 
1.3 General Scramble for Africa Scholarship 
The wider Scramble scholarship gives prominence to British encounters in Egypt and 
Southern Africa, ostensibly because of their strategic importance at the time to the empire 
than the specific case of Nigeria. In those instances, threats to British interests by rival 
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imperial powers and local crisis engendered impetus for action, which explains the violent 
nature of colonisation, especially of Egypt.
52
In studies by non-Nigerian historians, Nigeria is 
treated as peripheral, the scholarship not any more nuanced in recognizing the dynamics of 
the colonisation process. The narrative has often always centered on European agency, with 
the factors of rivalry and economic consideration as preeminent motives, leaving out local 
conditions in the periphery.
53
 
Notwithstanding this general perspective of giving prominence to only European agency 
for the Scramble, a prominent study has shed light on the conditions in indigenous societies 
as a dimension in the encounter process between Great Britain and peripheral groups 
globally. Famously, Robinson and Gallagher have suggested that, rather than account for the 
urge to expand only on the part of the Europeans, there is a need to examine the receiving 
end - Africa for answers. They suggested that Africa’s chaotic societies, its internal political 




Clearly, this thesis by Robinson and Gallagher resonates with developments in the case 
study societies. As indicated in chapter 4, conditions in Itsekiriland accentuated the meddling 
of the imperial ‘bridgeheads’, men on the spot, to diplomatically manipulate relations with 
the indigenes to the advantage of the imperial power. As Darwin has shown in the case of 
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India, the crucial variable for Victorian expansion was the ‘bridgehead’, who achieved the 
purchase of British interests in their zones of operations by establishing local political and 
diplomatic links with indigenous people.
55
Similarly, as indicated in the ensuing case study 
chapters, this role of ‘bridgeheads’ played out significantly and diplomatically in achieving 
colonisation more peacefully, rather than through force or threat of its use. It was a situation 
in which, the local people also expressed a welcoming disposition towards the imperial 
agents. This dimension of loyalist population working with imperial agents is a crucial gap 
missing in the general Nigerian narrative that this research fills. 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
This short review of the dominant literature on British colonisation of Nigeria is by no means 
an attempt to, foreclose other possible ways of examining the conquest narrative associated 
with the specifics of British colonisation of Nigeria in the late nineteenth century. The effort 
here has been to identify gaps in the literature which has been bridged in the research. 
Specifically, a salient gap identified was that the dominant historiography gives premium to 
British conquest of large kingdoms and polities as the standard for all cases of encounters 
with indigenous groups in Nigeria. Whereas, evidence suggests that treaty-making and other 
diplomatic means, rather than use of force was the dominant means employed by officials of 
Great Britain between 1884 and 1914 in bringing about the territories of the case studies of 
this dissertation under the control of imperial Britain. The use and place of treaties has 
attracted less attention in studies of British colonisation of Nigeria. Therefore, this 
dissertation has added to the body of knowledge on the peaceful colonisation of the Itsekiri, 
Western Ijo, Urhobo, Isoko, and Ukwuani areas by imperial Britain in the nineteenth century. 
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 Importantly, this brief survey of some of the important literature on the theme of 
conquest exposes existing historiography as inadequate in explaining how the British 
colonised aspects of Nigeria. It has been demonstrated that with regards to the Western Delta, 
accounts by historians of Nigeria that place premium on British use of force enabled by the 
Maxim gun, engendered a re-thinking of the need to explore the central role of a combination 
of diplomatic means including treaty-making, and colonial knowledge driven by the men on 
the spot, collaborating with the indigenous peoples in a more peaceful manner. This thinking 
is also the driving reason for examining in chapters two and three, the legal foundation of 
colonialism and the practical application of treaty-making for colonisation by Great Britain 
with indigenous groups elsewhere, before the Scramble for Africa. The intent was to 
underscore the use of this form of appropriation of territory by Great Britain as a progressive 











Chapter Two: Understanding the Legal Context of Colonialism 
 
Introduction 
Because this dissertation is about the use of treaties and other forms of diplomacy for 
colonisation of the Western Niger Delta by Great Britain, it is germane to understand the 
wider relationship between international law and colonialism in the age of empire, especially 
as this is a historiography which has evolved separately, usually written by lawyers, and gets 
minimal attention in most histories of colonisation or the Scramble.
56
As has been noted in the 
introduction, Saliha Belmessous and others have recently put forward innovative scholarship 
on treaty-making and European expansion in the nineteenth century.
57
For this dissertation 
understanding the development of Positivism as the underpinning legal foundation for 
European expansion particularly in the age of empire is imperative. European imperial 
powers, individual imperialists, companies and agents coveted other lands outside their 
domains for purposes of control, to satisfy national prestige, and for exploitation and 
profit.
58
In this vein, ideological mantles hinged on racial and other categorizations were 
crafted to justify colonialism.
59
As James Gathii has suggested, understanding the legal 
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thoughts of earlier and nineteenth-century Europe provides not just a clearer notion of 
ideologies of empire but also the justifications expounded by European powers in their 
acquisition of title to territories.
60
 In other words, we need to understand why treaties were 
used if we wish to understand how they were used in the Niger Delta. 
In this instance as in the case elsewhere in Africa and globally as demonstrated in 
chapter three, Great Britain employed contractual agreements, cession and protectorate 
treaties to legitimise the process of acquisition of the territories of indigenous peoples.
61
This 
knowledge elicits some salient questions. First, what prompted the British to resort to treaty-
making as a means for empire- building? Were the treaty-making processes between the 
officials and agents of Great Britain and the indigenous peoples anchored on any pre-existing 
legal foundations of that time? From indications, the British and Europeans in general had 
preconceived notions about Africa. In legal terms, it was a case of how Africans fit into 
European paradigms of law and order within the then existing social constructs, which 
viewed the non-European world as barbaric and uncivilized.
62
 
Without dwelling too deeply on all the conceptual and legal discourses associated 
with and the underpinning doctrines of colonialism, the chapter draws out how European 
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ideas of non-Europeans as uncivilised, of the creation of hierarchies of sovereignty within the 
framework of Positivist international law impacted on the empire-building process 
globally.
63
Within the wider legal historiography of the Scramble, a notable trend was how 
the postulations and teachings of legal scholars also impacted on the age of empire. Such 
expert opinions and treatises of jurists in support of individual imperial power have been well 
documented, and need no rehashing. However the point to note is that, in the case of Great 
Britain, expert legal scholarship and advice from British and other European jurists 
influenced the general notions of the applicability of law and legal instruments in 
expansion.
64
 Ideologies of empire were variously advanced as assertive and defensive claims 
emanating from past inter-European practices which were universalized in the age of empire. 
Even though they were presented in a scattershot legal approach, with sometimes 
overlapping and conflicting arguments, they served the imperial cause and studying them 
helps historians to better understand the relationship between law and empire-
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Given that colonisation was about territorial acquisition, in the specific case of 
Great Britain, settler colonies acquired through a mix of treaties and conquest in some 
instances represents a reliance on age-old European legal practices carried forward and 
applied in encounters with indigenous groups. It was a case of the imperial powers using 
concluded treaties with indigenous leadership to indicate that they own the land afterwards, 
or through outright purchase and conquest in other instances.   
Regarding the case studies of this dissertation, understanding the legal context of 
colonialism is also to demonstrate that the imposition of British colonial rule went hand in 
hand with the imposition of English legal rules. As indicated in the ensuing case study 
chapters, following treaty-making, the British proceeded to set up administrative structures 
fashioned alongside metropolitan systems. Clearly, this was a transposition of European legal 
ideas on the indigenous peoples and represents a process that was usually part of a ‘soft 
power’ approach to colonialism. Indeed, as indicated in chapter 4, the Itsekiri seem to have 
actively embraced the introduction of the rule of law and protection against other local 
pirates.  
Thus, knowing how European notions of international law were framed, how global 
sovereign hierarchies were constructed and how the tradition of treaty-making and use as a 
tool for territorial acquisition were galvanized to justify and support imperialism in the 
nineteenth century are useful to this study. The legal frameworks of Naturalism and 
Positivism, the doctrine of Sovereignty and the contradictions created by the non-recognition 
of indigenous forms of governance owing to the characterisation of non-Europeans as 
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uncivilised and thus lacking capacity to make laws and conclude treaties, and how this 
conundrum was resolved later to allow for treaty relations with indigenous groups are briefly 
examined here to underscore how international law was deployed in support of the 
colonisation enterprise, globally and specifically in Nigeria. 
The language of the treaties deployed by Great Britain in the Western Delta is worth 
looking at, as treaties were the central legal tools for colonialism. Great Britain’s treaties of 
protection with the study groups were title deeds purporting to transfer political and 
sovereign rights from the indigenous peoples to the imperial power. As instruments of 
capitulation, the language of the treaties inherent in each clause, were styled legalistically to 
subsume the sovereign rights of the people under imperial control. It has been suggested that 
the language of the treaties Europeans concluded with indigenous peoples was derived from 
past inter-European practice and that it represents a case of exploiting loopholes in 
international law to assert sovereignty and legal ownership of lands.
66
To understand why 
treaties were deployed for colonialism requires knowing the trajectory of international law 
from earlier times to the age of empire.  
2.1 From Naturalism to Positivism 
Before the age of empire, international legal theory and practice was influenced by the 
doctrine of Naturalism as its major underpinning philosophy. The basis of this international 
law of nations was anchored on assumptions of reasonable accommodation, of reciprocity 
and fairness and commitment to sovereignty amongst states.
67
As Casper Sylvest has 
suggested, until the 1850s international law within the jurisprudence of Naturalism was one 
                                                          
66
 Steven Press, Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s Scramble for Africa (Harvard: University 
Press, 2017); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order (Cambridge: University Press, 2004). 
67
 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954). 
37 
 
considered to have emerged from an external agency or structure, in this case, from - God.
68
 
Made prominent by writers such as Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), and Emerich von Vattel (1714 – 1767), the naturalist’s view of international law was 
predicated on ideas of justice and sovereignty, in which states and human activity, according 
to Anthony Anghie, were bound by an overarching adherence to notions of justice and 
morality.
69
This commitment to morality and  sovereignty embedded in the naturalist legal 
foundation of the early modern law has been explained by C. H. Alexandrowicz as one in 
which European States treated non- European states and sovereigns as equals in international 
society.
70
 In other words, the understanding at this time was that, all states, and all people 
were equal. Within this framework, there was a certain universal international natural law 
that applied to all states irrespective of whether they were European or non-European. It was 
one of equal social hierarchies, in which diplomatic relations between European states and 
others, especially, states of the Orient were carried on under mutual respect and reciprocity.
71
 
This was the standard practice prior to the age of empire. 
However, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, international legal thought 
began to assume a new dimension due to European imperialism. From this time law became 
viewed as man-made, not originating from a divine source, and considered as separate from 
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the morality and justice of Naturalism. Embodied in this new thought of legal Positivism was 
the evidential behavior of states in the international arena as the basis of law, and not law 
derived from an external agency. It was one in which state consent expressed in contractual 
agreements between two sovereign states became the accepted norm. This emergent 
Positivist legal thought was largely a shared practice amongst European states, derived from 
a common past, common values, with similar Christian inclinations, and one which regarded 
each other as sovereign.
72
These shared common legal ideas had their roots in Roman times 
even though traditionally the beginnings of the modern legal system are associated with the 
classical Westphalian Treaty of 1648.
73
 Over centuries, the methods of acquiring territory 
followed Roman normative concepts of res nullius (things without owners), and terra nullius 
(land without owners).
74
Subsequently, as European interests outside Europe increased before 
the age of empire, (1875-1914),
75
Roman era legal doctrines encapsulated under the concept 
of Discovery and its constitutive elements of rights of first discovery; effective occupation, 
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title rights, limited sovereignty, contiguity, terra nullius, Christianity, and conquest were 
deployed globally for territorial acquisition.
76
 In the age of empire, this new legal positivism 
came to the fore, and together with the concept of Discovery and its constitutive elements, 




2.2 Hierarchies of Sovereignties 
Though like naturalism, positivism regarded sovereign states as the subject of 
international law, but unlike naturalism, the emergent positivist notion of International law in 
the age of empire recognized only European states as sovereign. Using distinctions of 
civilised and non-civilised as characterisation, positivists purportedly expelled the non-
European states from legal internationalism, thereby clearly creating a regime of hierarchies 
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of states in the global system.
78
 This positivist notion created a structure of European 
superiority over others which ultimately supported a state of a few dominating so many 
viewed as inferior.  Essentially, the positivist hierarchical system placed the European states 
at the top and a myriad of other political systems globally regarded as lesser entities and 
societies at the bottom. These lesser societies were considered as lacking in organization and 
sovereignty. Thus, as Andrew Fitzmaurice has suggested, it was an idea of the world by 
Europeans which allowed them to justify empire by projecting European notions of 
sovereignty onto other societies viewed as less developed in relation to Europe.
79
 From this 
time, positivists theorists began to put forward ideas that naturalism could not possibly 
explain international law as a binding mechanism hinged on equality of states because, doing 
so, implied some measure of enforcement and order beyond the sovereign, which was an 
impossibility in a world of equal sovereign states. This new paradigm incorporated 
assumptions and aspirations that portrayed an imperial bent and its exponents manipulated it 
to serve specific imperial interests and endeavours.
80
 
 At the core of the positivists’ doctrine in relation to colonialism rests the idea that, 
European expansion and imperialism itself was central to the need for an international legal 
regime, to regulate relations between the European and non-European worlds in the emergent 
colonial confrontation. In the case of Britain, by the nineteenth century, expert legal 
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advocacy increased, calling on the application of legal instruments for colonisation.
81
As 
Heinhard Steiger has stated, what emerged from the positivists’ perspective was an 
international law of civilized European states borne out of the age of Enlightenment, an era 
which coincided with ideas for expansion overseas.
82
 Similarly, Chris Bayly has described 
the emergence of positivist international law as a phase of legal globalization, one of 
exporting European notions of law to other climes involving a process of interactions and 
connections which became manifest in the nineteenth century.
83
 In this light, David Kennedy 
has suggested that the positivists’ view of international law rooted the binding force of 
international law on the consent of sovereign states, predicated on a loose analogy to the 
private law of contract, expressed in sovereign consent through a laborious search of state 
practice or a catalog of agreements. He adds that, international legal positivism was simply 
the working out of the private law metaphor of contract for a public legal order. Chris Bayly 
also makes the point that, such earlier inter-European legal practices of contractual 
agreements, constituted the historical trends carried forward over time by Europeans to other 




Clearly, both Kennedy and Bayly were alluding to the fact that European society was 
beginning to see the substance and possibility of employing some means akin to contractual 
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agreements in forging relations with states outside Europe, in a manner consistent with prior  
inter – European practice of treaty-making and use. In the case of Great Britain, by the dawn 
of the nineteenth century, following the imposition of direct rule in India, positivism became 
the underpinning theory for the legitimization of expansion there and elsewhere. Championed 
by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin
85
, the dominant theme of positivist legal postulations in 
relation to colonialism was that, ‘the nation state was the exclusive source of rights, and that 




It must be noted that in the naturalist scheme of international law, the sovereign 
administered a system of natural law by which it was bound, whereas in contrast, positivism 
viewed the sovereign not only as the administrator and enforcer of the law, but that the law is 
a product of the sovereign will. As John Austin, the foremost spokesman of positivism at the 
time famously asserted: ‘laws properly so called are a species of commands, but being a 
command, every law properly so-called flow from a determinate source.’
87
 However, this 
notion of positivist international law, of the classification of states into hierarchies proved 
contradictory in how relations with others considered inferior and without sovereignty were 
to be streamlined in the age of empire. How would legal instruments such as treaties and 
contractual agreements be concluded and applied to Africans and others who have been 
characterised as uncivilised and lacking in social organization and sovereignty? To this end, 
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ideas and thinkers came to the rescue by providing notions on how best to structure relations 
with specifically Africans for purposes of treaty-making and to justify colonialism. 
2.3 Overcoming the Conundrum 
The determinate source of international law in the view of Austin and other positivists was 
not divine, but an earthly sovereign. This Positivist concept of law derived from an earthly 
sovereign contradicted Positivist hierarchical classification of the world. As noted above 
clearly, the classification of the non-European world as uncivilized and lacking capacity in 
organization and basic political institutions threw up a problematic. Given that treaties as 
indicated earlier can only be concluded with other sovereigns, how would this play out in 
practice if treaties were to be concluded with groups already classified as less politically 
sophisticated?  To overcome this hubris, positivist jurists of the age of empire formulated a 
grand redeeming scheme of bestowing recognition and sovereignty on indigenous leadership 
for purposes of treaty-making, by supposedly re-admitting expelled non-European groups 
back into the orbit of international society.
88
 African kings and chiefs were conceptualized as 
equal sovereigns to enter contracts. Legal thinkers like Travers Twiss offered a way out by 
strongly making a case for the use of treaties concluded with indigenous leadership 
recognized as sovereign heads, as the basis for acquiring political and sovereign rights for 
European powers.
89
 Innovative legal arguments were postulated to justify the use of treaties 
for the extension of European sovereignty over the non-European world.
90
 Thus, the notion 
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that others could possess rights only through possessing sovereignty extended to them by 
Europeans was promoted, implying that the societies that had hitherto been classified as 
lacking in sovereignty could possess some degree of law, and hence some level of 
sovereignty. It was a case of the Europeans now recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples 
or extending rights to Africans for purposes of concluding treaties.
91
 
Henceforth, positivists and imperialists adopted treaties as an international legal 
instrument and as a primary source to justify and legitimise empire-building, as treaties 
became viewed as expression of sovereign will. Law as emanating exclusively from a 
sovereign follows a long tradition notably espoused by renowned political philosophers such 
as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin.
92
 This Positivist legal methodology of the age of empire, 
of formulating innovations to justify colonialism engendered a movement towards 
abstractions – a propensity to throw up new ideas, concepts and categories, which were fine-
tuned and amended as a means of preserving order and resolving legal encumbrances.
93
 
Within the context of treaty-making and diplomatic colonisation of this study, it can 
be argued that legal positivism, with its elaborate vocabulary defining the European world 
and the other, constructed an international legal framework which was revised to recognize 
and accommodate African sovereigns with which treaty agreements were concluded as part 
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of the colonisation process. As Makau Wa Mutua has suggested, the application of positivist 
international law relating to this criteria for sovereignty rights bellies a convenient 
manipulation of the legal norms by the authors of the Scramble for Africa to serve their 
innate interests.
94
The adoption of treaties as valid legal instruments for territorial acquisition 
warranted the recognition of indigenous leadership as having the legal personality to 
conclude agreements. So that, even though the vocabulary of the time denigrated the non-
European world and presented the people of the other as unequal, legal positivism created the 
atmosphere for the wide use of treaties in the nineteenth century.
95
In the age of empire, 
positivism became generally accepted and provided the primary legal resource and 
explanation by jurists of the late nineteenth century to promote the use of and giving effect to 
treaties for colonialism, and formed one of the legal and ideological bedrocks that shaped 
European expansionism. In the case of Great Britain and the study areas, men on the spot, 
Consuls, and Vice-Consuls were vested with administrative and judicial powers by the 
imperial home government to conclude treaties and use such to gain dominion over 
indigenous peoples and ultimately incorporate their territories into the British Empire. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter briefly examined the legal ideological constructs that impinged on and shaped 
earlier and age of empire territorial acquisition enterprises of the European powers. Most 
importantly, it notes that legal doctrines from Roman times served to propagate modern 
colonialism, as a transmission of time-tested ideas of empire-building anchored on 
dominium, tutelage and imperium. In the earlier age, the doctrine of discovery and its 
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constitutive elements, ideas which were part of inter-European diplomatic practice, especially 
treaty-making were treated with utmost seriousness and applied as valid in relations with 
indigenous groups globally. By the age of empire, justifications for empire-building followed 
these earlier laid down precepts and were reinforced by legal scholarship at a time the 
dominant legal thought of Positivism excluded the non-European world from the realm of 
civilized and sovereign states. However, this conundrum of erasing the non-European world 
from the orbit of international law and sovereignty was resolved by granting paradoxically, 
recognition to the leadership of indigenous societies for purposes of treaty-making and other 
agreements. 
In the case of the British Empire, Travers Twiss, James Lorimer, and John Westlake, 
eminent legal scholars of the nineteenth century – the apogee of imperial expansion, lent 
their expertise and knowledge to the debates of the time and proffered acceptable 
interpretations and analyses of legal doctrines to governments,’ institutions and conferences 
on the value, viability and applicability of these theoretical constructs as suitable instruments 
for the legitimization of expansion. In particular, it was claimed that treaties concluded with 
indigenous chiefs and kings transferred political and sovereign rights to the imperial power. 
It can be argued that Positivist legal thought influenced and emboldened imperial 
bridgeheads, the men on the spot, traders, missionaries and later consuls, with the knowledge 
to apply treaties for territorial acquisition on behalf of the British Crown in the age of empire. 
As indicated in the ensuing case study chapters of this dissertation, in Nigeria, the treaties 
concluded with indigenous groups were utilised to proclaim protectorates and subsumed 
peoples and territories under imperial control. The next chapter gives an overview of the 
practical application of treaty-making for territorial acquisition by the British Empire to 
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illustrate the wide use of treaty instrument for territorial acquisition. Knowing this adds to 
our understanding of the legal context and application of legal tools for colonisation globally 
and specifically in relation to the case studies of this dissertation. It demonstrates that the 
trend of treaty-making and its usefulness for empire-building had long been recognized by 
the British before the Scramble for Africa. Most importantly, it must be noted that these legal 
and ideological doctrines examined here served to propagate both ancient and modern 
colonialism. It was a transmission of time-tested ideas of empire-building anchored on 





















Chapter Three: British Treaty-Making before the Scramble: An Overview 
 
Introduction 
The legal discourse in chapter two, especially on the application of legal tools for 
colonisation, played out significantly in Great Britain’s empire-building endeavours in 
Nigeria, as indicated in the ensuing case study chapters. However, the use of treaties for 
colonisation, and the role of men on the spot driving the process through diplomacy, had 
already been exercised before the age of empire. This chapter draws out how legal 
instruments – treaty-making, as a means of territorial acquisition was practically applied in 
the specific case of Great Britain’s expansion globally. For this dissertation, it is important to 
understand how the practical implementation of treaty-making for colonisation through 
‘bridgeheads’ developed over time in British imperial enterprise before its application in the 
Lower Niger areas. This indicates that, treaty-making and use was one of the preferred tools 
of the British in their expansionary and territorial acquisition venture from earlier times, and 
that by the time of its application in the Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, it 
had become a mastered, progressive and growing trend which had been tried out in North 
America, Asia, Australasia and elsewhere in Africa.
96
 The treaties used in the Niger Delta, 
and the British methods of acquiring treaties, were heavily influenced, not just by the legal 
theory outlined in the previous chapter, but by this legal history of the application of treaties 
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before the Scramble. Knowing this helps to contextualise the argument of the role of treaties 
and peaceful colonisation of this study, and also illuminate historians understanding of the 
transition from informal imperialism to formal empire in the Niger Basin, as in the case with 
China, where treaties were used and adapted to suit both forms of empire-building.
97
 
 The specific overviews of Great Britain’s colonisation of Canada, New Zealand, and 
other aspects of Africa indicate how the British Empire employed the treaty-making 
mechanism frequently and effectively (from their own perspective). In these instances, a 
myriad of imperial interests hinged on land for settlement, trade concerns, and above all 
pacification and gaining of sovereign rights and ultimate control played out simultaneously, 
so that, the treaties concluded with these groups served multiple purposes. However, despite 
the differing circumstances of each case as indicated, the treaty-making practice followed a 
common approach whereby, the contracting parties were officials of the British Crown  (men 
on the spot) or other representatives of the imperial power (Chartered Companies) on one 
hand, and the kings, chiefs, and representatives of the indigenous peoples who, more often 
than not, did not fully understand the contents of the treaties, but affixed their marks to the 
documents, which ultimately transferred political and sovereign rights to the imperial power. 
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These treaties, once concluded formed the basis for all future actions taken by the imperial 
power to acquire the lands of indigenous peoples for settlement and eventual colonisation.
98
 
 Given that colonisation was essentially about acquiring land, imposition of law and 
control, wherever treaties were concluded by imperial powers with indigenous groups, the 
treaties often served to legalise and validate the encounter process. Whether cession or trade 
treaties, they often contained clauses which took away the peoples’ rights to their territories 
and bestowed sovereign rights on the imperial power over the indigenous groups. Even 
though European treaty-making processes have been dismissed in some quarters as 
fraudulent and unequal, in a recent study, the point has been made that, Europeans promoted 
treaty-making to give justification to their means of acquiring land than were conquest or 
occupation, and that they had recognized its importance as a way to reconcile expansion with 
moral and legal considerations.
99
 
This overview indicates that British treaty-making served as a first step for the 
expropriation of indigenous lands, and to formal colonisation. To this end, British treaties in 
Canada, the treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, and treaty-making in aspects of Africa 
before the Scramble, examined here, further underscores the cogency of the argument in this 
study in relation to treaty-making and peaceful colonisation in the Western Lower Niger. 
3.1 Treaty-Making in Canada 
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Great Britain’s acquisition of Canada and its transformation into a settler colony represents a 
legacy of inter-imperial diplomatic and military rivalries, grand treaty settlements between 
imperial powers and treaty-making between imperial powers and indigenous peoples. The 
elements of the doctrine of Discovery were applied broadly by Great Britain to gain 
dominion over indigenous peoples in North America. The various commercial compacts, 
friendship treaties and treaties which ceded indigenous territories to the French and later the 
British at different times followed age-old inter-European territorial acquisition patterns. 
From 1497 when the first English settlement of Newfoundland was inaugurated, Great 
Britain’s expansion was accelerated by imperial agents and specifically by the trading and 
land acquisition activities of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC).
100
 
 In the age of discovery and trade in North America, contending European powers, 
especially Britain and France scrambled for treaties of commerce and diplomatic association 
with indigenous peoples. This inter-imperial rivalry for control of North America, swept in a 
swathe of indigenous groups in Canada into its machinations.
101
Whereas the treaties of 
commerce were imperial-indigenous settlements for trade advantages, the diplomatic treaties 
of alliance, of peace and friendship according to James Rodger Miller were for inter-imperial 
conflicts and alliances, as both the French and the British coveted the friendship of 
indigenous peoples.
102
 It was in the aftermath of one such inter-imperial hostility, the Seven 
Years’ War between France and Britain for dominance in North America, which began in 
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1756 that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 came into being. Regarded as the beginning of 
formal British colonisation in Canada, this imperial instrument would later have significant 
impact on British – Indigenous relations and the treaty-making regime in Canada. First, it 
enabled the British to gain swathes of land from the French.
103
 Secondly, it paved the way for 
the negotiation of territorial treaties between indigenous peoples and the British who craved 
access to land for settlement, culminating ultimately in the Canadian Confederation of 
1867.
104
 All subsequent British actions after the Royal Proclamation up to Confederation 
were transitional moves from informal control to formal colonisation.
105
 
 Clearly, in Canada, Great Britain relied on treaties concluded with indigenous groups 
as valid instruments for proclaiming the Canadian Confederation. This pattern was similarly 
applied in relation to the case study areas of this dissertation when, after the Berlin 
Conference, the Niger Districts were proclaimed on the strength of concluded treaties with 
indigenous peoples of the area. Another discernible feature of Great Britain’s expansion in 
Canada was the role of the Charter Company, HBC. As it later turned out in the case of the 
Royal Niger Company in the Western Delta (chapter six), the HBC played a significant role 
in concluding treaties with indigenous groups for land acquisition.
106
The HBC’s territories 
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were later handed over to the Crown as formal control intensified, just as the territories of the 
RNC in Nigeria were handed over to the Crown in 1899. The interplay of treaty-making and 
chartered companies acting on behalf of the imperial power were clearly tried and tested 
patterns of colonisation before their application in the Niger Basin. 
 As explored in the previous chapters, the dominant European view of territories and 
homelands of indigenous peoples as free for the taking was hinged on racial characterisations 
which, presupposed that the Europeans were bringing civilization and prosperity to these 
places and peoples.
107
As a demonstration of pacific colonial expansion through treaty 
diplomacy, the general picture of British treaty-making in Canada encompassing the period 
of the granting of the Charter to the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1670 to Confederation in 
1867 showcased how commercial agreements, diplomatic compacts and territorial treaties 
were used to achieve absolute propriety of indigenous territories. The various agreements 
followed a similar pattern with the indigenous peoples viewing them as basically friendship 
ententes, while British perceptions were characterized by subtle and veiled intents of land 
cession, appropriation and ultimate colonisation.
108
W. E. Daugherty has noted that, even 
though they were styled treaties of Peace and Friendship, most of the treaties began with the 
words ‘Articles of Peace and Submission.’
109
This was a clear indication of the true desires of 
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the British to employ subtle and ‘peaceful’ means to bring the indigenous peoples under its 
control. 
 On the whole, British treaty-making enterprise in Canada metamorphosed from peace 
and friendship treaties to land cession treaties, a process which was intensified after the 
proclamation, as imperial officials such as, Robinson, Douglas, and later Sir William Johnson 
of the British Indian Department, acting as imperial bridgeheads, concluded several land 
surrender treaties with various indigenous groups along the Great Lakes Basin.
110
The 
significance of these imperial bridgeheads in the light of peaceful colonisation through treaty 
diplomacy in this study was that, it was the case of imperial officials contracting on behalf of 
the British Crown with the objective of securing sovereignty rights over the territories of the 
indigenous peoples through the concluded treaties. This trend of men on the spot, driving the 
imperial cause and course, would play out in similar manner in Great Britain’s treaty-making 
encounters with the study groups as indicated in the ensuing chapters. Clearly, treaty-making 
with indigenous groups played a central role in Great Britain’s eventual colonisation of 
Canada, and this pattern of treaty-making in Canada was exported and applied in Great 
Britain’s encounters with the study groups of the Western Lower Niger.  
3.2 Acquiring New Zealand with the Treaty of Waitangi 
New Zealand is significant amongst British possessions in the age of discovery and settler 
colonisation as one in which Britain secured sovereignty over it in 1840 through a cession 
                                                          
110
 John Borrows, ‘Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-
Government,’ in Michael Asch (Ed), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and 
Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997); David L. Schmidt and Balcom, 
B. A., ‘The Reglement of 1739: A Note on Micmac Law and Literacy,’ Acadiensis, 23, no.1, 1993; Robert J. 
Surtees, ‘The Robinson Treaties,’ Treaty Research Report, Treaties and Historical Research Centre Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada, 1986; W. E. Daugherty, ‘Maritime Indian Treaties In Historical Perspective,’ Treaties 
and Historical Research Centres, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, 1983. 
55 
 
treaty – (the treaty of Waitangi), concluded with several indigenous Maori chiefs, and not by 
outright military conquest. Here, a chain of events involving men on the spot, and indigenous 
agency led to the transfer of land through treaty from the Maori to the British, just as it was 
in North America and Australia.
111
Propelled by trade and the possibility of settling the land 
on the basis of discovery, with a perception of the indigenous peoples as backwards, the 
arrival of James Cook in 1769 increased English presence in New Zealand 
thereafter.
112
British – Maori contacts and encounters progressed with little or no altercations 
except an incident involving a sailing ship in December 1809.
113
 
 As with the case in Nigeria and elsewhere, the perspective that Britain’s expansionist 
desires alone cannot account for the chain of events which led to colonisation of groups 
globally by the British Empire is tangible. In this case of New Zealand, just because it is not 
clear that Maori signatories knew what they signed, or that the power dynamics did not 
favour the indigenous peoples, historians of New Zealand have not ignored the treaty-making 
process, as Nigerian scholars have done. Indeed, New Zealand historians, demonstrate how 
valuable it can be to study colonial treaties. In 1831, a Petition by Maori Chiefs called for 
British protection, having been devastated by three decades of internal conflagrations in 
which, up to one-fifth of their population died. Thus, the Maori called for British intervention 
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to stem the chaos and violence in their domain.
114
 This move inadvertently gave the imperial 
power a chance to interfere in the internal affairs of the indigenous people and use such to 
foster their own agenda of colonisation. As Robinson and Gallagher have noted, in the course 
of European colonisation, there were instances where, often the colonised were collaborators 
in their own subordination, through their friendly and welcoming disposition to the 
encroachment of the imperial powers.
115
This argument can be extended to this case of the 
Maori for British intervention in their internal affairs. As indicated in the case study chapters, 
this trend played out in Great Britain’s encounters with Lower Niger groups too. 
 Like the case of the HBC in Canada, and the Royal Niger Company (RNC) in the 
study areas, a chartered company, the New Zealand Company (NZC), also acted on behalf of 
Great Britain in the colonisation of New Zealand. In the early nineteenth century, in order to 
protect its trading interests, the company called on the home government to assume a 
frontline position on Maori-Settler relations.
116
 The appointment of the first British official 
Resident, James Busby in 1833, set in motion, the actions of the British man on the spot. 
Between 1834 and 1835, acting on behalf of Great Britain, Busby talked some Maori chiefs 
of the Northern Tribes to adopt a flag and conclude an agreement for a Declaration of 
independence for New Zealand. This was to be a Confederation of united tribes and 
represents an important peaceful step towards the eventual conclusion of the treaty of 
Waitangi. The 34 Maori chiefs, who ended up signing the declaration on 28
th
 October 
1835,not only thanked Great Britain for recognizing their flag, but also called on the Crown 
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to become the father and protector of the Maori.
117
 Busby regarded this agreement as 
significant in stopping other European powers from making in-roads into New Zealand, and 
his effort, again, remains a pointer to the role of men on ground, driving the imperial agenda, 
and influencing the course of events through their ideas and actions on behalf of the imperial 
power. 
 Great Britain’s colonisation of New Zealand represents a classic application of the 
discovery element of title rights through treaties. A legal tool deployed for peaceful 
colonisation by an imperial power. To transition from informal control to formal colonisation 
in New Zealand, the Colonial Office dispatched William Hobson to New Zealand as 
Lieutenant Governor, with a charge to bring the whole of the Pacific Island under British 
sovereignty with the consent of as many Maori chiefs as possible.
118
Hobson left England in 
August 1839 to carry out this directive and arrived New Zealand on 29 January 1840. With 
assistance from Busby, Hobson concluded on 6February, the treaty of Waitangi (versions in 
English-language and Maori-language), with Maori chiefs on the grounds of Busby’s official 
quarters at Waitangi.
119
European witnesses from varied places also signed each copy of the 
treaty, so that at the end of 1840, New Zealand became to all intents and purposes, a de-facto 
Crown colony of Britain with Hobson as Governor.
120
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By November, Hobson assumed the usual powers and prerogatives as Governor, was 
assisted by an executive council, and constituted a legislative body with full powers to make 
laws and enact ordinances for the peace, order and good governance of New Zealand.
121
 
Within the context of treaty diplomacy and peaceful colonisation of this study, Great 
Britain’s acquisition of New Zealand reflects once again the carry over and application of the 
heritage of treat-making for territorial acquisition and for imperium and dominion. With the 
declaration of British sovereignty over the territory by Lieutenant Governor William Hobson 
in May 1840, it represents a manifestation of British imperialism which had followed earlier 
traditions such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 in Canada, in which the Crown explicitly 
took possession of indigenous territories through purchase or cession treaty. The treaty of 
Waitangi expressly stated providing protection for the Maori. Within the context of European 
legalistic notions of what protection entails, it meant the imperial power assuming full 
political rights over the people in all ramifications. Next is an examination of British 
expropriation of indigenous territories elsewhere in Africa before the general Scramble 
through treaty-making.  
3.3 British Treaty-Making Narrative in Africa 
In aspects of Africa, the practical implementation of the legalistic context of colonialism also 
played out long before the start of the Scramble for Africa and its intensification after the 
Berlin Conference. Even in Nigeria, the very first Crown Colony of Lagos was instituted 
through a combination of conquest and a treaty. While British gun-boat diplomacy against 
Lagos in 1851was engendered by a need to stop ongoing slave trading activities, the 
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annexation proper in 1861 was achieved through a cession treaty with King Dosunmu.
122
This 
treaty to all intents and purposes subsumed Lagos under British control, was a precursor to 
future treaty-making in the Nigeria area, and represented the first step towards the formal 
take-over of Nigeria by the British.
123
Clearly, despite their military capacity the British 
resorted to a treaty with Lagos because of a need for form and legality in the colonisation 
process.
124
The point to note here within the context of the application of the legalities 
discussed in chapter two is that, the treaty-making episode with Lagos represents a heritage 
of old European tradition of treaties as a means of establishing title over territory.
125
The 
significance here is that, the treaty served the purpose of giving Great Britain recognition 
over its control of Lagos internally and externally. 
Elsewhere in Africa, treaty-making and use was equally an important part of conquest 
before the general Scramble. Given that British imperial interests everywhere were primarily 
shaped by early commercial opportunities, in Southern Africa, trade concerns were 
reinforced by the strategic importance of the Cape towards safeguarding the sea route to 
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India and the Far East.
126
 This much was echoed by British Admiral Pringle who warned in 
1795 that the Cape should not be allowed to be controlled by the Dutch; because they were 
‘more likely to rob us of India than to secure it to us.’
127
As in the case with Lagos and 
Dahomey, in relation to fears of French encroachment,
128
British actions to consolidate its 
hold in Southern Africa were dictated by imperial rivalry. In this instance, inter-imperial 
agreements between the British and the Dutch, the earlier settlers in South Africa, led to 
Great Britain’s conquest in 1795.
129
 With time, several land related treaties were concluded 
with the indigenous Xhosa for territorial appropriation. However, in Southern Africa, the 
dynamics of the settler system and indigenous reactions meant that treaty-making alone could 
not be relied on for colonisation. Rather, Great Britain’s eventual colonisation of all parts of 
South Africa was more through force than through the diplomacy of treaty-making. 
Nevertheless, again, the point stressed here is that, even in cases where violent conquest 
characterized the imposition of imperial rule, treaties remained important instruments 
justifying the legality of the process as it was in South Africa. 
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 Similarly, in the Gold Coast, an interplay of treaty-making, diplomacy, and war 
characterized Great Britain’s empire-building efforts. Here, treaties were employed not just 
as title rights for colonialism, but to ward off an African empire, the Ashanti Kingdom.
130
In 
this instance, treaty-making episodes between Great Britain and the indigenous people, 
particularly the Fante, were a common feature in the decades leading up to the annexation of 
their territories in 1874.
131
These treaties with the Fante should not be read as simply part of 
violent conquest. The commercial and diplomatic relationship between the British and the 
Fante people (one of a number of indigenous groups in the Gold Coast, the other being the 
more prominent Ashanti), from about 1830 to the establish of a Crown Colony in 1874, 
depended on a long-established tradition of indigenous African negotiation and treaty-
making involving imperial bridgeheads - merchants and administrators.
132
In other words, 
local Fante actively embraced economic and political links with the British because of the 
greater immediate threat from the Ashanti Kingdom. After the defeat of the Ashanti by 
British forces, a treaty was concluded in which the Ashanti recognized British dominion and, 
importantly, the independence (from the Ashanti) of other smaller indigenous states. The 
significance of these treaty-making episodes by the British again, points to importance of 
treaty diplomacy, given that, with the treaties, the imperial power indicated claims to land 
rights and political sovereignty. It also is an important demonstration of the mutual benefits 
which participants thought they could achieve through strengthening ties through treaties. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
This brief overview of the British Empire’s treaty-making enterprise prior to the Scramble 
attempted to give an understanding of the different circumstances but common approach 
employed in empire-building globally. It has been demonstrated that in areas of British 
interests such as in Canada, New Zealand, and in aspects of Africa, treaty-making was 
employed side by side with force as an important step and tool in the colonisation process. 
By the time of the general Scramble for Africa, the application of treaty-making for 
colonisation was a trend that was only carried forward from earlier practice. In these 
instances of Canada, New Zealand, and Africa, the role of men on the spot, and chartered 
companies and their agents driving the imperial agenda was also a common feature, just as 
economic and political conditions on ground in the indigenous societies served as a pointer to 
indigenous agency in the colonisation process. These dimensions of imperial-indigenous 
relationships would play out significantly in the case study areas of this research as indicated 
in the ensuing chapters. It is worth noting that, Great Britain’s deployment of treaty-making 
in colonialism was quite pervasive and not limited only to the examples given here. In some 
instances, as in Hong Kong, the treaties served both to end wars and as instruments for land 
appropriation.
133
 It was interplay of trade concessions, war and treaty diplomacy combining 
to enable Britain gain eventual control.  
 The next five chapters examined the direct application of treaty-making and peaceful 
colonisation by the British in the case study areas of the Western Lower Niger. The 
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Protectorate treaties concluded by the officials and agents of Great Britain as well as the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC), between 1884 and 1896, some of which Goldie on behalf of 
the British Empire, rushed to, and presented at the Berlin Conference as evidence of British 
effective presence in the Lower Niger region served to indicate the central place of treaty 
diplomacy in Great Britain’s colonisation of the study groups. Derivative acquisition through 
treaties of cession was the prominent mode of expropriation rather than primitive acquisition 
hinged on force. Premised on the basis of these case studies of the Western Lower Niger, the 
central place of treaty-making and less of violent colonisation within the context of British 
expansion in the age of empire was examined against existing perspectives on conquest by 
historians of Nigeria. In the discourse, the case studies examined the treaty-making 
processes, the pacification of the territories by the British using the treaties, and highlighted 
instances where force was applied. Clearly, from the evidence as demonstrated in the case 
studies, treaty-making and peaceful diplomacy was the principal pattern of Great Britain’s 















Chapter Four: The British and the Itsekiri 
 
It is hereby notified for public information, that under and by virtue of certain 
Treaties concluded between the month of July last and the present date, and by other 
lawful means, the territories on the West Coast of Africa, here-in-after referred to as 
the Niger Districts, were placed under the Protection of Her Majesty’s the Queen 
from the date of the said Treaties respectively…The measures in course of 
preparation for the administration of justice and the maintenance of peace and good 





This proclamation in the London Gazette of 1885, exemplifies the use of treaties as a tool for 
colonisation by Great Britain in the age of empire. This chapter focuses on the beginning of 
Great Britain’s treaty-making episodes in the region with the Itsekiri. The various 
Protectorate treaties concluded with indigenous groups bestowed on officials of Great Britain 
sovereign and political rights and served to legitimise acquisition of the Western Lower 
Niger. Ideological and legal constructs underpinning the practice of treaty-making for 
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colonisation anchored on legal positivism as has been indicated and discussed, provided the 
impetus for imperial powers to deploy treaty-making and use in the colonial enterprise. This 
tradition of treaties for colonisation that had been applied in Canada, New Zealand, and 
elsewhere in Africa before the Scramble, easily became a means of choice for Great Britain 
in its relations with the study groups. Treaties cleared the way for the application of other 
means of pacification. Thus, this chapter and the next four sorted out the larger role of treaty-
making by Great Britain with the case study groups, that is; Western Ijo, the Urhobo, Isoko 
and Ukwuani. The processes of the various Protectorate treaties concluded between officials 
of Great Britain and the kings and chiefs of the peoples, beginning with the Itsekiri treaty of 
1884,provides the springboard for the discourse. 
 A close analysis of the events surrounding Great Britain’s relations with the Itsekiri, 
and subsequent encounters with the other groups debunks the view that Great Britain’s 
expansion in Nigeria was essentially a narrative of conquest by force of arms.
135
In such 
narratives, Great Britain’s encounter with the Itsekiri in particular, often begins with the so 
called spectacular episode of a British Naval and military offensive against the Itsekiri trader-
chief, Nana Olomu in 1894. Indeed, the British military interaction with Nana is one of the 
only aspects of regional conquest which usually gets mentioned in this scholarship; with the 
assumption made that what happened there was typical.
136
 The evidence does not support this 
singular narrative. The beginning of Great Britain’s relation with the Itsekiri predates the 
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events of the military expedition against Nana. Moreover, as has been noted in the 
introduction to this study, Great Britain’s formal colonisation of the study groups involved 
not just treaty-making as a form of peaceful diplomacy but equally discernible was the role 
of men on the spot, driving the colonial agenda, by immersing themselves in the politics of 
the indigenous societies. Again, as has been indicated in the introduction, imperial officials 
often embarked on Intel-gathering in a peaceful manner towards a better understanding of the 
indigenous peoples. This colonial knowledge of the people also played out in the encounter 
process as well as the local conditions of the indigenous societies which engendered in some 
cases indigenous collaboration in the process of colonisation. Essentially, agency has been 
explained by Jon E. Wilson as how a people have the power to act in a self-directing way, a 
free capacity to do things for themselves.
137
This trend indicates that British expansionist 
ideas alone could not account for the chain of events and developing relations between the 
imperial power and the indigenous peoples. Why Great Britain wanted the treaties cannot be 
extricated from the ideological underpinnings surrounding European legal ideas of treaty-
making and colonisation as has been discussed in chapters two and three. However, it is safe 
to say that British recourse to treaties was perhaps connected with an incapacity for 
comprehensive military conquest of the areas, reinforced by a love for legal form and 
tradition carried forward over time. Itsekiri themselves, under intense economic and political 
pressure from Nana, seem to have actively embraced protection from Britain, and so 
colonisation was largely peaceful in nature. 
In light of the foregoing, this chapter presents the encounters between the Itsekiri and 
the British in proper perspective, exploring the early contacts between the peoples and the 
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officials of Great Britain, the later treaty-making episodes, texts and follow up of the treaties 
leading up to the incorporation of the territories of this group into what emerged as the 
British protectorates of the Niger Districts, The Oil Rivers, Niger Coast, Southern Nigeria 
and eventually, the colony and protectorate of Nigeria between 1884 and 1914. The chapter 
reveals that, the British resorted to treaty-making for colonisation as an old tradition of 
legalising territorial acquisition. The encounters with the Itsekiri were generally of a peaceful 
nature driven by men on the spot. Save for the episode of the attack on Nana, (who was 
himself a British-appointed Governor of the Benin River), the two treaties with the Itsekiri in 














4.1 European Perceptions and Early History 
Early European encounters with indigenous peoples yielded the first written descriptions of 
the territories and the peoples, accounts which documented the ethnography and geography 
of the area.
139
This trend of intelligence collecting as has been noted in the introduction, 
represented a need by early European traders and  imperial agents to know more about the 
people, especially their topography, and human information so as to, as Tony Ballantyne has 
suggested, exert mastery over the indigenous society, its natural and human resources and its 
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 Much of the information for this section are drawn from existing studies 
based on ethnographic data of the Itsekiri, collected by British officials.
141
This collection of 
information represents an important part in understanding the argument of peaceful 
colonisation in this study, and ties in with suggestions earlier noted that empire-building was 
itself a cultural project of control, through peaceful knowledge of the ways and means of the 
people. 
 The significance of European knowledge-gathering is exemplified by the very name 
of the people. In European accounts of the era of contact, it is not uncommon to see 
references to the Itsekiri as ‘Oere,’ ‘Ouere,’ ‘Aweri,’ ‘Owerri,’ ‘Jekri,’ ‘Zekri,’ and ‘Jakri,’ 
and even as Warri and Benin, given that European contact with them took place on the banks 
of the Benin River.
142
However, locals refer to themselves as the itsekiri or iwere; their 
neighbours, the Urhobo, refer to them as the irhobo – a term which characterises people who 
float on water; while the Ijo call them selemo. The Itsekiri speak a dialect of the language of 
the Yoruba, a larger indigenous group in South Western Nigeria. The Yoruba language is 
quite different from the languages spoken by all of the other groups, and thus the Itsekiri are 
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culturally quite different from the other groups discussed in this dissertation. Despite this a 
leading ethnographer has described them as, borrowing many traits from their neighbours.
143
 
Itsekiri origin legends speak of multiple places of origin and several eponymous 
ancestors, as most of the settlements which make up the kingdom have their own origin 
accounts. From what is known about Itsekiri precolonial history from indigenous histories 
and early European ethnographic accounts, there are various myths, but a generally accepted 
charter emerged in the form of the Iginuwa legend, regarded as the founder and first Olu 
(King). He is said to have migrated from the Kingdom of Benin, where he was the son of the 
Oba, escorted by a retinue of chiefs, and settled at Ode Itsekiri, the head town of the Itsekiri 
in the Western Delta. Here, Iginuwa is said to have developed the kingship institution which 
lasted until the interregnum of 1848.
144
 An historian of Benin, J. Egharevba, using the oral 
traditions of the people, has suggested that the movement of Iginuwa and his party from 
Benin took place at about the last two decades of the fifteenth century.
145
 Subsequent 
expansion from Ode Itsekiri birthed several other settlements scattered in the maze of the 
creeks, around the estuaries of the Benin and Escravos Rivers. These includes: Gbolokposo, 
Batere, Obodo, Orere, Elume, Orugbo, Jakpa, Omadino, Irigbo, Inorin, Ureju, Ugborodo, 
Kantu, Jaghala, Koko, Obitugbo, and Ebrohimi (Nana’s enclave).  
Recent pre-colonial Itsekiriland, though not a static society, was a patrilineal one in 
which adult males of communities traced their descent from the patrilineal founder of the 
settlement. Upon his death, a male member of a community could only be succeeded by his 
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eldest son, who traditionally inherits a double share of what belonged to his father, and also 
took possession of all authority and objects which symbolized his father’s headship of the 
family and any other vested office. This crystallized in Nana’s succession to the 
‘Governorship of the Benin River’ upon the death of his father Olomu in 1883.
146
 
When the British first encountered the Itsekiri, they had a centralized monarchical 
state system with the Olu (King) at the head, and this system remains today, interrupted only 
in the period of interregnum from 1848 to 1936, a period which coincided with British 
colonialism. Understanding this and subsequent developments in Itsekiri encounters with 
Great Britain, illuminates the internal political events of the period, especially as it affected 
trade, treaty-making and British follow up actions. The Itsekiri political culture appears to be 
similar to the neighbouring Benin kingship institution.
147
 This certainly gives more credence 
to the Iginuwa origin legend from Benin. In the administration of the kingdom, the Olu was 
supported by varied titled chiefs in charge of different aspects of the life of the people and 
society. Prominent amongst these chiefs were the Ologbotsere (Prime Minister and chief 
adviser of the Olu), and the Iyatsere (the war chief or defense minister of the state). In 
Itsekiriland, chieftaincy titles were distributed and conferred by the Olu on individuals on 
discretionary basis, and such chiefs so appointed, wore large necklaces of coral beads as a 
sign of office and used the appellation of his title.
148
 The chiefs met as a council and 
outcomes of their meetings were passed on to the Olu often as advice on general governance. 
Administration at village and outlying settlements were associated with two important 
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officials: the chief priest and the oldest male in the village or settlement. The oldest male was 
often the village head, and usually the head of the descent-group of the villages or 
settlements. He presided over meetings and settled all matters brought before him, but lacked 
ritual powers, so that if there was need within the village or settlement to consult a diviner, to 
administer an oath or to take a decision based on super natural considerations, he deferred to 
the chief priest, who in-turn consulted the deities and oracles of the village for decisions.
149
 
However, in the absence of an Olu during the period of interregnum, it was chiefs, wealthy 
traders and heads of families that signed the two treaties the British concluded with the 
Itsekiri in 1884 and 1894. 
 On the whole, the general picture of Itsekiri socio-political system up to the age of 
empire was one in which, the Olu and his council of chiefs acted as a court of appeal for 
cases from the villages and other settlements, indicative that despite centralised kingship, 
Itsekiri settlements seemed to have enjoyed some degree of local independence.
150
 The 
implication of the relative independence of the villages was that, even though the Itsekiri 
political system was a monarchy, it was not an absolute institution. The foregoing outline of 
the socio-political history of the Itsekiri and that of the other groups in subsequent chapters 
is, not so much to reconstruct the exact historical beginnings of the peoples and their 
institutions, but to shed light on them in relation to the dynamics and vicissitudes that 
occurred in these societies as they encountered the British Empire. In turn, this helps 
illuminate the negotiation between the British and Itsekiri, revealing the agency of both in 
shaping the process of colonisation, one which was not primarily governed by violence. 
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 For the Itsekiri, certain trends occurred prior to contact with Great Britain which 
impacted relations. This came in the form of changes in their political and economic fortunes, 
developments which attracted British attention, interests and actions. As the map indicating 
the contiguity of the groups’ shows, the Itsekiri are geographically proximate with the 
Atlantic coast, occupying the north-western extreme of the Western Lower Niger, an area 
crisscrossed by the Niger’s distributaries, the Escravos and Forcados.
151
The Itsekiri are 
bordered on the north-west and north by the Yoruba sub-tribe of Ilaje and the Apoi Ijo, as 
well as by the Edo (Benin Kingdom) respectively. They share a common boundary with the 
Western Ijo to their south, while their Urhobo neighbours flank them in the east. Early 
European presence in the Niger Basin in the form of Portuguese contacts with the Itsekiri in 
early fifteenth century laid the foundations for trade and future developments in the Western 
lower Niger. By late fifteenth century, the Itsekiri and the other case study groups became 
involved in the emergent overseas trade in slaves, and the subsequent palm oil trade.
152
 A 
common feature of intergroup relations between the indigenous groups was rivalry over 
trade, especially as some groups were better located to reap from trade with the emergent 
Europeans on the coast than others.
153
 This was the case with the Itsekiri who as a coastal 
group, found themselves, together with the Ijo as middlemen in European-hinterland contacts 
from the slave trade era through to the nineteenth century when palm oil became the central 
commodity of trade.
154
 This history of early Itsekiri trade links with Europeans from the 
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slave trade era must be understood as an important primer for subsequent relations with the 
British. Trade was associated with significant local financial gains, albeit also bringing some 
political consequences in the form of instability to the region generally in the wake of 
imperial expansion. For the Itsekiri, the fact that they had a relatively clear political system 
also proved significant in their relations with the British, as it impacted the ways Britain 
considered ‘sovereignty’ in the areas. In each case, the relations and encounters each of the 
various groups had with officials of Great Britain in the age of empire were, largely dictated 
by both this history and the immediate interplay of trade and politics. This relationship took 
roots from the slave trade era and intensified from 1849 when Britain inaugurated consular 
diplomacy to oversee its interests in the Bight of Benin.
155
 
4.2 Political Situation in 1800s and Rise of British Influence 
While European powers had traded with the region from the slave era, in the nineteenth 
century, as the palm oil trade intensified, the British became increasingly conversant with the 
internal political system of the Itsekiri which seemed largely to be understood as ‘sovereign,’ 
within the framework of positivist legal assumptions earlier discussed in chapter two. Thus, 
by mid nineteenth century, deep political instability in Itsekiriland allowed an increasingly 
imperialistic Britain to make in-roads into Itsekiri society, and change the relationship 
considerably, albeit largely peacefully. Increased British influence began when the Itsekiri 
suffered the fate of losing their King, Olu Akengbuwa, in June 1848. It was an unfortunate 
development for the Itsekiri at this time.
156
Matters were made worse when a few days after 
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the passing of the Olu, his two sons, Omateye and Ejo, who were most likely to succeed him 
also died mysteriously. This threw up internal divisions within the royal family as to who 
should succeed to the throne, as there was no longer a clear successor with the support and 
financial means considered necessary.
157
 It was this situation that John Beecroft, the first 
British consul for the Bights of Benin, exploited diplomatically to interfere in the internal 
political affairs of the people. It is instructive to know a bit more about John Beecroft, how 
he came to serve the imperial cause as its first official bridgehead in the Niger Basin, and his 
motivations, to better understand his role in Great Britain’s expansion into Itsekiriland and 
subsequently into the other groups. 
 John Beecroft joined the Crown service at Fernando Po in 1829 as superintendent of 
works at a time the Gulf of Guinea Island was under Spanish control, but a place where Great 
Britain had established a base for the suppression of the slave trade. Bringing his earlier 
career experience in the merchant service to bear, Beecroft contributed to the building of 
docks and shore installations requisite for combating the slave trade. However, his usefulness 
to the British Crown crystalised when in the 1830s, from Fernando Po, he successfully 
ascended the Niger getting as far as Raba, about 400 miles from the coast (a rare feat before 
the introduction of quinine). This was at a time; the British were desirous to know more 
about the hinterlands. Through this exploration, Beecroft was able to gain good 
understanding of the Delta terrain and also seems to have developed very positive relations 
with indigenous peoples. In fact, in the 1840s, he helped to resolve a dispute between Duke 
Ephraim, a leading chief of Old Calabar and the leadership of the European settlement at 
Fernando Po. The chief had threatened to starve the Island, which depended on Old Calabar, 
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for its food supplies and Beecroft negotiated a peaceful resolution between both 
parties.
158
This feat fetched him recognition back in Britain, as the most knowledgeable and 
influential European on the Niger Basin.
159
 Consequently in 1849, Lord Palmerston, the then 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appointed him as the British Consul of the 
Bights of Benin and Biafra, to oversee British commercial interests, a position he occupied 
until his death in 1854.
160
 
 Beecroft approached his new task with awareness that British occupation of West 
Africa was threatened by rival imperial powers, particularly the French. Thus, here was a 
believer in colonialism ready to extend British influence beyond the coasts. British influence 
in the Niger Basin was at best superficial; his mission was to change this. Thus, from 1850, 
while visiting all the areas under his jurisdiction, from Lagos in the west to Bimbia in the 
Cameroons, Beecroft would read aloud his commission to show the indigenous leaders that 
he was the de facto accredited official of Great Britain by whose authority he interfered in 
their internal matters.
161
Clearly Beecroft’s original mandate in the Niger Basin to end the 
slave trade, imbued him with a sense of responsibility, perhaps within the context of Euro-
centric perceptions of the ‘others,’ to enthusiastically carry out his new mandate of imperial 
expansion. As indicated subsequently, his involvement in indigenous affairs, disrupted the 
local power dynamics, as he applied his conviction of himself as the man on the spot on 
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behalf of the imperial power to relate with the Itsekiri, thereby gradually extending informal 
British control over the people. 
 Beecroft immersed himself in the indigenous system and before long, was engaged in 
subtle and peaceful means of exerting British influence on the people, to the extent that he 
was able to influence Itsekiri chiefs to select one of them to be ‘Chief of the Benin River’. In 
this instance, Diare (Idiare in some accounts) emerged as the first British nominated Itsekiri 
Governor of the Benin River, and he together with other chiefs and elders, concluded a trade 
protection treaty with Beecroft in 1851.
162
 It should be noted that before the demise of Olu 
Akengbuwa, the chief of the Benin River was, usually appointed by successive Itsekiri kings 
to oversee trade activities on the River. While the specific details of Beecroft’s discussions 
with the chiefs have not survived, the result is a clear example of a negotiation between a 
British bridgehead and the local indigenous leadership which resulted eventually in Britain’s 
preferred candidate becoming the Governor of the Benin River. In this case, force was not 
used to achieve the objective. With the appointed governor of the river taken as sovereign, it 
was easy for the trade protection treaty to be concluded with the Itsekiri. 
Significantly, in the absence of a king and with internal disharmony, here was a 
British Consular official, exploiting local conditions to shape informal colonialism, thus 
giving credence to the view held by some scholars that local conditions in the peripheries 
also aided imperial expansion.
163
 It was a case of using a well-established trade relationship, 
or a newly developing relationship to diplomatically influence local decision-makers to 
accept his suggestions of who becomes their nominal leader. Clearly, what transpired 
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between Consul Beecroft and the Itsekiri, exemplifies perspectives held by some scholars 
that, African agency – indigenous peoples as active participants in their colonisation should 
also be considered in the discourse. 
In 1853, Beecroft made attempts without success to select a new king for the Itsekiri. 
This may have been an accident rather than because of any lack of influence, however, the 
Itsekiri elders and princes he desired to meet with at the Benin River over the matter arrived 
after his departure.
164
Undoubtedly though, Britain was not yet a dominant power in the 
Western Delta, but its man on the spot was striving to lay the foundations of British 
economic and political imperialism through diplomatic means by identifying and working 
with indigenous leadership.  
 In its state of internal political instability, of the absence of a king, Itsekiri society 
became vulnerable to extraneous influences, as succession to the kingship could not be 
quickly resolved. However, centuries of contact with Europeans during the slave era had 
made the people to become comfortable with European presence and influence without 
associating such with overt conquest. Thus, they were not particularly hostile to the presence 
and influence of the likes of Beecroft. Internal divisions within the royal lineages as to who 
should succeed to the throne in the wake of the deaths of the royal princes engendered a 
situation whereby the traditional power structure headed by the Olu ceased to exist and 
function. In this vacuum emerged the ‘Governorship of the Benin River concept,’ a system in 
which Itsekiri personalities with wealth acquired from the emergent palm oil trade between 
the Africans and the European merchants, this time still at the coasts in their vessels, became 
the nominal political figures of Itsekiri society, exercising influence and power over mostly 
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trade, but not wielding enough authority to function as de facto traditional central leadership 
in the form of a king. Between 1851 and 1883, the Governorship of the Benin River was held 
in succession by Diare, Ebrimoni, Chanomi and Olomu, all of whom were appointed with 
British support.
165
These were all peaceful transitions but not between fathers and sons, 
except in the case of Nana and Olomu. This was the state of affairs politically in Itsekiriland 
when Nana succeeded his father Olomu to the Governorship of Benin River in 1883. By this 
time, the power of the nominal leadership of the Itsekiri had slowly been eroded, largely 
thanks to the influence of Beecroft locally. Recall that in the times of the Olus (kings of 
Itsekiri) the chief of the River was appointed by the king. However, during the years when 
there was no clear Olu, Beecroft exploited the vacuum to influence the appointment of a 
nominal governor who particularly allied with himself. Because the governors appointed 
relied on Beecroft for their appointment, these Itsekiri were expected by the European traders 
and the consuls to maintain peace in all trading stations, including overseeing law and order 
for trade to strive and not disrupted. 
 Long before Beecroft arrived in the region, trade was probably the main livelihood in 
the region. During the nineteenth century, the product being traded shifted from slavery to 
palm oil. Note that, Beecroft and others were in the region because of Britain’s efforts to stop 
the slave trade and nurture the palm oil trade. Previously, in the era of the Atlantic slave 
trade, the Itsekiri had emerged as the dominant group in the western Delta with early trade 
and political links with the Portuguese, who travelled up the Forcados River for missionary 
                                                          
165
 TNA, F. O. 84/858, Beecroft to Palmerston, 20 March and 19 April 1851; TNA, F. O. 84/1061, Campbell to 
Clarendon, 1 March 1858; TNA, F. O. 84/1541, Easton to Salisbury, 29 November 1879. 
80 
 
and economic activities at the Itsekiri head town of Ode-Itsekiri.
166
At the height of the slave 
trade, the Itsekiri enjoyed the middleman position between the European traders on the coast 
and the hinterland dealers. It was a position they held on to up to the advent of the palm oil 
trade in the 1830s. 
Rather than suffering financially as the slave trade ended, the new palm oil trade 
brought great economic benefits and prosperity through the competitive advantage the 
Itsekiri occupied as the most influential middlemen. They bought palm-oil and other 
agricultural goods particularly from the hinterland Urhobo and Ukwuani and delivered them 
directly to the Europeans at the coast.
167
From the 1840s, two Liverpool firms, Horsfall and 
Harrison had already established factories in the Itsekiri settlements of Bobi and Jakpa, with 
their ships anchored off the mouth of the Benin River receiving palm oil supplies from the 
Itsekiri who functioned as the middlemen with the oil producers of the interior. At this stage, 
contact was not much different than during the slave trade era, with Europeans limited to the 
coasts, without, direct contact with producers in the interior.
168
Between 1851 and 1870 more 
British factories and small firms, such as Stewart and Douglas emerged, operating within the 
vicinity of the Benin River, engaged in palm oil export.
169
 At this time, the palm oil trade was 
at the center of Great Britain’s relations with west Africa, hence there was considerable 
competition between European firms for monopoly of trade with the hinterland as many of 
the oil markets were located deep in the hinterlands of the River Benin estuary, requiring a 
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great amount of organization and cost to bring the oil in canoes to the factories.
170
It was this 
opportunity that the Itsekiri exploited as middlemen to their advantage.  
As trade vigorously expanded, politics and commerce would combine to throw up 
three powerful rival merchant families in Itsekiriland with the finance and means to influence 
and dictate the affairs and fortunes of the Itsekiri kingdom and its relations with the British in 
the absence of a reigning Olu. Obaro Ikime has identified these families as: the royal family 
based at Ode-Itsekiri – the ancestral home; a branch of the royal family at Batere; and the 
Ologbotsere family at Jakpa.
171
 Together, between 1851 when Diare was appointed the first 
Governor up to the emergence of Nana Olomu in 1884, these three regal and trade families 
produced the Governors of the Benin River consecutively in the following order: Idiare 




In the ensuing commercial enterprise with the European firms, the nature of trade was 
such that Itsekiri merchants collected goods such as cloth, guns, gun powder, glass wares, 
mirrors, rugs, spirits, beads, plates and sundry other products from the Europeans on trust, for 
redistribution to credit-worthy persons around the Benin River settlements who in-turn 
mobilized big canoes into the hinterland markets, where the trust goods were further 
redistributed to local palm oil producers, which were subsequently collected for trade with 
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 An interesting character of the trade was that, if a local producer failed to 
supply the required commodities, it often led to raids from Itsekiri merchants, resulting in 
cases whereby individuals were sometimes handed over as pawns to the Itsekiri creditors. On 
the other hand, any failure on the part of the Itsekiri merchants to deliver the expected goods 
to the Europeans on the coast who had advanced them credit on trust, led to seizure of Itsekiri 
merchants’ consignments meant for other Europeans.
174
This scenario often put the Itsekiri 
merchants in tight corners, as the practice of restitution for inability to deliver, which was 
popularly called “chopping” at that time, greatly offended the Itsekiri middlemen, resulting 
occasionally in misunderstandings with European traders.
175
 In this circumstance, the 
aspiring indigenous merchant had to be not only a determined trader, but a strong willed one 
with a resolute capacity to survive within this arrangement.
176
 
The foregoing was the general picture of commerce in the Western Delta as the 
Itsekiri, despite the challenges of the trust system, profited and prospered from the legitimate 
trade favoured by their location as middlemen between the Europeans and the hinterland. 
Tied to this understanding was the changing fortune of the merchant chiefs. From 1849 when 
British consuls took up position in the Benin River and began reporting on political and trade 
affairs of the area, the consuls began to interfere as has been noted, in the internal politics of 
the Itsekiri and at a point decided to appoint one of the chiefs always as ‘Governor of the 
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 This development coincided with the first trend of political instability in 
Itsekiriland which shaped Itsekiri-British relations. From the mid nineteenth century 
onwards, the emergent discernible pattern of relations between the Itsekiri and the British 
was one of increased British political interests and influence in Itsekiriland. 
Now, as has been noted, Beecroft attempted to first install a new king for the people, 
but having failed on that, succeeded in influencing them in the selection of Governor of the 
Benin River. Again, as has been discussed, the various Governors in their tenures up to and 
even Nana’s time could not subject British traders and consular officials under their 
directives, rather, the British expected the Governors to enforce their (British) will on their 
Itsekiri subjects. Clearly, such developments were pointers to increasing British influence on 
the Itsekiri, further manifestation of which was the sackings of Idiare by Consul Campbell in 
1858, for alleged resumption of the slave trade and the replacement of Tsanomi with Olomu, 
father of Nana as Governor in 1879.
178
 By the time of Nana’s accession to the Governorship 
of the Benin River, following Consul Hewett’s advice to Itsekiri elders to choose a successor 
to Olomu in 1884,
179
 the general dynamics of British – Itsekiri relations took a turn. 
Local political weakness, growing trade dependence on Britain, and thanks to the 
personal influence Beecroft cultivated, British influence was pervasive in Itsekiriland in the 
form of peaceful diplomatic consular penetration into the affairs of the indigenous society. 
Most importantly, the position of power in the Consul as man on the spot-on behalf of Great 
Britain passed on to the successors of Beecroft. The palm oil era also witnessed the 
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uneventful tenures of six separate Consuls of the Bight of Biafra, appointed after the death of 
John Beecroft. Up to 1879 when Edward Hyde Hewett became Consul of the Bight, relations 
between the indigenous peoples and the British were mainly peaceful with British firms 
largely engaged in trading with locals and a new elite developing out of this emergent 
economic relationship. It is difficult to know why the British and the Itsekiri could not 
conclude a treaty of protection earlier. Perhaps, the delay was due to the latitude the British 
enjoyed in the Niger Basin, until rivalry from other imperial powers threatened its position. 
In due course, the Consul, on the back of instructions from London, concluded treaties with 
indigenous leaders, treaties which served to legitimate not only the process of colonisation 
but transferred political and sovereign rights to the imperial power over the indigenous 
peoples. 
Thus, the period from 1884 to 1894 witnessed not only increased British interest and 
influence in Itsekiriland, but also led to the conclusion of the treaties of protection between 
the British and the Itsekiri. These were the treaties which to all intents and purposes, 
subsumed Itsekiriland under British control. Again, in this move from informal control to 
gradual formal empire, the man on the spot in the person of Consul Edward Hewett played a 
significant role in the process. In his early career, Hewett had served in the Royal Bucks 
King’s Own Militia and in the East Kent Militia from 1850 to 1860. Subsequently, he was 
appointed Clerk to Her Majesty’s Slave Trade Commissioners at Loanda, a West Coast of 
Africa anti-slave trade garrison under Portuguese control, and in 1879 as Consul of the Bight, 
and subsequently as Consul General of the Niger Districts from 1885 to 1891.
180
 When it 
became apparent to the official minds in London that, rivalry from other imperial powers 
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made formal control inevitable in the Niger Basin, Hewett received instructions from the FO 
to, make arrangements for extending British protection over the Niger territories by 
concluding treaties with the indigenous leaders.
181
The point to note here is that, London 
directed its official on the ground to expedite action in concluding treaties with the chiefs of 
the Delta as a means to ward off not only rivals but to gain British control of the territories. 
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4.3 Nana and Great Britain 
For a better understanding of the treaty-making episodes between the British and the Itsekiri 
and the subsequent falling out with chief Nana which, engendered the expedition against 
Nana in 1894, a full grasp of Nana’s stewardship as Governor and his relationship with the 
British in general deserves some attention for, he was the principal Itsekiri character in the 
events that unfolded within the period under review.  
 Nana, originally called Eriomala, was one of several sons of Olomu, but was said to 
have found favour before his father even though he was much younger, so that, during his 
father, Olomu’s time as Governor of the River, Nana was recognized as his father’s deputy. It 
is worth noting that the British certainly believed that Nana’s appointment as deputy to his 
father was due to his smattering of English, which helped in communication and relations 
with the British, although, it is impossible to verify this.
183
 Upon succeeding his father as 
Governor in 1884, Nana set up at Ebrohimi, a settlement higher up a creek from the Benin 
River that Olomu had established earlier. He quickly, with other Itsekiri leaders, concluded a 
treaty of protection with the British in July 1884. In appointing Nana as Governor, the British 
perceived him to be the indigenous power through which Her Majesty’s Consular authority 
was to be established, exercised and enforced.
184
 Indeed, Vice-Consul Blair who presented 
Nana with his staff of office as Governor regarded Nana as head of the Jekri people, though, 
the actual development on ground portrayed Nana only as a nominal head.
185
However, while 
it is clear that British agents did not understand all of the internal politics within the Itsekiri, 
the imperial power still played a major role in the internal affairs of the people to the extent 
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of appointing Governors of the Benin River. Surely, at this time, British influence was 
entrenched, even though formal control had not been instituted and no warfare had occurred. 
 Nana used his position of Governor to win a near- monopoly of trade for himself, 
controlling in the process, the trade from the Urhobo hinterlands through the Ethiope and 
Jamieson rivers. Nana’s trading depots were deep in the Urhobo settlements of Okpara, 
Kokori, Eku, Igun, Abraka, Effurun, Ukan and Mogba. Ikime has noted that, it was from 
these trade centres that Nana employed a mix of friendship and marriage diplomacy – taking 
wives from the Urhobo clans he traded with, and coupled with a formidable administration, 
coordinated by slaves, and reinforced by the acquisition of European armaments, that Nana 
emerged as the foremost middleman merchant, with influence, considerable wealth, and 
strength in the palm oil trade with European merchants.
186
 
It must be emphasised that Nana was never king of the Itsekiri. Neither was Nana 
politically influential to the point of controlling the neighbouring Urhobo, Ijo, Isoko and 
Ukwuani. To some extent, imperial officers were conscious of this in appointing him to the 
governorship of the river, a way to have sovereign to trade with and to eventually conclude 
treaties with a sovereign head of state, despite the absence of a substantive Olu (King) in 
Itsekiriland. Thus, as Governor of the Benin River, he represented the overall interest of the 
Itsekiri in relation to the ever increasing presence and influence of the British Empire, 
accentuated by the trading activities of Goldie’s National African Company (later Royal 
Niger Company in 1886), and other firms in the Niger Basin. Locals partly accepted Nana’s 
increasing dominance because the geographical advantage of being in-between the British 
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traders and the hinterland offered opportunities for trade benefits, which in turn gave him 
considerable political leverage locally and with the British. 
However, these arrangements changed after the Berlin Conference as the British 
made efforts to have direct trade and diplomatic contacts with hinterland groups, especially 
the Urhobo, and subsequently concluded separate treaties with them, thereby bypassing Nana 
and the Itsekiri, weakening the position of both in the process. This move by the British to 
have direct contact with interior groups prompted Nana to take certain actions which the 
British considered inimical to free trade between 1885 and 1894.The first action by Nana in 
early 1885, was to stop all trade with the hinterland Urhobo, insisting that he alone should 
open and close the hinterland markets, at a time the Royal Niger Company was seriously 
infiltrating the hinterlands, and thus setting itself up as direct competition. Then, some of his 
men attacked nearby Urhobo villages still doing business with the British resulting in the 
closure of the Ethiope River, the gateway to the Urhobo hinterland.
187
 In this circumstance, 
the British who were by this time committed to free trade which was writ large over the 
Berlin Conference became more anxious to trade directly with the oil producers in the 
interior, so measures were taken to check Nana. First, Consul Hewett stopped Nana’s office 
as Governor of the Benin River in 1891. As the authority which appointed him in the first 
instance, this was not surprising. However, Nana was still able to command respect from 
local traders, as he continued to control and dictate trade in his own terms and succeeded in 
forcing trade to almost a halt in the Benin and Ethiope rivers. 
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Violence was not immediately used by the British against Nana. Even when he first 
stopped trade in 1885, the British tried to peacefully remove him by withdrawing his office 
as governor of the River in 1891. Nevertheless, following further actions of trade disruptions 
by Nana, Ralph Moor, who was acting as Consul in place of Claude Macdonald instituted 
punitive action against Nana in 1894, blockading Ebrohimi, Nana’s enclave, and attacking on 
25 September 1894.
188
 In the event, little actual fighting occurred, as Nana fled to Lagos, 
only to surrender later and be exiled to Accra in the Gold Coast.
189
 In giving justifications for 
the military action against Nana, Acting Consul Moor accused Nana of terrorism, of stopping 
trade in the Ethiope River, and declared Nana as a threat to the protectorate’s peace and 
prosperity.
190
 Indeed, in a dispatch to the British Consulate – General in Calabar, dated 6 
August 1894, Moor outlined the course of events between Nana and the British, the context 
and rationale for the military action against Nana and the need for a second treaty in 1894. 
The following is an abridged extract of Moor’s dispatch: 
I have the honor to report that, owing to reports of the unsettled state of the district, I 
proceeded to Benin on the 18
th
 June last. Finding on my arrival on the 21
st
 that 
matters were most unsatisfactory trade being almost entirely stopped owing 
principally to the acts of the people of Chief Nanna in seizing Sobo (Urhobo) people 
and generally terrorising the locality of the Ethiope River. I write to the Chief first 
requesting and then directing his attendance to answer to the charges made against his 
people. The Chief failed to attend sending letters of excuse. I therefore wrote ordering 
him to withdraw from the Ethiope River his people who were causing the disturbance 
and stoppage of trade and to hand over the Sobo people seized to the Government, 
giving him fourteen days to carry this out….I further considered it necessary to issue 
a Proclamation…prohibiting the appearance of war canoes in the district as it was 
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Clearly, the Consul’s primary concern was the disruption of trade in the area, as he ordered 
Nana to withdraw his war canoes from the Ethiope and Benin Rivers. However, Nana’s 
actions engendered attention and required response from an imperial power which by 1894, 
(ten years after concluding a treaty with the Itsekiri which gave it sovereign and political 
rights), was bent on imposing effective formal control and to maintain law and order. In 
furtherance of why action was taken against Nana, Moor’s dispatch continues thus: 
On 21
st
 July when in Bonny I received a cablegram stating that Nanna was 
threatening to attack two friendly chiefs, Dore and Dudu. A reinforcement of one 
officer and seventeen men was at once sent from Brass to assist in preventing any 
disturbance and I issued instructions for a notice to be given for the holding of a 




 July I arrived in Benin and found that 
meeting had been arranged as directed for 2
nd
 instant. At Warri I had received a letter 
from Chief Nanna stating that he was afraid to attend meeting lest he should be seized 
and deported from district – further letters and messages to the same effect were 
received from him by me in Benin to all of which replies were sent guaranteeing him 
a safe conduct to and from the meeting. The Chief wished to be represented by some 
one of the others but this I declined to allow and he failed to attend. All the other 
chiefs of the Benin and Warri district were in attendance and appeared anxious to do 
all in their power to carry out the orders of the Government and for the peace of the 
district. A form of Treaty was entered into by all of them, copy of which is enclosed, 
and which it will be seen from Article X is regarded as ratification of all former 
treaties. After the meeting I sent messages to Chief Nanna with a copy of this treaty 
and a letter informing him that he was at liberty, if he so wished to enter with a 
similar form of Treaty but must attend at the Vice Consulate to do so and that on his 
carrying out the orders previously given him and so doing the restrictions regarding 
himself and his people would be withdrawn…learning that in opposition to the orders 
of the Government that all the waterways of the district were to be free a strong 
barrier had been erected at the mouth of the creek leading to Brohemie Town (Nana’s 
Ebrohimi) where Nanna resides I ordered it to be at once removed informing him that 
neglect of this order might entail serious consequences…
192
 
The British action must also be seen as a way of interpreting Article IV of the 1884 Treaty 
which stipulated the resolution of all disputes between the Itsekiri and Europeans and other 
groups by the British Consular or other appointed officers for arbitration and decision. 
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Clearly, it was this power as contained in the treaty of 1884 that emboldened the Consul to 
attempt to remove Nana from his post earlier. It indicates that on paper, the British were 
already having jurisdiction over the Itsekiri even though in practice the locals did not 
necessarily recognize this as the case. 
 At this point, it may be tempting to conclude that with the punitive action against 
Nana, the British employed force to bring Itsekiriland under their imperial yoke. This may be 
simply accepted if one does not have a grip of earlier developments before this episode of 
gun-boat diplomacy. However, the history of interactions in the nineteenth century shows a 
much more gradual process of political power grabbing by the British, with treaties used as 
has been said, at least ten years before Nana was toppled. Outside the early contact treaties of 
commerce for trade protection,
193
 the British concluded only two Treaties of Protection 
(cession) with the Itsekiri, that of 1884, and 1894, which conferred sovereign and political 
powers on the British and confirmed and validated the absorption of Itsekiriland into the 
British Empire. These protection treaties were relied upon by officials of Great Britain at 
different times, such as at the Berlin Conference, to demonstrate mainly to other European 
powers of British imperial control over Itsekiriland.  
4.4 Treaty-Making and Establishment of Control 
The Itsekiri were the first amongst the groups examined in this study to conclude a treaty of 
protection with the British on 16 July 1884. This was done months before the treaty-making 
activities of Goldie’s National African Company which rushed to conclude treaties with 
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various other groups before the Berlin Conference.
194
As noted earlier, upon his appointment 
as governor of the river in 1884, Nana and other leaders of the Itsekiri concluded a treaty 
with Consul Hewett, effectively placing Itsekiriland and the areas of the Benin River under 
British protection.
195
While it is difficult to know if the Itsekiri understood all of the terms and 
conditions of the treaty, Nana and Chanomi clearly understood the significant, because they 
went around Itsekiri country on a tour to sensitize the people about the treaty.
196
 This move 
by Nana and Chanomi may not be unconnected with the fact that in the days of the 
interregnum, the absence of a ruling Olu (king), necessitated the need to secure the support of 
the people. Indeed, when the tour got to Warri, the royal Princes were said to have at first 
objected to supporting the treaty given that it was to be signed by Nana, but only accepted 
when it was confirmed that Chanomi and other senior chiefs from other Houses were to sign 
as well. This is an important point. Local leaders signed partly to demonstrate their own 
importance and prestige, rather than because of specific content of treaties. In practice 
though, this meant that those who put their marks on the treaty reflected a representation of 
the leading Itsekiri regal, trade and influence groups drawn from the Ologbotsere and Emaye 
Houses, and this spread of acceptance was a powerful tool for the British.
197
 Indeed, the 
Consul’s insistence on getting so many signatories indicates some awareness on the part of 
the British of the delicate political balance necessary in the region if they wanted to achieve 
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control, and demonstrates at least some willingness amongst the local traditional elite to use 
British influence to maintain their own positions locally.  
 The British employed ten different varieties of pro forma treaty forms, a topic which 
will be further explored in the ensuing chapters. Another point to note about the treaties is 
that they all bore the name and mark of Edward Hyde Hewett, who was Her Majesty’s 
Consul for the Bight of Benin as at that time, while the treaties transacted by the National 
African Company always had the mark of not only Hewett, but also a certain D. McIntosh, 
who signed on behalf of the National African Company. The British treaty with the Chiefs of 
Jakri, River Benin was christened as one for maintaining peace and friendship. Made up of a 
total of nine articles, its opening paragraph states as follows: 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress 
of India, &c., and Chiefs of Jakri being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the 
relations of peace and friendship which have for long existed between them; Her 
Britannic Majesty has named and appointed E.H. Hewett, Esq., Her Consul for the 
Bights of Benin and Biafra, to conclude a Treaty for this purpose. The said E. H. 




 Ordinarily, as the title of the treaty suggests, it ought to be a treaty of peace and 
friendship, but the clauses in the articles revealed the true intent of the British. Of particular 
interest are Articles I, II, and V. For instance, while Article I emphasized subsuming the 
territory of the Itsekiri under the authority, jurisdiction, as well as protection of the British, 
Article II, forbade the Itsekiri from concluding agreements or treating with other foreign 
powers without the consent and approval of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government. Article V 
reinforces Articles I and II, stating that the Chiefs of Itsekiri were to assist British Consular 
or other officers in the execution of such duties that may be assigned to them in matters 
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relating to amongst others; the administration of justice, the development of the resources of 
the country, the interests of commerce, and the general progress of civilization. Clearly, to all 
intents and purposes, these Articles and others in the treaty portends only one fact, that of 
loss of Itsekiri sovereignty to the imperial power through peaceful diplomatic means. 
Some notable issues to be pointed out here are that the Itsekiri raised objections to a 
few of the articles in the treaty. The free trade and permission and protection for all Ministers 
of the Christian religion in Itsekiri territory clause (articles VI and VII) did not go down well 
with the Itsekiri, and it was left out for future negotiations.
199
It is unclear why the Itsekiri 
objected to these clauses, but the Itsekiri may have objected to the free trade clause for fear 
of further undermining their position as middlemen in the hinterland-coast trade.
200
This most 
likely explains why Nana acted the way he did in stopping trade in 1885, in the process 
incurring the wrath of the Consul. Thus, in the enforcement article IX,  it was expressly 
stated that this treaty shall come into operation so far as may be practicable from the date of 
its signature except as regards articles VI and VII which are to be left for negotiation on a 
future occasion. This treaty was signed aboard Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Flirt, which was 
anchored in the Benin River, and the Itsekiri Chiefs who put their marks to it were: Nana, 




 Having gained political and sovereign rights of the Itsekiri, officials of Great Britain 
proceeded to establish administrative and judicial institutions over Itsekiriland. In containing 
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Nana after his various stoppage of trade, the political relations in the Western Delta reflected 
the growing power of the Consul over indigenous leadership and society ostensibly achieved 
through the peaceful diplomatic process of treaty-making.
202
Nana had to adhere to the 
dictates of the Consul, coming to terms with the realities of the new power configuration. 
From 1884, the British did not hide the direction of their intent and objectives, as their 
Consuls decided more and more overtly the trade regulations and customs duties in the palm 
oil trade. However, the British did not set up elaborate machinery of administration in 
Itsekiriland after the treaty of 1884, probably due to cost and the difficulties in getting 
European personnel.
203
Consuls continued to represent and oversee British interests until the 




Within the framework of legal positivism and the application of treaties before the 
Scramble discussed in chapters two and three, clearly, the British regarded the conclusion of 
treaties as not only the beginning of colonisation, but also one that gives justification and 
legitimation to the territorial acquisition process. Thus, this treaty with the Itsekiri and others 
between the Niger Company and other groups were used by the FO in London to announce 
Great Britain’s control of territories. On 5 June 1885, a formal notification was published in 
the London Gazette, proclaiming that, by virtue of treaties concluded with indigenous 
leadership, Her Majesty’s Government had gained control of the territories and affairs of the 
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indigenous peoples and states.
205
Clearly the hand of the home government through the FO in 
the treaty-making enterprise was ubiquitous. It would become a consistent feature of the 
colonisation project subsequently, as more territories were added to the British orbit, in the 
form of further proclamations of the Oil Rivers Protectorate (1891), the Niger Coast 
Protectorate (1893), the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (1900) and eventually, the Colony 
and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914), all of which followed a similar notification pattern. 
From Moor’s dispatch to the Consulate-General at Old Calabar as indicated in the 
preceding section, it was clear that the British preoccupied themselves with two basic tasks: 
to deal with Nana so as to free the interior trade from all forms of disruption, and to 
consolidate their hold on Itsekiriland legally and politically. Both the treaty and other actions 
were aimed at imperial rivals, the French in particular and for consolidating British presence 
and control in Itsekiriland, given that the very process of getting the signatures of the 
indigenous leadership for the treaties seems an important step in the colonisation process. 
This move, clearly bestowed on the British, sovereign rights to exercise political control and 
establish administration.  
The conclusion of another treaty of protection with the Itsekiri on 2 August 1894, was 
ostensibly to ratify the earlier one of 1884, but this time without the signature or mark of 
Nana, who could not attend the meeting out of fear of being arrested and deported, as clearly 
captured in Moor’s despatch. This treaty was not in any way fundamentally different from 
that of 1884.A large number of local leaders signed the treaty this time, however, despite 
Nana’s omission. Twenty-five Itsekiri chiefs put their marks to it compared to twelve in 
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1884, including some who did so in the earlier treaty. Within the context of colonisation 
through treaties of this study, the process of gathering the leadership of Itsekiriland for their 
signatures should be considered as more significant than is usually appreciated in the 
standard historiography. There is no evidence to suggest that the chiefs were coerced into 
action, and historians are not sure whether their support for a second treaty was as a result of 
dislike for Nana, support for the British, fear of the British, or to achieve personal elevation, 
but they did sign it. 
The articles of contention (VI and VII) in the 1884 treaty were retained, while a 
further article X was inserted which served as the ratification clause. Its wordings are 
interesting in so far as it concerns the central place of peaceful colonisation in this study and 
how it signifies increased British political control over the Itsekiri. It reads as follows:  
This treaty is regarded merely as a ratification of existing treaties between the parties 
thereto, and it is understood that if reasonable and consistent effort be shown by the 
signatory Chiefs to adhere and carry out the terms of it, there will be immunity from 
punishment for any and all offences which may have been committed against the laws 
and orders of the Government prior to the signing of it, but all disputes and troubles 




This clause was clearly designed and inserted by the British to extract compliance and good 
conduct to the terms of the treaty from the Itsekiri Chiefs with a promise for patronage. It 
prompts one to suggest that perhaps, this was done in the light of Nana’s intransigence, and 
possibly as a ploy to get the total support of the Chiefs in a divide and rule atmosphere. As 
will be shown in chapter six, the Treaties of Protection, especially, the numbered treaties 
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concluded by the National African Company (later Royal Niger Company, RNC), essentially, 
were made up of nine Articles. Thus, the 1894 second treaty with the Itsekiri could be 
considered as a novelty ostensibly designed for this particular purpose of ratifying the earlier 
treaty with the Itsekiri and to contain what was considered as possible intransigence of 
indigenous leadership through paper diplomacy and not by force of arms or threat of its use. 
It also shows that the British were quite willing to take a very broad interpretation of who to 
consider as having sovereign power to sign treaties. 
For the Itsekiri, the 1884 treaty of protection effectively subsumed them under British 
control. The military action against Nana, ten years after the first treaty was ostensibly 
carried out to stop Nana from disrupting trade with the hinterlands along the Ethiope River, 
and to demonstrate publicly that all remaining local men of power accepted British 
dominance. In subsequent years, the British appointed Dore, one of the signatories to the 
second Treaty of 1894, first as Political Agent and later as a Paramount Chief over 
Itsekiriland, a post he held up to his death in 1936.
207
 Again, this indicates how clearly the 
British identified and related with local leadership in a peaceful manner to achieve 
colonisation. 
Earlier on10 July1886, a Royal Charter was granted to the National African 
Company, which henceforth became known as the Royal Niger Company. The Charter was 
essentially granted on the basis of the company’s long trading history with the people of the 
Niger Basin and the numerous treaties it had already concluded starting from 1884 with the 
indigenous Chiefs placing their territories under British Protection. With this Charter, the 
                                                          
207
 Lloyd, P. C, ‘The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century:  An Outline Social History,’ Journal of African History, 
Vol. IV, No. 2, 1963, P. 230. 
99 
 
RNC was invested to administer aspects of the Niger Basin where it had concluded treaties 
with the indigenes. Indeed, in a further notification in the London Gazette of 18 
October1887, concerning the Niger Districts, the FO placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Company, all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluent, which are or may be for the 
time being subject to the Government of the National African Company Limited (now called 
the Royal Niger Company), in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the RNC.
208
 
By this time, the administrative structures of the British over its acquired territories were 
beginning to gradually take shape, and would continue up to 1914. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the primary task was to draw out how Great Britain through her imperial 
agents acting as bridgeheads (the men on the spot, driving the colonial agenda), brought 
Itsekiriland under colonisation. It was also a case of active indigenous engagement with the 
colonisation process, ensuring that the process remained peaceful for decades. Despite the 
state of flux of their centralised political system, the scant number of treaties – two in all, was 
a testament to the centralization of the Itsekiri elite who put their marks on the treaties. This 
centralization will be in stark contrast to the subsequent case study chapters. 
 The emergent result was that treaty-making as a peaceful means characterised Great 
Britain’s eventual pacification and colonisation of the Itsekiri. First, the chapter provided an 
understanding of the social and political structure of the Itsekiri in precolonial times pointing 
out the dynamics of the society and how this impacted on the economic and political 
relations between the people and the British Empire. Secondly, the historical background of 
British presence in Itsekiriland was also examined in terms of contact. The Itsekiri as coastal 
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people had early relations with the British and enjoyed the advantage of a middleman 
position between the Europeans at the coast and the interior from the slave trade era up to the 
era of the palm oil trade and imperialism. This vantage position empowered Itsekiri Chiefs 
economically and politically to the extent that when their most prominent Governor of the 
Benin River, Nana Olomu became recalcitrant and obstructed the flow of palm oil from the 
Urhobo hinterlands, the British, who appointed him in the first place, took military action and 
deposed him in 1894.  The British action against Nana was only after long years of British 
influence in Itsekiriland, beginning from 1849 when John Beecroft was British Consul for the 
Bights of Benin. From this time, British officials after Beecroft developed further interests in 
Itsekiri affairs to the extent of appointing prominent Itsekiri personalities as Governor of the 
Benin River as a political instrument in the wake of the regal interregnum following the 
death of Olu Akengbuwa in 1848. The British exploited this situation to consolidate their 
presence and hold in Itsekiriland culminating in treaty-making, and these treaties were the 
instruments used by the imperial power to gain sovereign and political rights over the people. 
Local rulers, including Nana and others, benefitted economically and politically by 
cooperation in this process, thanks to the growing prominence of the palm oil trade. 
Thus, the chapter realized that the central tool in bringing about the Itsekiri under 
British control were the two treaties of Protection in 1884 and 1894, concluded between the 
agents of the imperial power and the chiefs of Itsekiriland. However, as has been noted, the 
general story of British expansion in what became Nigeria is characterized by historians of 
Nigeria as one of outright conquest and subjugation of the various peoples by the military 
forces of imperial Britain. As noteworthy as the conquest narrative is in relation to other 
aspects of Nigeria, the evidence specifically for the areas of this study suggest that in this 
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instance, the process was less of use of force and more of a peaceful process save for the 
attack on Nana in 1894 over trade disruptions. It was one in which, the British relied on and 
referred to the various treaties concluded with the chiefs of the areas to proclaim their 
Protectorates of the Niger Districts, the Oil Rivers, and the Niger Coast in 1885, 1891 and 
1893 respectively. 
It is doubtful if the chiefs who signed these treaties on behalf of their people knew 
exactly the import of their contents. Nevertheless, following the streamlining of the rules of 
engagement on how best to approach the Scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference in 
1884/85, the British expedited their treaty-making processes in the Niger Basin, so that, the 
various treaties concluded with the chiefs became the tools for introducing and consolidating 
British power and authority in the various areas. It is safe to say that in light of the evidence 











Chapter Five: The Western Ijo and the Royal Niger Company 
 
How can we doubt that the French will take them? If there is one thing clearer than 
another, it seems to be that the French have a settled policy in Africa, both on the East 
and West coast and that that policy is antagonistic to us… M. de Brazza is on the 
Congo … from Porto Novo the trade of Lagos is attacked; the French official agent is 
at work above the delta of the Niger, while the Captain of the ‘Voltigeur’ is trying to 
induce the natives of the mouth of that river to accept his Treaties. If he succeeds in 
this, the final step will have been taken, and the British trade will have no chance of 
existence except at the mercy of French officials. Action seems to be forced on us … 
Only one course seems possible; that is, to take on ourselves the Protectorates of the 





Percy Anderson, then head of the newly created African Department in the FO, raised the 
memo above, to Whitehall in June 1883, advocating for increased British presence in the 
Delta as a response to increasing French activities on the Niger. This indicates a case of 
French actions on the Niger touching off on Great Britain’s sensibilities and interests, and 
represents a clear testament to how imperial rivalry also dictated the tone and direction of 
expansion. This chapter highlights how the Ijo of the Western Delta were colonised by Great 
Britain. The different case studies reveal different experiences of colonisation. In this 
instance, trade, championed by the National African Company (later RNC), and concerns 
about rival powers combined to accelerate Great Britain’s colonisation of the Western Ijo. 
However, a significant part of the chapter dwells on the specific circumstances of Patani in 
its encounters with the Company, which demonstrated both elements of violence and treaty-
making. 
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 Europeans characterised the Western Ijo as savages, cannibals, pirates and a most 
‘difficult’ group to deal with. Paradoxically, they were also regarded as a brave people, who 
lived much on the water with expertise in paddling and fishing.
210
 With such 
characterization, current historiography would suggest that violence would have been used to 
suppress such a ‘difficult’ group, who also lacked clear political leadership. Surprisingly, this 
was not the case. This chapter shows how a largely peaceful process of treaty-making and 
diplomacy, rather than guns, were the instruments of choice employed by Great Britain to 
colonise the Western Ijo, even though the imperial agent, the RNC, later established a 
constabulary to maintain law and order in its territories. However, the process of treaty-
making was spread over decades, meaning that formal colonisation was slow, centred during 
the 1880s and 1890s, which may help explain why little violence occurred.     
As Percy Anderson’s memo clearly suggests, British hold in the Niger areas from the 
1880s was at best informal not until actions of European rivals, particularly the French, 
precipitated a change of heart at Whitehall. Alarmed that France might upstage them on the 
Niger by concluding treaties with indigenous peoples, treaties which would serve as title 
deeds for legitimation of territory, the British deployed diplomacy to stop the French from 
building trade and colonial relations in the region, as violence would have been counter-
productive.
211
 As such, treaty-making was the first diplomatic tool of choice by Great Britain. 
Indeed, to counter the French, Consul Hewett was despatched on 16 May 1884, to the Niger 
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territories armed with blank treaty forms, which the FO had given to him to conclude as 
many treaties as possible with the indigenous chiefs. Hewett’s treaty-making efforts within 
the Delta culminated in the first treaty concluded with the Itsekiri in 1884, discussed in 
chapter four.
212
 From this time, treaty-making defined the character of Great Britain’s 
colonisation of the study groups. As this chapter demonstrates, in the treaty-making episodes 
between the Western Ijo and officials and agents of Great Britain, it was not Consul Hewett 
that predominated, but the National African Company (later RNC). In this encounter, here 
was a company and its agents acting on behalf of an imperial power, reminiscent of similar 
actions of chartered companies such as the HBC and the NZC of Canada and New Zealand 
respectively (see chapter 3).  
In the slave trade era, the Ijo in the Niger Delta served as middlemen between 
hinterland groups and the Europeans at the coast. E. J. Alagoa has shown that this trend was 
most prominent with Ijo groups of the Eastern Delta, such as the Bonny and Opobo, even 
though the Delta as a whole was a sort of clearing house for the external trade with the 
Europeans.
213
 Nevertheless, the Western Ijo groups of this study were not left out in 
intercourse with the Europeans within the period under review. Being geographically located 
like their Itsekiri neighbours on the Atlantic coast and the estuaries of the Escravos and 
Forcados Rivers, they also functioned as middlemen traders between the English merchants 
on the coast and the hinterland Urhobo, Isoko and Ukwuani settlements.
214
 This middleman 
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position played a pivotal role in shaping and defining the eventual outcome of the economic 
and political relations which characterized Western Ijo encounters with the British in the age 
of empire. Therefore, in line with the general thesis of this study, how treaty-making was 
central to Great Britain’s mainly peaceful colonisation of the Western Ijo informs the 
discourse.  
As the other case studies demonstrates, the dynamics of encounters between the 
peoples and the imperial power were not simply about colonizers and victims, rather, it 
involved trade and commerce in general, which reflected a far more complex power relations 
on the ground, indicative that Africans were less passive in the processes leading up to 
eventual colonisation. Thus, this chapter provides accounts of the varying dynamics and the 
roles of the different actors in the process and seeks to explain how and why treaties were 
used by the British in the colonisation process. To do this, the chapter first identifies the Ijo 
groups of the area, outlining their locations and settlements within the geographical precinct. 
It then, provides a cursory early history of the group as a whole, with a view to understanding 
their migratory history and links with their kith and kin in other parts of the Niger Delta. 
Next, is an exposition of the social and political organization of the Western Ijo. This context 
explains the institutional structures which shaped and steered relations with her neighbours 
and with Europeans, during both the slave and palm oil trade eras. Ijo encounters with the 
Europeans forms the next section for purposes of ascertaining the patterns of contact with the 
Europeans as they gradually made in-roads into the various Ijo settlements. The chapter also 
demonstrates how the Ijos benefited from the slave trade and how they adjusted their 
relations with the advancing Europeans in the wake of imperialism. Lastly the treaty-making 
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episodes with the agents of Great Britain are examined and discussed within the context of 
ascertaining how the Western Ijo were eventually colonised. 
5.1 Western Ijo location, Origins and Socio-Political System 
Geographically, the Ijo are widely distributed across the Delta of the Niger River, practically 
inhabiting the whole coast of the Niger Delta, some 250 miles in length, and about seventy 
miles inland from the coast, stretching between the Ibibio in the east and the Yoruba in the 
west.
215
 An early British officer on the Delta, Major Arthur Glyn identified the Ijo territories 
within the Lower Niger as located, ‘in the triangle formed by the Nun and the 
Forcados…both eastward and westward,’ and that, in this triangle dwell the Ijo, ‘the most 
important tribe in the Lower Delta.’
216
 Ijo settlements have been classified and delineated 
along linguistic variations and hydrological lines into Eastern, Central and Western Delta.
217
 
Like the Urhobo, the Ijo groups of the Western Delta share border with all the other groups in 
this study. To their extreme west are, located the Itsekiri, who also share the Atlantic 
coastline with them. To the north of the Ijo are, the Urhobo, while the Isoko and the Ukwuani 
borders them on the east and north east respectively. Other Ijo groups which are outside the 
scope of this study, flank the Western Ijo beyond the right bank of the Forcados River. In 
their Niger Delta abode, the Ijo comprise about fifty clans (Ibe),
218
 loosely affiliated along 
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kinship and shared cultural and religious lines. The Ijo groups examined in this study are, 
those located within the vicinities of the estuaries of the Escravos River and the right and left 
banks of the Forcados River from the coast up to Otrofani. They constitute the clans referred 
to as Western Ijo in Alagoa’s classification, in his study of the early history of the Ijo as a 
whole. Therefore, in this study, the attention is on the following clans of the Western Delta, 
which were under the jurisdiction of the Royal Niger Company in the age of empire. They 
include; the Gbaramatu, Obotebe, Seimbiri, Tuomo, Ogulagha, Iduwini, Operemo, Mein, 
Tarakiri, Kumbowei, and Kabowei.
219
 These are all made up of numerous settlements, 
located around the estuaries of the Forcados and Escravos, and along the right and left banks 
of the Forcados. 
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Figure 6. Map showing the Ijo Clans of the Western Niger Delta
220
 
This riverine location dictated the Ijo way of life as basically fishermen, who used 
locally made nets from stringy grass and raffia palm, traps and spears for fish and shrimps 
around the mouths of the rivers and rivulets that abound in their domains. The fish and 
shrimps were mostly dried in the sun and exchanged with the produce of interior groups, 
mainly the Urhobo and Isoko whose land was more favourable for root crops like yam and 
cassava. The people also practiced salt making, producing salt from sea water and from the 
roots of the mangrove trees. Salt making was lucrative in precolonial times as it was a 
measure of exchange in trade relations between and amongst the various peoples of the 
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 As well as basket weaving, the Ijo are also adept at canoe carving. The canoes, 
which remain essential for communication and transportation in the riverine terrain were 
patronized by the neighbouring Itsekiri and the hinterland Urhobo, Isoko, and Ukwuani 
groups, and by the Yoruba to the west. This fostered intergroup relations between and 
amongst the various peoples before the advent of the Europeans in the fifteenth century.
222
 
However, despite much contact with their neighbours, P. A. Talbot has suggested that the 
cultural traditions and language of the Ijo are distinct from their neighbours.
223
 The Ijo 
language, which is of the Niger-Congo group of languages, has been affirmed in recent 




In European records, the Ijo were variously addressed as Jos, Ijo, Ijaw, Ejo, Ojo, Idzo, 
Oru and Ujo. Pereira, the early Portuguese voyager to the Western Delta informed that the 
Jos (apparently referring to the Ijo) occupied the eastern and southern banks of the Forcados 
River. He also identified the occupants of the lower estuaries of the same river as the ‘Huela,’ 
suggestive of the Ogulagha (Ogulah), one of the subgroups or clans of the Ijo of the Western 
Delta.
225
 The people call themselves Izon and Ezon, but in the wider literature, all the variant 
terms have been used interchangeably to refer to the people and their language.  
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A general theme on the origins of the Ijo as a whole in the Niger Delta is that they are 
of considerable antiquity in their abodes.
226
The origin myths of the Western Ijo clans of this 
study refer to Ogobiri, Ke, Ikibiri, Oporoma, and Obiama in the Central Delta as places of 
dispersion.
227
 Generally, the traditions of the groups reveals episodes and layers of 
migrations, splits and rebound migrations as the people wandered about the creeks in search 
for habitable land. In these migrations, individual founder heroes of groups led their people 
through the maze of the Delta to eventually settle in hospitable abodes.
228
 Apart from this 
origin links with the central Delta, the Ijo of the Western Delta also shared common cultural 
and socio-political practices with their kith and kin of the Niger Delta.  
The Ijo did not develop elaborate socio-political organizations, encompassing all 
groups under a single polity. Though the city state system prevailed in the Eastern Delta 
amongst the Kalabari, Nembe and Opobo, the Western Ijo socio-political system revolved 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Macdonald’s Mission to the Niger and Benue Rivers, West Africa (London: George Phillips and Son, 1892), p. 
32. 
226
 NAI, CSO 26, No. 20653, July 16, 1928.  In this report, P. P. Lynch reported on the aboriginal status of the Ijo 
to the Secretary of Southern Provinces; E. J. Alagoa’s studies of the Ijo based on collected Oral Traditions of 
the various Clans across the Niger Delta have dealt in details on the early history of the people. See A. M. 
Okorobia, “History” inE. J. Alagoa, T. N. Tamuno and J. P. Clark (Eds), The Izon of the Niger Delta (Port 
Harcourt: Onyoma Research Publications, 2009).  
227
 E. J. Alagoa, ‘Oral Traditions among the Ijo of the Niger Delta,’ Journal of African History, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1966, 
P. 406.  
228
During the colonial period, the British made Intelligence Assessment Reports on almost all ethnic and sub-
groups in Nigeria. This covered their early histories including origins legends. These reports are at the Nigerian 
National Archives Ibadan (NAI), classified under CSO 26: Records of the Chief Secretary’s Office. See, NAI, CSO 
26, No. 29184, Fellows, L. E. H., Intelligence Report on the Tarakiri Clan of the Western Ijo Sub-Tribe, Warri 
Province, 1932; NAI, CSO 26, No. 27524, Hook, R. J., Intelligence Report on the Operemor  Clan of the Western 
Ijaw Sub-Tribe, Forcados District, Warri Province, 1930; NAI, CSO 26, No.7/2, Hook, R. J., Assessment Report on 
the Tuomor Clan of the Western Ijaw Sub-Tribe, Forcados District, Warri Province, 1930; NAI, CSO 26, No. 
29183, Hook, R. J., Assessment Report on the Ogula Clan of the Western Ijo Sub-Tribe, Forcados District, Warri 
Province, 1930; NAI, CSO 26, No. 7308, Johnson, S. E., Intelligence Report on the Gbaramatu Clan of the 
Western Ijo Sub-Tribe, Warri Province, 1930; NAI, CSO 26, No. 29181, Legge, C. C., Intelligence Report on the 
Seimbiri Sub-Clan of the Ogbo Clan of the Western Ijo Sub-Tribe, Forcados District, Warri Province, 1931; NAI, 
CSO 26, War Prof. 7/2, Main, P. V.,  Assessment Report on the Mein Clan of the Western Ijo Sub-Tribe, 1930; 
NAI, CSO 26, No. 26805, Rutherfoord, J. W. C., Assessment Report on the Kabowe – Kumbowe Sub-Clans of the 
Okita Clan of the Westen Ijo Sub-Tribe, 1929. See also, E. J. Alagoa, and Ebiegberi A. Femowei, ‘The Western 
Delta,’ in E. J. Alagoa, T. N. Tamuno and J. P. Clark (Eds), The Izon of the Niger Delta (Port Harcourt: Onyoma 
Research Publications, 2009).  
111 
 
around the principle of gerontocracy and primogeniture. Clan dictated blood and family ties 
determined relations to a large extent, while life generally was communal and sedentary.
229
 
This non-centralization of pre-colonial Western Ijo political system has been characterized as 
a society of fragmented village groups, constituted by people who appeal to common descent 
through the male line, with lineage groups playing prominent parts.
230
 Settlements (towns 
and villages) are constituted by families of common eponymous ancestors, designated into 
quarters. In turn, quarters are formed by several families each living within defined spaces 
known as compounds. Within such compounds are located a man, his wives and children as 
the case may be. The compound represents the smallest political unit with the male head of 
the family occupying a place of paramountcy. 
Essentially, within the pre-colonial Western Ijo Clan set up, the oldest man (Ama-
Okosowei) in the settlement was the political head of the community, and chairman or head 
of the village or town council (Amagula). This was the main political unit of administration 
in the Western Ijo areas. However, the day to day executive responsibilities of the Amagula 
were carried out by a much younger member of the council called the Ogulasuowei or 
spokesman of the settlement. He acted on behalf of the Council in the day to day relations 
with and between the people of the community and presented matters to the Amagula for 
deliberations and settlements. In religious matters, each settlement had its own priest, the 
Orukareowei, while the larger Clan or Ibe set up of several settlements had a Chief Priest, the 
Oru-Pere, who presided over the annual event of commemorations to the group god of the 
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On the whole, the precolonial socio-political system of the Western Ijo groups before 
the advent of the Europeans on the scene was one of a segmentary non-centralized 
organization anchored on autonomous settlements arranged into clan or Ibe lines, without 
kingship institutions in place, but rather governed by gerontocracy and age grade units. By 
the time of the arrival of European adventurers and traders on the coast in the late fifteenth 
century, the Ijo people of the Western Delta, though defined as a difficult group by the 
British, were well tuned within the confines of their political and social institutions to engage 
in the emergent external trade which eventually characterised their relations with Great 
Britain. 
5.2 Ijo Intercourse with the British 
It is pertinent to examine relations between the Ijo and the Europeans prior to the point of 
treaty-making for a better understanding of the dynamics of the encounters between the two 
groups. As indicated earlier, Europeans perceived the Ijo as difficult pirates, chiefly 
remarkable for treachery, lawlessness, and love of plunder. Consequently, in the grand 
scheme of mid-Victorian imperial policy towards Africa, the legal and philosophical 
foundations of colonisation as has been discussed in chapter two, were driven in part by the 
three Cs of commerce, civilization, and Christianity’.
232
 In British encounters with the 
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Western Ijo and others, clearly, what played out was a case of Great Britain balancing all the 
contingencies for expansion in the form of ideology and pragmatism. In the first instance, 
ideological notions of the so called, ‘White Man’s’ superiority over other races, a sentiment 
which had been given fillip long before the Scramble, influenced the characterisation of the 
Ijo and others as savages to which a moral responsibility lies with the Europeans to colonise 
and civilise.
233
 This  implied that, Great Britain  would have to rescue these wild lands from 
barrenness and savagery, so that,  the Ijo, like others in the Western Delta had to be pacified; 
to be freed from their state of innocence by extending to them European knowledge, religion 
and ways to progress. On the other hand, pragmatism in the form of the glaring potentials for 
commerce and natural resources in Africa offered justification for expansion. Thus, buoyed 
by both inter-European rivalries and an appetite for forest produce, Great Britain did not 
hesitate to enter into general diplomatic negotiation with the Western Ijo and other areas for 
the purposes of trade exploitation, but one, also underpinned by the ‘civilising mission’.
234
 
 The centrality of trade to Britain’s interest in the region was evident in the fact that 
early contact and later treaty-making were conducted through the Royal Niger Company. 
Though, not known for its civilizing mission, the RNC established itself in the Niger Basin 
and held sway as a trading company and principal imperial agent of the British Crown to 
ward off other European rivals. Indeed, long before the Scramble, its Chairman, George 
Goldie was desirous to see the dominion of Great Britain over the Niger Basin, and to gain 
access to the trade and resources of the hinterland, and ultimately to check the advance of the 
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French and the Germans.
235
 He set about this task by first, working to amalgamate the myriad 
of trading interests in the Niger Basin to form a new company from the United African 
Company (UAC) in 1879.
236
 In this process, the trading interests of the English merchants, 
James Crowther of the West African Company; David MacIntosh’s Central African 
Company; and the firms of the William Brothers and James Pinnock were combined with the 
UAC into the new National African Company (NAC), in 1882, with Goldie himself 
emerging as the Chief Agent of the combined conglomerate in the Niger Basin.
237
 Having 
out-muscled rival European trade interests, subsequently, this monopolistic firm, which was 
eventually given a Charter by the British Government in 1886 and renamed the Royal Niger 
Company (RNC), became not only the face of Great Britain’s trade interest and presence on 
the Niger by filling the niche which was lacking, but also as a fulcrum, vanguard and spur for 
aggressive imperial expansion as it was able to consolidate British presence and control 
through treaties concluded with indigenous peoples which, became the basis for subsequent 
legal and political control.
238
 
 It must be understood that, the pattern of granting charter rights to the RNC by the 
English Crown was, consistent with similar practice earlier in India and Canada as 
exemplified by the Charter granted the East India Company (EIC), and in the case of Canada, 
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the Hudson’s Bay Company’s (HBC) Charter of 1670. As discussed in chapter three, the 
HBC’s charter enabled her to become involved in the process of treaty-making, engaging in 
commercial monopoly and assuming political control on behalf of the Crown in an informal 
manner. Similarly, the political expediency of granting a charter to the RNC in 1886 
bestowed on her both commercial and governing rights over the Niger territories which, her 
agents exploited to conclude further treaties with the chiefs and peoples, and thus keeping the 
territories out of French hands. Indeed, the contracting of a company and the granting of a 
charter to the RNC should be seen as the early steps in the RNC becoming a form or conduit 
of British eventual political control in Nigeria.
239
  In the Niger territories, the RNC had its 
depot station at Akassa, at the mouth of the Nun River, and it was from there that trading 
steamers from England discharged their goods for the whole of the areas under the 
company’s later control, and loaded up again with the products of the indigenes, while its 
administrative headquarters was at Asaba, up the Niger from the Delta region. But how did 
Britain’s encounters and relations with the indigenous Ijo people of the Western Delta 
progress to the level of treaty-making and eventual establishment of political control?  
 In the era of the slave trade, the Ijo of the Western Delta like their Eastern Ijo 
brethren served as middlemen in the contact process between the hinterland and the 
Europeans at the coast. But, unlike the Eastern Delta, the Atlantic trade was not as much 
carried out in terms of volume in the Western Delta, the primary slave port being only the 
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Benin port of Gwato.
240
 Nevertheless, the pre-existing long distance internal trade between 
and amongst the various peoples of the Western Delta through the riparian system of the 
Delta, no doubt accentuated the growth and development of the emergent overseas slave 
trade and its later successor, the palm oil trade. Thus, the scene was laid out for the Ijo of the 
Western Delta to be actively involved in both the Atlantic and Palm Oil trades that emerged 
from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Both in the era of the slave trade and forest 
trade, the indigenes living near the sea and near the various factories were the middlemen 




However, it must be emphasized that, in histories of the slave era contact between the 
Delta peoples and the Europeans, prominence is often given to the Eastern Delta city-states 
of Bonny, Kalabari, Okrika, and Nembe-Brass.
242
  This may not be unconnected with the fact 
that the Western Delta unlike the Eastern Delta was not as much a trading hub both in the 
slave and legitimate commerce eras. This did not diminish the area from featuring in trade 
relations and the attendant political and diplomatic consequences it brought with the early 
Portuguese and other European powers, whose presence in and around the estuaries of the 
Escravos and Forcados Rivers in the late fifteenth century inevitably ensured interactions 
with the Ijo of the area. Indeed, Portuguese trading activities during the slave trade era were 
concentrated around the mouths of the Escravos, Forcados, and Benin Rivers which were the 
highways of the trade of the time between the coastal peoples and the Europeans. For 
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instance, from the early sixteenth century, the Portuguese enclave of Sao Tome was supplied 
with slaves supplied from Forcados.
243
  It appears that the Forcados area was as much a 
center of slave trading activity as the Benin port of Gwato, which has received more attention 
in existing historiography. Clearly, the Western Ijo, especially, the group Pereira referred to 
as Huela, who occupied the estuaries of the Forcados and the Escravos Rivers, were major 
players in the slave trade as much as the Benin and the Itsekiri did.
244
 
Importantly, it appears the organization of the slave trade with the Portuguese in the 
Western Delta was largely in the hands of the Benin, not the coastal Itsekiri and Ijo groups. 
In the early sixteenth century, a Portuguese ship trading in the Forcados had to send local 
indigenes – possibly – the Ijo and Itsekiri to Benin to buy slaves needed to complete its 
cargo, while the following year, the Captain of another ship from Sao Tome was instructed 
by the Oba (King) of Benin to endeavour to berth at the mouth of the Benin River, but that 
otherwise, arrangements would be made to send slaves from Benin to the Forcados.
245
 As the 
slave trade intensified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Portuguese were 
displaced by other European rivals, particularly Britain and France on the West Coast of 
Africa as the traffic in humans became the principal item of commerce most important to the 
economy of the New World.
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By the late eighteenth century, Dutch and English slave traders and ships had 
displaced the Portuguese as the main merchants on the Delta, operating around the estuaries 
of the Benin, Escravos and Forcados Rivers, at a time the export of populations to the new 
world was at its height, averaging between seventy thousand to eighty thousand slaves a 
year.
247
 By this time, the Western Ijo acted in tandem with the appellation given to them by 
Europeans as pirates and plunderers, mostly engaging in capturing hinterland peoples for 
their Itsekiri neighbours who in-turn sold such to the Europeans.
248
 This description, and 
Ryder’s characterization of Forcados, an Ijo settlement as an entrepot for slaves, clearly 
suggests that there may have been some form of cooperation between the two coastal groups 
– the Itsekiri and the Ijo, in the Atlantic slave era. In the social structures of the Western 
Delta, both the Itsekiri and the Ijo rarely kept their folks as slaves; rather, most slaves came 
through the slave routes from the Benin and Yoruba countries as victims of tribal wars.
249
 
The significance of this rests within the context of the intricacies of the ways and means of 
the slave trade, which was fraught with crises, bordering on conflicts and abductions that 
engendered mistrusts and rivalries. According to G. I. Jones, evidence from oral traditions of 
the Forcados Ijo indicates that, increased European demands for slaves in the seventeenth to 
eighteenth centuries led to numerous wars and slave raiding episodes between and amongst 
the various Ijo groups of the Western Delta, with the trend most common with the Mein and 
Trakiri (Tarakiri) Ijos.
250
 This perhaps explains why the Ijo were often engaged in piracy and 
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plunder. By and large, as E. J. Alagoa has noted, the Western Ijo were in a peripheral 
position in relation to the Itsekiri and the Benin in the emergent enterprise. Thus, the Ijo often 
preyed on the trade canoes of the Itsekiri in particular, plundering their cargo and whisking 
them off for themselves. The Kabowei of Patani were said to be notorious for such piratical 
activities on the Forcados, a trend they extended up to the palm oil trade era.
251
 
The abolition of the slave trade in the early nineteenth century forced the Western Ijo 
and the other groups to adjust and rearrange their relations with the Europeans, especially 
with the British in particular to suit the vagaries and demands of the new palm oil trade. The 
industrious and adaptive character of the people ensured that, the end of the slave trade did 
not overly affect their economic bases. Rather, the people took advantage of the new 
opportunity and redirected their resources and energies into the new palm oil trade, which by 
1840, was estimated to be millions of pounds in annual turnover.
252
 In this new trade, the 
Western Ijo featured prominently, setting out in the process relations and intercourse with the 
agents of Great Britain. But, it appears the Western Ijo, most likely because of their non-
centralized political system, could not fashion out an ordered trade arrangement, rather, they 
seem to have been more involved in the carrying business of the palm oil trade, of getting 
forest goods from the hinterland Urhobo (Sobo)  and Isoko groups, and delivering such to 
British traders who at this time were stationed in a few Western Ijo settlements, such as 
Forcados, Burutu, Patani, Ganagana, and Frukama which, had emerged as trading centers, 
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5.3 RNC Treaties with Western Ijo 
As the imperial ambitions of the European powers increased in Africa, the accelerated 
expansion of Great Britain into Western Ijo areas was facilitated by a trading company, 
acting to all intents and purposes on behalf of Great Britain. Like the cases of the HBC and 
NZC in Canada and New Zealand, the NAC (later RNC), was the agency on ground, driving 
the imperial process in this instance. The treaties it concluded with indigenous chiefs, served 
both its trade interests and the imperial ambitions of Britain. These treaties, which gave the 
company trade advantages and also transferred sovereign powers to it and later to Great 
Britain in 1899, when its Charter was abrogated, provided the fait accompli for British 
colonisation of the people. For instance, two weeks before the opening of the Berlin 
Conference, the National African Company was able to obtain through treaties from African 
chiefs concessions of trading and political rights and also won significant trade wars with 
French companies, and drove them out of the Niger Basin. These were the treaties and others 
rushed to the Berlin Conference by Goldie and relied upon by British negotiators to validate 
Great Britain’s claims over the Niger territories.
255
This feat subsequently enabled the 
declaration of a protectorate over the Niger Districts by Great Britain in June 1885.
256
 This 
did not require military force. 
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 The process of treaty-making between the NAC and the indigenous Western Ijo 
predated the Berlin Conference. As discussed in chapter two, apparently influenced by 
nineteenth century European legal understandings of treaty-making as a means of acquiring 
title deed to territories, the National African Company under Goldie and its Chief Agent 
MacIntosh – the same that was bought over by Goldie - doggedly embarked on a treaty-
making enterprise with several Western Ijo settlements. By the 1880s, as the Delta states 
were struggling with how to secure their middleman position in the palm oil trade, Britain 
was streamlining its plans to push further into the interior to have direct access to producers 
of palm oil. The operative philosophy of the British was control, commerce and profits, and 
in this case, the NAC provided the needed tonic to achieve these objectives of incorporating 
the Ijo territories into Great Britain’s commercial and political orbit. 
 In its treaty-making enterprise in the Niger territories, the NAC employed ten 
different types of treaty forms. From available records, one can only speculate why different 
and not a single uniform treaty form was used. Perhaps, the exigencies of the time could not 
allow for the production of a single uniform treaty form. It is also likely that the different 
forms were designed to serve different peculiar situations. Nevertheless, the basic provisions 
of these numbered treaties were similar, including the transfer of indigenous territory and 
sovereignty to the NAC and its administrators forever; forbidding the indigenes from 
entering into any form of legal bind with other European powers; and remedies which could 
be activated in the event of breach of any aspects of the clauses inherent in the treaties. All 
the treaty forms also had provisions for an interpreter and a witness, and the name of Edward 
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Hyde Hewett, who was Consul of the Niger Districts at the time. They also bore the name of 
D. MacIntosh, the Chief Agent of the NAC and right-hand man of Goldie on the coast. 
 The forms did differ in the number of articles or clauses contained. Whereas a 
majority of them had up to ten articles, others were made up of four to five articles. Again, 
one can speculate that the different forms with varying articles and clauses may have been 
used simply because that was what was available at the time, or because the different articles 
contained specific clauses which were relevant to each individual encounter, as detailed 
below. There also seem to have been some adjustments to forms over the course of the 
treaty-making encounter. For instance, Form (1) was used to conclude arrangements with 
indigenous peoples between January and December 1884. Form (2) was used from August to 
October 1884, but not used for any settlement under this study. Form (3), September to 
October 1884, was also not used for any settlement here. Form (4) was used from March to 
October 1886, but also did not cover areas of this study. Form (5), from April 1884 to 
September 1888, this form was used most with the Ijo under this study. Form (6) was used 
between April 1885 and November 1885. Form (7) was not used for any treaty conclusions 
with settlements under the study area. Form (8) was used in June 1885. Form (9) was used 




 In all, the NAC and later the RNC concluded thirty treaties with the Ijo of the 
Western Delta, under forms number one, five and nine. It is impossible to know the total 
number of Western Ijo settlements as at the time of their encounters with the British as a 
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measure of knowing whether the treaty-making exercise involved all of the settlements. A 
noticeable trend was that the process was rather more like a cherry-picking one whereby, one 
settlement after the other was approached and treaties were concluded with them; this likely 
explains why so many treaty forms were used. 
These agreements ultimately ceded political and sovereign rights of the indigenous 
peoples to the Company and later Great Britain, even though as in the other cases, it can be 
argued that the indigenous leadership and its people had little or no understanding of the full 
implications of affixing their marks on the treaties. For the imperial agent, this was 
irrelevant, as far the treaties served the purpose of granting trade advantages and imperialism. 
Interestingly, the concluded treaties unwittingly reflected a spread across the identified Clans 
of the Western Ijo of this study. It is apparent that the imperial agent was not keen on trying 
to bring together all of the different clans for a few big treaties, instead, it negotiated with 
them all individually and signing many treaties. Perhaps, the Company had enough local 
Intel to know how the people were organized along clan lines. A close examination reveals 
that, at least one settlement in each of the clans, not necessarily the head town concluded a 
treaty with the imperial agent.  
Again, a further analysis of the pattern of treaty-making by the NAC in Western Ijo 
territory reveals some salient points. As earlier noted, some of the treaties, especially those 
concluded before the start of the Berlin Conference, were the treaties rushed by Goldie to that 
Conference to validate Great Britain’s presence and hold in the Niger territories, and also 
referenced in the Charter application of the Company in 1886.
258
 Secondly, the process began 
with settlements at the headwaters of the Forcados River around the Patani area, and moved 
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downstream to the Atlantic coast, covering the settlements at the estuaries of the Escravos 
and Forcados Rivers. One can explain the trend of starting at Patani perhaps as a result of its 
status as a trade hub, being one of the trade stations of the Niger Company, and also being 
close to the Isoko and Ukwuani palm oil producers. It may also have been due to its 
reputation as a piratical hub, thus a need to conclude treaties with Patani, so as to quickly 
bring it under the control of the company. Lastly, the negotiation processes of these treaties 
are not easily discernible from the contents, even though the names and signatures or marks 
of the indigenous leadership that signed are clearly recognizable. 
 In light of the above, a time based analysis of the treaty-making episodes between the 
NAC and the Western Ijo reveals that in 1884, between October and December, seven 
treaties were concluded with the following settlements accordingly: Torofani – Terro Fanni 
(Otrofani of Kabowei Clan) settlement of the Patani area (21 October, 1884)
259
; Patani – Big 
Patanithe head town of the Kabowei Clan (22 October, 1884)
260
; Ogollama (Agoloma), 
Angiama, Obiodiobiri(Ebedebiri), and Angalabiri (all on 27 December, 1884)
261
; Sagbama -  
head town of the Kumbowei Clan (29 December, 1884).
262
 The Torofani and Patani treaties 
were concluded under form number one, and from the conclusion dates, the Patani treaty was 
                                                          
259
 TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Terro Fanni (Torofani), 21 October 
1884, Pp.102 – 103. 
260
 TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Big Patani, 22 October 1884, Pp. 
100-101. 
261
 The Ogollama, Angiama, Obiodiobiri, and Angalabiri treaties were concluded on the same day. These 
settlements are just a few miles apart from one another on the left and right banks of the Forcados River. See, 
TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Ogollama, 27 December, 1884, Pp. 80-
81; TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Angiama, 27 December, 1884, Pp. 
84-85; TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Obiodiobiri, 27 December, 
1884, Pp. 86-87; TNA, F. O. 84/1748, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Angalabiri, 27 
December, 1884, Pp. 96-97. 
262




concluded a day after that of Torofani. On the other hand, the treaties with Ogollama, 
Angiama, Obiodiobiri, Angalabiri, and Sagbama were concluded with form number five.  
Typically, the text of the pro forma treaty form number one was as follows: 
We, the undersigned …fully recognize the benefit accorded to our country and people 
by our intercourse with the National African Company (Limited), and, in recognition 
of this, we now cede the whole of our territory to the National African Company 
(Limited), and their administrators, forever. In consideration of this, the National 
African Company (Limited) will not interfere with any of the native laws, and also 
not encroach on any private property unless the value is agreed upon by the owner 
and the said Company. 
The National African Company (Limited) will reserve to themselves the right of 
excluding foreign settlers. 
Any palaver that may exist with any other tribe at any time, or in the event of any 
dispute arising between the …and territory, shall at once be referred to the National 
African Company (Limited) or their representative at the time. 
We, the …and district, do hereby agree to afford assistance at any time for the 
protection of the said Company’s’ property and people. 
As per mutual consent of the … of the foregoing agreement, The National African 
Company (Limited), agreed to pay … 
       David McIntosh. 
      pp. The National African Company (Limited), 
In approval of the foregoing agreement, we, the …, do hereby affix our names as 
under. 
We, the undersigned, are witnesses to the marks of the …, and also vouch for their 
understanding what they have signed. 
I do hereby declare that the foregoing Agreement was duly and correctly explained to 
the above …, and they fully understood it. 
      (Signed) … 
Declared before me, at… this… day of … 1884. 
Consular Seal affixed here.     EDWARD HYDE HEWETT, 
128 
 




As earlier indicated, clearly the NAC and the imperial power were working in one 
accord, given that Consul Hewett’s name was boldly captured in the treaties. Apparently, it 
was a case of the imperial Consul overseeing and ratifying any action taken or agreement 
concluded by the agents of the Company. This underscores the notion that, the Company 
clearly acted on behalf of the British Crown in its treaty-making endeavours. As noted, Form 
One was used for the first treaty the NAC concluded with the Ijo of the Western Delta, that 
with the Otrofani on 21 October 1884. However, the treaty - which was also on Form One - 
with Big Patani (Patani), the head town of the Kabowei Clan, to which Otrofani also belongs 
perhaps deserve greater attention because of its place as a center of trade, and some 
developments between the people and the Company which degenerated to conflict. 
The Patani treaty was concluded on 22 October 1884 under form number one. The 
title reads, The National African Company, Limited, Treaty with Big Patani. The addition of 
the word ‘Big’ perhaps suggests that the Agents of the Company were informed or 
cognizance of the fact that they were dealing with a settlement that was an amalgam of 
several Kabowei communities, as indeed, Patani town is a fusion of several descendants of 
the eponymous founder of the Kabowei Clan. Following this, reference is made to King and 
Chiefs of Big Patani in the opening sentence of the treaty and repeated in five other instances 
in the body of the treaty including the signing section. This indicated that, the Company and 
its Agents most probably dealt with a King and his Chiefs. As seen in the signatory section, 
the column of the King where he affixed his mark was separated from the other Chiefs who 
                                                          
263
 For samples of the various pro forma Treaty forms, see, TNA, F. O. 881/6425, Treaties. Royal Niger 
Company and Native Chiefs, 1884-1892,Pp. 4-16. 
129 
 
affixed after him. In total, the King and his Chiefs who affixed their marks were ten in 
number accordingly: King Buloway; Chief Apaupri, Chief Ebarr, Chief Amanana, Chief 
Deggeh, Chief Eggarah, Chief Wohloah, Chief Bibrah, Chief Oputeh, and Chief Amanana 
Oboo. The treaty was also witnessed and signed by six persons, three of whom seems to be 
Europeans, while the other three seems like African employees of the Company, going by 
their names, and the fact that unlike the European witnesses, they affixed marks like the 
indigenous King and Chiefs. The Africans also seem to have been the interpreters of the 
contents of the treaty to the people, with their names and marks coming under the section of 
the treaty which outlines that the witnesses vouch for the natives’ understanding of what they 
have signed.
264
 The names of the witnesses were: E. A. Bedford; E. P. Lowe; and M. F. G. 
Monday as the Europeans; Obooragu, Agberi, and Abokie, as the Africans. The treaty seems 
to have been negotiated by Isaac T. Palmer, on behalf of the Company, while it was 
obviously taken to the Company’s headquarters at Akassa and certified by its Chief Agent 
David MacIntosh on the 15 November 1884. 
Patani was significant as a trade center farther up the Forcados River and close to the 
Isoko and Ukwuani oil producers.
265
 Without the Itsekiri to contend with unlike the Ijos at 
the mouths of the Forcados and Escravos Rivers, Patani enjoyed the middleman advantage in 
the Company’s dealings with the hinterland groups.
266
 Most importantly, it was likely that 
the trading companies – John Holt and the NAC- chose to set up station at Patani not just 
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because of its proximity to the hinterland Isoko oil markets alone, but because of its 
proximate location to the Niger. By the 1840s, the route from Warri, via the Patani axis of the 
Forcados River had been explored by Beecroft, so that it became preferred for its deeper bar 
and shorter time to get to the Niger from Warri compared to the Nun River route which was 
troubled by Eastern Ijo pirates for centuries so much so that, almost every European traveler 
along that route had experienced an affray with them. Consular reports by Campbell to the 
Foreign Office within the 1850s indicated that the menace of Ijo pirates became unbearable 
to the point where English merchants took it upon themselves to confront the pirates with 
war canoes, but with little success. By 1856, the pirates were said to engage in looting boats 
within the sight of English factories.
267
  In the Western Delta, the mouths of the Escravos and 
Forcados Rivers and the Patani area were so notorious for Ijo piracy activities that the British 
Admiralty was called in on occasions to protect factories.
268
 Nevertheless, by the 1870s, all 
seemed calm as Ijo piracy activities reduced significantly, especially around the estuaries of 
the Escravos and the Forcados. No doubt, this calm was engendered by the growth of the 
palm oil trade and the gradual establishment of the presence of the Niger Company and other 
trading concerns. So that, as slaving activities declined considerably and later fizzled out in 
the face of the new trade, the Western Ijo and other groups were forced to adapt and 
participate in the emergent commerce in the Niger Basin.
269
 
 However, in the organization of the trade, one distinctive Royal Niger Company 
practice in the area was its introduction of the instant payment for goods system. The 
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company did not do its business on the trust system which prevailed in the Itsekiri and 
Urhobo areas, as payment was only made for what is actually supplied and received. This 
suggests that, while strong trade links existed between the Company and indigenous peoples, 
there was also evidence of some continued mistrust between the two parties. Nevertheless the 
Ijo were attracted ostensibly by the economic benefits associated with the new commerce and 
this practice does not seem to have discouraged trade.
270
 It was in the course of taking 
advantage of this new commerce that the Patani area had altercations with the Company.  
What must be quickly noted here is that the conclusion of the treaty with Big Patani 
did not entirely stop some use of violence by the British in their encounters and relations with 
the people as demonstrated shortly. We can recall the prominence of Patani in European 
accounts earlier in the slave era, when piratical activities of the Kabowei on the Forcados 
were so worrisome that Consular and company officials took measures to curtail their 
preying on trade canoes and goods. Indeed, in the 1850s, efforts by English merchants to 
chastise the Ijo on their looting activities on the Forcados River yielded little, to the extent 
that, even gunboat operations to seek and destroy the lair of the Ijo pirates in 1856 did not 
achieve the desired objective, as Ijo piracy on the Forcados continued unabated.
271
 An 
incident which warranted the intervention of the Niger Constabulary of the RNC was 
narrated in Claude MacDonald’s Mission up the Niger in 1891. In this instance, most likely 
in 1887, the Patani were said to have harboured a local trader from Brass, who came up the 
Niger with a canoe laden with smuggled goods, and upon being detected by the Company’s 
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ship, the Vigilant, which was patrolling the river, the Brass man rowed into Patani to seek 
refuge, and in the process, the people of Patani came out and opened fire on the Vigilant, 
forcing it to retreat.
272
 This action by the Patani prompted a reaction from the Niger 
Constabulary, to attack the town and occupied it for some time.
273
 
The import of this incident was that, despite the conclusion of a treaty earlier in 1884 
with the Company, the Patani Ijo seemed to have exercised considerable commercial and 
political independence. Clearly, the reaction of the Company points towards post treaty 
enforcement of political and commercial rights inherent in the treaty of 1884. By the 1880s, 
as Scott Pearson has noted, the RNC had succeeded in becoming a virtual monopoly, 
circumventing the native middlemen in the oil palm trade, and established relatively high 
customs duties and a licensing system which cut off the indigenes out of the Niger trade 
effectively.
274
 Indeed, in the aforementioned episode with the Brass man and the Patani, the 
Brass man’s actions of trading goods, which the Company must have taken as its sole 
preserve, and the attempt by the Patani to come to the Brass man’s aid were taken as inimical 
to the monopolistic operations of the Company, hence, the punitive action against Patani to 
teach the town a lesson for challenging the Company. This attack on Patani it must be noted, 
was the only recorded punitive action against any Ijo settlement in the Western Delta, but it 
came four years after treaty diplomacy had been used as a first step to pacify the people and 
subsume them under the political control of the Company. However, an important point to 
note from this episode was, whether this action by the Company on the Patani had the effect 
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of getting other groups to cooperate with the company in concluding treaties. The answer to 
this is not clear-cut, but the treaty-making endeavours between the Company and other Ijo 
groups continued unabated. 
The Company concluded treaties in succession with Ogollama (Agoloma), 
Obiodiobiri (Ebedebiri), Angalabiri on 27 December, and with Sagbama on 29 December 
1884. These were all on form number five. In content, Form Five was more elaborate than 
Form One. Specifically, it contained additional clauses giving full powers to the Company 
over the indigenous peoples on matters of war and dispute resolutions with neighbouring 
groups. It also granted the Company rights to mine and build in any portion of the territories 
of the people in addition to the control of their internal and external diplomatic relations. 
Typically, as tools for colonisation the text of the pro forma form number five was as 
follows: 
We, the undersigned Chiefs of ……, with the view to the bettering of the condition of 
our country and people, do this day cede to the National African Company, Limited, 
forever the whole of our territory extending from ……. 
We also give to the said National African Company, Limited, full power to settle all 
disputes arising from any cause whatever, and we pledge ourselves not to enter into 
any war with other tribes without the sanction of the said National African Company, 
Limited. 
We understand that the said National African Company, Limited, have full power to 
mine, and build in any portion of our country. 
We bind ourselves not to have any intercourse with any strangers or foreigners except 
through the said the National African Company, Limited. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the said National African Company, Limited, bind 
themselves not to interfere with any of the native laws or customs of the country, 
consistently with the maintenance of order and good government. 
The said National African Company, Limited, agree to pay native owners of land a 
reasonable amount for any portion they may require. 
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The said National African Company, Limited, bind themselves to protect the said 
chiefs from the attacks of any neighbouring aggressive tribes. 
The said National African Company, Limited, also agree to pay the said Chiefs …… 
measures native value. 
We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby solemnly declare that the ……. Chiefs 
whose names are placed opposite their respective crosses have in our presence affixed 
their crosses of their own free will and consent, and that the said …… has in our 
presence affixed his signature 
  (Signed) ………. 
Done in triplicate at …., this ……. Day of ……, 188… 
    Declaration by Interpreter 
I … native of, do hereby solemnly declare that I am well acquainted with the 
language of the … country, and that on the … day of …, 188…, I truly and faithfully 
explained the above Agreement to all the Chiefs present, and they understood its 
meaning. 
 
The next set of treaties with the Ijo of the Western Delta were concluded in 1885 
between February and October, so partially after the Berlin Conference ended. The treaty 
with the Kumbowei settlement of Appelebiri was concluded on 17 February 1885. The 
treaties with the Kabowei settlements of Ekperiwari, Ofonibahan (Elemebiri), and Samabiri 
were concluded on same day, 23 February 1885. The treaty with the Seimbiri Clan settlement 
of Opokoni was concluded on 16 March 1885, while the treaty with Babalabiri, of Mein was 
concluded on 12 June 1885. The last treaty in 1885 was with the Akoumbri, a Kumbowei 
settlement, on 27 October.
275
 These treaties were all concluded under form number five 
above.  Following these, two treaties were concluded in 1886 with, the Olodiama of Iduwini 
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on 15 June, and with Pakiama of Mein on 17 October, respectively. These treaties were also 
settled under form number five. But by far, the largest numbers of treaties under form 
number five, were concluded with the Western Ijo in the year 1888.  
As earlier said, the treaty making process followed a movement from the Patani axis 
in the north, southwards towards the mouths of the Escravos and Forcados Rivers. Thus, in 
the process, between June and September 1888, a total of twelve treaties were concluded 
with several settlements in this order: 12 June; Bomodija and Baragola of Mein. 13 June; 
Ayakruama of Seimbiri. 14 June; Amassamah of Obotebe. 16 June; Baccabo, Borotu and 
Gana- Gana. 17 June; Froukama. 18 June; Oboro. 28 August; Goolah of the Ogulagha Clan 7 
September; Balabiri, and 12 September; Foonoweh. Again, these were also all concluded 
under treaty form five.
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The last sets of treaties were concluded with the Ofunobiri and Egbematoro 
settlements on 8 and 30 July 1889 respectively, but under Treaty Form Nine. This form was 
not significantly different from Forms One and Five other than bearing the name Royal Niger 
Company as against the others which carried the old pre-charter name of the Company. Its 
clauses were much similar to the others as follows: 
Treaty made on the …. day of ……, 18…., between the Chiefs of …… on the one 
hand, and the Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited), hereinafter called “the 
Company,” on the other hand. 
We, the undersigned Chiefs of ……., with the consent of our people, and with the 
view of bettering their condition, do this day cede to the company, and to their 
assigns, forever, the whole of our territory; but the Company shall pay private owners 
a reasonable amount for any portion of land that the Company may require from time 
to time. 
                                                          
276
 TNA, F. O. 881/6425. 
136 
 
We hereby give to the Company and their assigns, forever, full jurisdiction of every 
kind; and we pledge ourselves not to enter into any war with other tribes without the 
sanction of the Company. 
We also give to the Company and their assigns, forever, the sole right to mine in our 
territory. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the Company bind themselves not to interfere with 
any of the native laws or customs of the country, except so far as may be necessary 
for good government and the maintenance of order. 
The Company bind themselves to protect, as far as practicable, the said Chiefs from 
the attacks of any neighbouring aggressive tribes 
In consideration of the above, the Company have this day paid the said Chiefs of 
…… goods to the value of ……., receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. 
This agreement having been interpreted to us, the above mentioned Chiefs of ……, 
we hereby approve, and accept it for ourselves and for our people with their consent, 
and, in testimony of this, having no knowledge of writing, do affix our marks below 
it, and I, ……., for and on behalf of the Company, do hereby affix my hand. 
We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby solemnly declare that the Chiefs whose 
names are placed opposite their respective marks have in our presence affixed their 
marks of their own free will and consent, and the said …… has, in our presence, 
affixed his signature. 
   (Signed)……. 
   For the Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) 
    Declaration by Interpreter 
I… native of …... do hereby solemnly declare that I am well acquainted with the 
……language, and that on the …… day of ……, 18……, I truly faithfully explained 
the above agreement to all the native signatories whose marks are affixed to this 
Treaty, and that they understood its meaning. 
 Witness to the above … mark signature: 
Done in triplicate at …, this … day of …. 18…. 
On the whole, the peaceful treaty-making process between the Western Ijo and the Company 
set the stage for further developments in Great Britain’s relations with the people after the 
Berlin Conference. As indicated, the treaty-making process was a long one, but what 
followed on the part of the Company and the imperial power were predicated on the inherent 
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clauses and provisions in the treaties which empowered Great Britain to consolidate on its 
hold on the Western Ijo territories.  
5.4 British Consolidation 
The change from the slave trade to palm oil trade translated to a greater presence and 
influence of Great Britain and her agents in the territories of the Western Ijo by the 
nineteenth century. As Martin Lynn has pointed out, during most of the nineteenth century, 
the palm oil trade constituted the catalyst that defined the relationship between Great Britain 
and West Africa, so much so that from 1807 when the slave trade was abolished, up to the 
end of the century and beyond, the emergent palm oil trade impacted majorly not only on the 
internal politics and economy of the indigenous states and peoples, but also on the direction 
and increased development of British imperialism.
277
 This increased growth in British push 
into Western Ijo territories, as they did in the cases of the Itsekiri and Urhobo discussed in 
chapters four and five, crystallized in a greater involvement of Great Britain and her officials 
and agents in the affairs of the people.  
So, ultimately, for the Western Ijo, the final outcome was the incorporation of the Ijo 
areas into the British Empire, beginning with the treaty-making activities of the National 
African Company in 1884. By the time of its Charter in 1886, the RNC through the powers 
conferred on it by the Charter found it easy to conclude further treaties with the Chiefs and 
peoples of other Ijo territories who inadvertently placed their domains under the protection of 
the Company, a company acting to all intents and purposes on behalf of the British Crown. 
With the concluded treaties, the RNC was able to assume control of the political and 
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economic dynamics of the territories of the Niger Basin under its jurisdiction, and 
consequently made economic gains in large measures from the palm oil trade up to 1899 
when its Charter was revoked by the British government. What is of utmost importance here 
is that the RNC played a pivotal role in bringing about the Western Ijo areas eventually under 
British colonisation through its industrious treaty-making enterprise with the indigenous 
peoples.  
 An analysis of all the treaties concluded with the Ijo of the Western Delta reveals 
some discernible operative words in relation to the theme of peaceful treaty diplomacy as a 
central instrument employed by Great Britain in incorporating these areas systematically into 
her imperial domain. These are, ‘we, the undersigned Chiefs…cede to the Company the 
whole of our territory, forever.’ It is doubtful if the said Chiefs truly understood the full 
import of these words before putting their marks on the treaties. But, in extracting these 
treaties from the indigenous chiefs, the Company and its agents must have felt they were 
acting legally and within the context of nineteenth century European international law, a 
process that was witnessed by local interpreters, who swore that they were well acquainted 
with the language of the natives and had fully explained the terms of the treaties to them. 
Thus, what was done was time tested colonisation process, one of treaty-making towards 
both appropriation of territory and gaining of political and sovereign rights over others. It 
was a practice that was considered as fixed and traditionally European carried forward from 
earlier times and applied in the age of empire. 
 As indicated earlier, at the Berlin Conference, Great Britain was recognized as the 
power of influence in the Niger Basin. Thus, it became the duty of Great Britain to enforce 
the principles of free navigation and commerce enunciated at Berlin. To do so ultimately 
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warranted a greater control of the areas with which treaties had been concluded. Thus, 
effective occupation necessitated a need to also establish and maintain sufficient authority for 
peace and governance in the acquired territories.
278
To conform to the foregoing 
understanding at Berlin, Great Britain notified the other powers of her various protectorates 
which she had acquired through treaties on the Niger territories. As such, in 18 October, 
1887, the FO duly released a notification in the London Gazette announcing the annexation 
of various territories, including the Western Ijo areas, which have all now been subjected 
under Her Majesty’s protection, by virtue of the concluded treaties with indigenous 
leadership.
279
Note that a similar notification was inserted in the same London Gazette of 5 
June 1885, proclaiming a British Protectorate, following the conclusion of the Berlin 
Conference and based on the treaties concluded with the Itsekiri as indicated in chapter five. 
Both instances clearly underscore the importance of treaties in the colonisation process, and 
more importantly, the use of treaties, obtained mainly through peaceful means further 
underscores the colonisation process as mainly devoid of force. 
By and large, the claims and sovereignty rights of Great Britain over the territories of 
the Western Ijo areas were based entirely on treaty rights, obtained from the indigenous 
chiefs, who in principle gave their voluntary consent when they affixed their marks to the 
treaties.
280
 Whether these treaties were obtained under questionable manners is impossible to 
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determine from the records available, although, one is not oblivious of typical British treaty-
making episodes in other parts of the world as discussed in chapter three. However, the 
concern here is that, in the course of the European partition of Africa, territorial titles through 
concluded treaties played a significant role in the subjugation and annexation of the 
territories of indigenous peoples. Importantly, contained in these treaties were far-reaching 
clauses and provisions which invariably implied surrender of political and sovereign rights 
and territories on the part of the indigenes to the imperial powers. The operative words in the 
treaties as pointed out earlier attests to this point.  
In places where the imperial power had concluded treaties, usually, the next step was 
the establishment of some form of administration as demanded by Article XXXV of the 
Berlin Act. In the case of the RNC, by the provisions of its Charter, it had responsibility to 
maintain law and order in its territories. Consequently, the Company established 
administrative machineries to coordinate its commercial and governance activities in its vast 
territory. On the commercial side, matters of revenue, customs duties and import and export 
controls were introduced, which invariably turned the Company to a monopolistic concern. 
This commercial strategy worked out well for the Company up to the revocation of its 
Charter in 1899, and its success was underpinned by an administrative system overseen by its 
Agent-General. The Company’s formal administrative structures were made up of its office 
headquarters at Asaba, at which the Agent General of the Company operated from. A judicial 
arm had jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters in the territories that had been subsumed 
under the authority of the Company through the concluded treaties. A constabulary force, 
supported by a fleet of more than twenty vessels was also established, pursuant to 
enforcement of treaty terms and protection of the Company’s properties and personnel. 
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Essentially, the company functioned according to regulations determined at its headquarters 
in London, where the Company’s Board of Directors, or Council, chaired then by Lord 
Aberdare and with Goldie as Vice-Chairman and de facto Chief Executive Officer, served as 
the ultimate authority, just as a Governor would in other protectorates.
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However, on the spot in the Niger, correspondence between the company and its 
headquarters in London revealed that different officials were responsible for making and 
taking decisions, but that such officials appropriately reported to the Agent General for the 
whole territories of the company. The situation was such that, there was a commandant in 
charge of the discipline and efficiency of the Company’s Constabulary, while a judge looked 
after all judicial matters at Asaba. District Agents and assistants oversaw the various districts 
in which the Company’s territory was divided into for day to day administration. In this vein, 
each District Agent had complete executive powers within his District but took instructions 
from the Company’s Agent General. The District Agents also controlled the constabulary in 
their domains, except only when the overall commandant of the force assumed direct control 
if need be. The judicial functions of the District Agents involved hearing and deciding cases 
at their domains, but once a matter involved a criminal case, a foreigner and an amount 
exceeding fifty pounds, it was referred to the Supreme Court at Asaba, though not before the 
District Agent had conducted preliminary investigations.
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G. L. Baker has noted that, in all its time on the Niger territories, the Company had 
only two substantive Agents Generals, in the persons of David McIntosh, who served from 
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1885 to 1888. The second was Joseph Flint, who succeeded McIntosh on 15 November 1888. 
He served up to and through the year of the revocation of the Company’s Charter in 1899, 
and subsequently handed over to the British Government on 1 January 1900. All others, 
whose names feature in documents as Agent General took on the duty as acting agents as a 
result of the Company’s policy of propping up Senior Executive Officers designated to act on 
behalf of the Agent General in given situations.
283
 This was why names of others other than 
McIntosh and Flint appeared in some of treaties with the Ijo of the Western Delta. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined how Great Britain colonised the indigenous Ijo groups of the Western 
Delta. It found that, even though there was a solitary case of gun-boat diplomacy, the process 
overall was mostly peaceful, achieved through treaties as against wide use of force of arms or 
threat of its use. The chapter opened with an examination of the early history of the people, 
in the process, identifying the various groups that constituted the Western Ijo, their location 
and settlement patterns within the estuaries of the Escravos and Forcados Rivers, as well as 
along the right and left banks of the Forcados up to Patani. In all, fifteenth Clans were 
identified as making up the group, which all trace origin mostly from their kith and kin in the 
Central Delta, and remains also culturally and linguistically not fundamentally different from 
the other Ijo groups who occupy the bulk of the Niger Basin. 
 The chapter realized that the social and political system of the Western Ijo in 
comparative terms with the Ijo of the Eastern Delta was quite different. Whereas in the 
Eastern Delta the city-state system prevailed, the unit of political organization in the Western 
Delta was the compound and village assembly. This non-centralized character of governance 
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in the Western Delta developed institutions of state identified as the town/village assembly 
(Council) – Amagula, the oldest man – Ama-Okosowei, spokesman – Ogulasuowei, priest – 
Orukareowei, and chief priest of the Clan – Oru-Pere, which together, coordinated both 
social and political governance of the Western Ijo settlements. The high level of the 
involvement of ordinary folks in governance created, greater and individual participation 
which was induced more by a lack of a centralized kingship figure head which would 
otherwise have affected differently the emergent economic and political relations with the 
Europeans beginning from the fifteenth century. In the event, the autonomous settlement 
patterns of the Western Ijo engendered a system of independent settlements acting devoid of 
central control both in the slave trade and palm oil trade eras in relation to their neighbours 
and to the Europeans in general. Thus, unlike their Itsekiri neighbours, the Western Ijo could 
not fashion out and sustain a coordinated control of trade. So that, their activities were 
limited mostly to raiding and carrying businesses, which invariably earned them the 
sobriquet, pirates and plunderers in most European accounts.  
 However, by the palm oil trade era, a few Western Ijo settlements emerged as trade 
hubs, with Patani at the headwaters of the Forcados turning out as most prominent, housing a 
station of the Niger Company. From here, the Company traded palm oil from the Isoko and 
Ukwuani hinterlands. Other Ijo groups engaged more in the business of carrying palm oil 
from the hinterland Urhobo and Isoko producing areas to the trading stations at Burutu, 
Forcados, Ganagana and Frukama. Nevertheless, as the imperial interests of Europeans 
intensified in the late nineteenth century, the Western Ijo like the Itsekiri and the Urhobo 
found themselves at the mercy and machinations of Great Britain, which desired to gain more 
access into the hinterland regions of the Niger Basin. In this case, the move from informal 
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empire to formal control was achieved mainly through the conclusion of treaties, which were 
used as a first step towards pacifying the people and eventually as justification for the legal 
and political proclamation of protectorates over the indigenous peoples and their territories. 
 Evidence shows that no entity was more instrumental in bringing about the Western 
Ijo areas under the eventual control of Great Britain than the Royal Niger Company (RNC), 
which began its trading activities in 1879 as the United African Company. By 1882, it had 
metamorphosed into the National African Company having bought over other trade interests 
in the Niger Basin on the strength of its then very enterprising head, Sir George Goldie. 
Imbued with a desire for imperial acquisition of the Niger territories for Great Britain, Goldie 
embarked on a treaty-making endeavour with indigenous leadership of the Niger areas years 
before even the Charter of his Company was approved. This treaty-making enterprise turned 
out first as a bulwark against French and German rivals, but most importantly, as instruments 
for the validation of British claims over the Niger areas at the Berlin Conference on West 
Africa. To all intents and purposes, the RNC through its treaties with the indigenous people 
in which they placed their territories under British protection, succeeded in consolidating 
British Colonial interests in the Niger Basin, and subsequently, in the creation of the Colony 
of Nigeria in 1914. There is no gainsaying in the fact that, the Company served the ends of 
Great Britain, as its principal agent in its imperial machinations on the Niger. Indeed, the 
eventual granting of the Charter to the Company in 1886, rationalized the sole objective of 
the British Government to achieve its grand designs through the Company. By 1899, when its 
Charter was revoked, evidently because it became impossible for a chartered company to 
hold its own against the state supported protectorates of rival European powers such as 
France and Germany, the ceded territories which the company had controlled through 
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peaceful treaty-making, though for a relatively short time, were nevertheless, easily 
transferred to the Niger Coast Protectorate and later the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 
1900. This transition was easily achieved ostensibly on the strength of the concluded treaties 
which had earlier effectively placed the indigenous territories under the Company’s 
jurisdiction, a company which acted on behalf of Great Britain, the eventual beneficiary of 
















Chapter Six: The Urhobo Welcomes British Officials 
 
The ground is high and though covered with forest could be easily cleared. 
The people of Sapele informed me that if I would come and build there, they 





As discussed in chapter four, the main differences between the British and Nana stemmed 
from British desires to expand into the hinterlands, a move Nana regarded as a displacement 
of his role as middleman in the palm oil trade. This chapter explores how, from 1891, the 
British began to gradually engage directly with the Urhobo areas, first through Vice-Consul 
Gallwey’s tour of Urhobo country along the Ethiope River, in which he (Gallwey) identified 
the Urhobo town of Sapele as a suitable site for his Consular headquarters.
285
Apart from 
making headways into Urhoboland, and the cutting off of Nana, the British also inaugurated 
the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1891, on paper incorporating not only Itsekiriland into it but 
also adjoining territories, while the Benin River and New Warri areas were established as 
vice-consulates.
286
As was the case with the proclamation of the Niger Districts, the British 
proclaimed the Oil Rivers Protectorate through the FO in the London Gazette of 1 January, 
1891, in which the Queen, appointed Major Claude Maxwell MacDonald as Commissioner 
and Consul-General for the Oil Rivers Protectorate and as the Queen’s Consul in the Island 
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Subsequently, Consul Macdonald visited Sapele in November 1891 where 
he was warmly welcomed by the Urhobo of the area.
288
Thus, in Great Britain’s expansion 
into the hinterlands beyond the coast of the Western Delta, Macdonald and Gallwey as 
demonstrated were the key men on the spot, driving the imperial process. 
 After the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, the accelerated actions of the various 
European powers to acquire territories in Africa ensured that for Great Britain, the Urhobo 
territories, useful for its oil palm, should be explored, pacified and ultimately controlled. This 
chapter shows how a combination of soft-power approach by the British, and not violence, 
led to the gradual colonisation of Urhoboland. Once again, official visits treaty-making and 
diplomacy by local bridgeheads were central to colonisation. This is not to suggest that 
violence did not occur, but that instances of such cannot be taken as the main driver of the 
colonisation process as a whole. 
In their thrust into the hinterlands, officials of Great Britain were guided largely by a 
need to bypass the middleman Itsekiri merchant trader Chief Nana, who as has been 
discussed in chapter five enjoyed control of the oil palm trade with the interior. Thus, imbued 
with a desire to, know more about the people and to develop commercial ties with them 
directly, the British commissioned visits into the Urhobo areas, mapping and marking out its 
geography, peoples and resources as a form of cultural project. In this endeavour, as the 
epithet above reveals, the Urhobo too were very much enthusiastic about British presence in 
their domain as expressed in the willingness of the Urhobo of Sapele to offer not only land to 
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Claude Macdonald, but also to clear the bush and prepare such land for officials of Great 
Britain to settle in. 
Though, there is no evidence from local Nigerian sources to explain why the Urhobo 
were willing to work with the British, it seems likely that the Urhobo were equally happy to 
cut out middle men who kept most of the profits for themselves. This could bring better 
prices for their palm oil, at least initially.
289
This also helped them from being perpetually 
under the shadow of Nana, the Itsekiri Chief politically. While the Urhobo were never 
involved directly in the earlier slave trade, except as victims (often of the Itsekiri), the palm 
oil trade, a product which their territories bore in abundance, created massive opportunities 
for them and a chance to circumnavigate the dominance of their coastal neighbours.  
As indicated in chapter four, in the era of the palm oil trade, Nana exercised influence 
on the process and dynamics of trading activities from his domain at Ebrohimi, with his 
influence reaching as far as the Urhobo palm oil markets of Abrakar. Nana’s intransigence in 
disturbing the flow of trade consequently drew reactions from both the British and the 
Urhobo alike, with the former employing military measures to contain his excesses, while the 
Urhobo on their part withheld supply of palm oil to the coast through Nana’s territory, a 
demonstration of their unhappiness with the prevailing arrangements and perhaps a mark of 
their willingness to deal directly with the officials of Great Britain. Thus, within the wider 
context of the Scramble literature, this welcoming attitude of the Sapele Urhobo conforms to 
Robinson and Gallagher’s African agency theory that, in some instances, internal political 
and economic changes in indigenous societies propelled the people to collaborate with the 
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Europeans in their own subjugation.
290
 In other words, in this instance of the Urhobo, their 
desire to gain direct economic benefits from the palm oil trade triggered closer ties with the 
British and hence aiding in their ultimate subjugation. The British did not need to use 
violence. However, in the general historiographies of the events in the Delta by historians of 
Nigeria, the standard narrative often emphasises the violent sacking of chief Nana to the 
exclusion of other events.
291
But, as demonstrated from the evidence, this was not the case in 
Urhoboland. The sacking of Nana was in 1894, while Great Britain’s push into Urhoboland 
began from 1891 and culminated in the first treaty with the Abrakar in 1892. Therefore, to 
relate the event of the sacking of Nana as the trigger for British penetration into Urhobo 
territories is ahistorical. Furthermore, such scholarly interpretations ignore the fact that Nana 
did not exercise control over the Urhobo other than through commercial links, so British 
relations with the Urhobo should be treated as a separate process of colonisation.  
The conditions of Great Britain’s push into Urhobo areas should be considered more 
within the context of British sensitivities to the area as a strategic oil palm producing area, an 
area which the official mind in London valued and coveted economically. In this vein, 
Britain established a Vice Consulate at Sapele, an Urhobo settlement in 1892. From then, a 
good two years before Nana’s downfall, the British presence in Urhobo land took root, 
through numerous treaty-making episodes and the establishment of political and judicial 
institutions, which to all intents and purposes subsumed the Urhobo under British control.  
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Thus, in line with the general theme of this dissertation, this chapter indicates that 
Great Britain’s colonisation of Urhoboland was more by means of treaty diplomacy and not 
by force of arms. To demonstrate this, the chapter examined first, the early history and socio-
political structures of the Urhobo, their encounters with the agents of Great Britain, and the 
treaty-making episodes between the indigenous chiefs and officials of Great Britain. The 
roles of British officials on ground and indigenous agency in the encounter process are also 
highlighted as a testament to the central narrative of a less violent colonisation process. 
6.1 Precolonial Foundations of the Urhobo 
Unlike the Itsekiri, the Urhobo did not develop a centralized socio-political structure that 
enveloped and controlled the whole of their territories. Rather, precolonial Urhobo socio-
political system was heterogeneous and characterized along small, independent clans, each 
with its own leadership. This fragmented clan structure, revolved around an association of 
settlements that claim common descent from an eponymous ancestor. As H. L.Gallwey, the 
first British official to reach Urhobo country rightly identified in his survey of the Benin and 
Urhobo areas in 1891, they recognize no common head, the country being divided among a 
number of Chiefs.
292
The people call themselves ‘Urhobo’ (not to be confused with the larger 
and better known Yoruba of Western Nigeria), but the dominant European nomenclature of 
them appears to have originated from a Portuguese explorer, Duarte Pacheco Pereira, who 
explored the Forcados River (Rio Dos Forcados), and wrote that, ‘farther in the interior is 
another country called the Subou, which is densely populated.’
293
This characterization of the 
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Urhobo by Pereira has been extended variously in subsequent European accounts as Subou, 
Subo, Sooba, Uzobo, Issobo, Usobo, and Sobo.
294
 The Urhobo language belongs to the 
‘Edoid’ group of Niger Delta language cluster. This makes it closer to the Bini (Benin) 
language, but culturally, they share traits and affinity with other neighbouring groups, 
particularly with the Isoko.
295
 
Urhobo origin myths refer to four legends. The first speaks of the Benin kingdom, 
which the Urhobo call ‘Aka,’ as a place of early origin. The other three versions, made 
popular by J. W. Hubbard in his book on the people, refer to origins from the Isoko 
settlement of Erowha and from Ijo on the coasts and the Ibo areas, east of the Niger 
River.
296
It is generally believed that the Urhobo had settled in their abode long before the 
arrival of the first Europeans to the Niger Delta.
297
Urhoboland is the heartland of the Western 
Delta, and is mainly dry and flat, but with the Ethiope River running from the Benin River 
into its hinterland. It is an evergreen tropical rain forest terrain which sustained the palm trees 
that produced the oil palm, the main commodity of the forest products trade with the 
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 Urhobo political system revolved around the clan as the dominant state structure. As 
has been noted, a clan is made up of groups of associated communities and settlements that 
share and recall common descent and origin. Kinship ties dictated relationships between and 
amongst Urhobo settlements, so that in the absence of a central monarchical institution for 
the whole group, various autonomous political clans closely related in language constituted 
the Urhobo country. R.E. Bradbury has identified in total 18 Urhobo clans and chiefdoms as: 
Agbarho, Ujevbe, Udu, Evbreni, Olomu, Ewu, Arhavbarien, Okparabe, Ughele, Agbarha, 
Ogo, Orogun, Agbon, Abraka, Okpe-Urhobo, Uvbie, Oghara, and Idjerhe (Jesse).
299
Under 
these Clans are numerous settlements of villages and hamlets. 
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Figure 8. Map showing Urhoboland
300
 
This background on the precolonial foundations of the Urhobo deepens historians 
understanding of the character of indigenous political and social structures which, ultimately 
interacted with officials of Great Britain during colonisation. The sets of beliefs, attitudes and 
sentiments which defined the people need to be understood and related to the encounter 
process with officials and agents of Great Britain. This is especially true of their political 
system, which was probably the best documented aspect of Urhobo culture by later scholars. 
From this literature, it seems that precolonial Urhobo political, administration, and 
governance was a gerontocracy mixed with titled chiefs, different associations of age grades, 
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and priesthood cults wielding political authority for the overall maintenance of law and order 
in the land. However, in some cases kingship (Ovie – King), vested in particular groups was 
noticeable, with such exercising their authority through a Council of titled Chiefs. At some 
time in the past, some Urhobo kingships were tributary to the Benin monarch who invested 
legitimacy and authority on them. Thus, like the Ukwuani described in chapter eight, these 
precolonial Urhobo were under some form of Benin Suzerainty. However, by the age of 
empire, Benin overlordship over any Urhobo chiefdom had regressed considerably, so that, 
when the Urhobo had contact with the British, they did so as politically independent groups, 
free from any external local imperial control. Generally, the pattern of indigenous authority 
in Urhoboland varied from one settlement to the other, so that it is not possible to refer to a 
single style of administration for the whole.
301
 This decentralization of Urhobo socio-political 
system characterized the way and manner Great Britain’s relations with the various groups 
evolved in respect of treaty-making as the chapter demonstrates hereafter. 
6.2 Urhobo Encounters with Officials of Great Britain 
In the Western Delta, before 1891 when Vice Consul Gallwey
302
 visited the Urhobo 
settlement of Sapele, European traders were excluded from having direct contact with the 
interior, as middlemen like the Itsekiri Chief, Nana, ensured that the statusquo remained to 
his advantage. Early efforts by John Beecroft in the 1840s and Richard Francis Burton in the 
1860s to navigate into the Urhobo hinterland to map out and glean information on the people 
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as part of Intel-gathering, represent initial attempts at contacts between British officials and 
the Urhobo on the River Ethiope,
303
but this did not translate to direct dealings.  
 After the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, trading companies and consuls on the Delta 
did not hide their desires to push further into the hinterlands to engage in direct trade with the 
palm oil producers. Thus, guided by the rule of effective occupation from the Berlin 
Conference and in a bid to forestall French inroads in the Delta officials of Great Britain 




Amongst the groups in this study, the Urhobo, Isoko and the Ukwuani were the 
producers of palm oil, with the Urhobo preeminent in the supply through the Itsekiri to the 
Europeans at the coast. As has been noted, the Urhobo area is inundated with evergreen 
forests and wild palm trees, so that over the years, the people were able to develop 
competence and skill in harvesting the palm fruits from the trees and processing it through 
indigenous technology into finished palm oil.
305
Thus, it was the Urhobo, with their palm oil, 
who fueled the trade with the Europeans in which the Itsekiri merchants emerged as the 
principal go-between, due to their advantageous coastal location, in the process bestowing on 
them, wealth and power. It was this position which set out the Itsekiri Chief, Nana’s 
problems with the British, for in a bid to maintain and enjoy his middleman position in the oil 
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palm trade, he disrupted trade at a time the British were resolved to have links and trade 
directly with the Urhobo and open up their territory for pacification and eventual control. By 
1891 when the Oil Rivers Protectorate was proclaimed, officials of Great Britain were in the 
process of carrying forward the consolidation of both trade and imperial control into the 
hinterland territories. 
 In this move to extend and consolidate formal control, Claude Macdonald and H. L. 
Gallwey emerged as the bridgeheads shaping and directing the imperial enterprise. 
Macdonald succeeded to the Consul Generalship and Commissioner of the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate in March 1891.
306
He had a varied career as a soldier and administrator, serving 
in the Egyptian campaign of 1882, and by 1887 was consul-general at Zanzibar. His links 
with West Africa began in 1889 when, he was sent by the Foreign Office to Berlin to 
streamline and delimit the frontier between the Oil Rivers and the Cameroons.
307
 No doubt, 
his time in Zanzibar proved an excellent choice in his appointment to the Oil Rivers, for as 
A. E. Afigbo has noted, Macdonald operated a flexible policy of engagement and made early 
efforts upon his arrival in the Niger Delta to extend British influence through peaceful 
diplomacy by concluding treaties and courting the friendship of indigenous leaders.
308
He 
later served as a British diplomat in China and Japan after his time as consul in the 
Delta.
309
His appointment also reflects the ambiguous ways that Europeans viewed the 
indigenous peoples and leadership. On the one hand, indigenous leaders were recognized as 
foreign powers, entitled to the same FO system of contact, trade and diplomatic negotiations 
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as practiced in other parts of the world. At the same time, clearly, racial assumptions, and 
positivist influenced legal constructs about the indigenous peoples permeated his 
involvement in the region and dealings with the peoples, especially in the treaty-making 
episodes with them. 
 H. L. Gallwey was a Sandhurst trained army officer who, from 1882 to 1889 was 
aide-decamp to the British Governors of Bermuda, and so was familiar with the colonisation 
enterprise. In 1891, he became the deputy commissioner and vice-consul of the Benin River 
under Macdonald. In his long imperial career, he went on to serve in various colonies, as 
governor in St Helena, in the Gambia and finally in Australia, illustrating how, while not yet 
formally colonized, his mission to Urhoboland was an imperial one.
310
He is described in 
existing scholarship as a man who relished punitive expeditions and loathed indigenous 
fetishism, yet, under Macdonald, Gallwey championed and led the visit to the Urhobo areas 
as a way of knowing more about the people and its land, demonstrating a capacity for 




 Great Britain’s contact with the Urhobo was a development local people also craved, 
given their experiences with Nana, the Itsekiri merchant. This had prompted them to resort to 
a boycott of supplying palm oil through the Itsekiri to European merchants at the coast by 
1891.
312
Urhobo craving for direct links with officials of Great Britain also played out in 
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Consul Macdonald’s visit to Sapele. When in November 1891 Macdonald, inspected the site 
at Sapele recommended by Gallwey for the Vice-Consulate, the Urhobo people of Sapele 
eagerly and enthusiastically received the British party, assuring it of their support. In the 
words of Macdonald in his report to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he 
wrote that ‘the ground is high and though covered with forest could be easily cleared. The 
people of Sapele informed me that if I would come and build there, they would clear as much 
ground as I wished.’
313
 Consequently, MacDonald approved Sapele as a Vice-Consulate; 
with apparent local support, given that the people were happy to have British presence in 
their territory rather than Nana’s influence. A barracks and constabulary posts were also 
designated to be sited at Sapele, and a hulk – the Hindustan, was towed in through the 
Ethiope River to serve as headquarters of the Vice-Consulate. Thus, by 1892, Sapele became 
the first Urhobo settlement with effective British presence
314
 
What happened subsequently was a steady and unhindered push by officials of Great 
Britain into Urhoboland. This was not through force or threat of its use, but through 
goodwill, friendship and peaceful diplomacy. Indeed, of more importance here is the 
awareness that Great Britain’s officials proceeded to set up station at Sapele without having 
concluded any agreement with the people, nor had they used any evident coercion. Only 
afterwards was this base used to secure treaties with various Urhobo settlements.  
These treaties were an important part of a longer peaceful process of British 
influence, power and dominion being introduced into Urhobo territories. Indeed, in time, 
after the conclusion of the protectorate treaties and the proclamation of the Niger Coast 
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Protectorate in 1893, the Consul and his officials relied on the provisions of the treaties to 
further the extension of British dominion and authority in the various territories. The treaties 
obviously served British self-interests by keeping away rival imperial powers, especially the 
French from the Niger Basin. While locals gradually realised that, there was no competition 
from European powers for their palm oil, save for the British as the Protector and buyers, this 
made colonisation easier for the British, as by then, locals were already politically and 
economically dependent on the British. However, it was such a gradual peaceful process of 
informal to formal control that there were no obvious instances of uprisings against the 
imperial power. In time, the British Consul became the de facto suzerain in the territory 
where a treaty had been concluded. He it was, who could enforce agreements and treaties 
concluded between the British and the indigenous Chiefs, and also make rules and 
regulations for the maintenance of peace, order and good government in consonance with 
British metropolitan standards. 
Perhaps, because of how secure the British felt in Sapele, the first treaty of protection 
Great Britain concluded with any Urhobo group was not there but with the nearby Abraka 
Urhobo (Abrakar in the Treaty) on 9 May 1892. It was not surprising that the British 
concluded a treaty with the Abraka before other Urhobo groups. Abraka then, was a 
prominent Urhobo market town upstream on the Ethiope River, in which all the palm oil 
from nearby Ukwuani settlements were collected by traders for onward delivery to the coast. 
It was this market and others that Nana stopped when his monopoly of trade was beginning 
to wane. As in the case with other groups of this study indicated in subsequent chapters, the 
British often concentrated in bringing about centres of trade and prominent settlements in 
particular areas under their influence quite quickly compared to other smaller settlements. 
160 
 
This played out in the case of the Ijo in the next chapter, as well as with the Ukwuani in 
chapter eight. After the treaty with Abraka, British penetration into other aspects of 
Urhoboland intensified from 1893 through a series of treaties concluded with different 
settlements, treaties which contained clauses transferring indigenous political and sovereign 
rights to the imperialists. 
 Before examining Great Britain’s treaty-making episodes with the Urhobo, it is 
pertinent to note that, by the time of the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, Great Britain’s 
concerns were geared towards warding off French and German rivalries from undercutting 
her interests on the Niger.
315
As such, Consular Officers of Great Britain and officials of the 
National African Company were active across the length and breadth of the Lower Niger, 
from Calabar to the Western Delta, convincing the local rulers and chiefs to sign treaties of 
protection.
316
In fact, there was some competition between different British agents to be the 
first to secure such treaties in any area. In this circumstance, some indigenous groups, 
especially the Urhobo of this study ended up concluding treaties with both the consular 
officials and company agents. This threw up a dispute between the RNC, after the granting of 
its Charter in 1886 and the government of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and its successor, the 
Niger Coast Protectorate, as to who had jurisdiction over certain territories. The bone of 
contention was that, the definition of the territories of the two bodies, that is, the Oil Rivers 
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Protectorate and the territories of the Royal Niger Company, embodied and overlapped 
aspects of the same areas, so that a deplorable situation arose whereby consular officials and 
company agents jostled to conclude treaties with indigenous leadership of the various 
settlements in a bid to win sovereign rights over the people. Matters only came to a rest when 
arrangements were made to fix their boundaries and harmonize the activities of both sides 
with the arrival of Major Claude Macdonald in 1891.
317
 
 While the Niger Coast Protectorate which succeeded the Oil Rivers Protectorate by 
1893 lies between the colony of Lagos on the West and the German colony of the Cameroons 
in the East, the territories of the Royal Niger Company constituted a bit of territory from the 
right bank of the Forcados River down to the mouth of the River Nun at Brass.
318
 The picture 
here was that, aspects of the Royal Company’s areas of jurisdiction in the Lower Niger were 
sandwiched between the territories of the Niger Coast Protectorate. Therefore, given that 
Urhobo areas were within the hinterland beyond the left bank of the Forcados River, they 
naturally fell under the jurisdiction of the protectorate, while the Ijo areas, from the Forcados 
to Patani fell within the purview of the RNC. Clearly, a lack of adequate knowledge of the 
actual physical and demographic boundaries that define the indigenous groups they were 
dealing with, threw up this jurisdictional problem for the Protectorate and the Company. This 
state of affairs between the Protectorate and the Company would partly slow down the 
establishment of governance institutions in Urhoboland and indeed in the Western Delta in 
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general until the 1900s.
319
 Moreover, it is instructive to note that in Hertslet’s list of Treaties 
concluded between the Royal Niger Company and indigenous Chiefs, 1884-1892, Itsekiri 
and Urhobo settlements are not included (possibly a diplomatic response to the disagreement 
with the British government over them).
320
 Therefore, the Urhobo treaties examined here are 
the treaties concluded with agents of the protectorate governments. 
6.3 Great Britain’s Treaties with the Urhobo 
As has been noted in relation to their socio-political system, in Urhoboland, there were no 
big chiefs with jurisdiction over large tracts of territories that the British could deal with. In 
the absence of a centralized figure head, it became a case of dealing with settlement by 
settlement, as officials of Great Britain tried to get through the area, exploring and opening it 
up for absorption into Her Majesty’s empire. However, the officials of the protectorate 
government did not conclude treaties with all the clans identified in Urhoboland here. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear, but perhaps, it may be connected with the strategy of 
the British to concentrate on treaty-making with groups mainly along trade routes, which 
were market towns of the palm oil trade. The British also divided Urhobo territories into two 
sections. Those within Sobo country and the others within the vicinity of Warri which by the 
1890s, had emerged as one of the Districts of the Oil Rivers and later Niger Coast 
Protectorate.
321
 Thus, the treaties concluded were classified as those with the Urhobo 
communities of the “Sobo Country”, and of the “Warri District”. These were standard 
treaties printed and shipped overseas by British imperial agents. Moreover, the wordings of 
the pro forma treaties were the same, with gaps in-between sentences filled out by hand for 
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names of the communities and other relevant information, while in some cases, sections, 
considered irrelevant were struck out. In all, not less than fourteen treaties were concluded by 
agents of Great Britain with Urhobo settlements between 1892 and 1895.
322
 
 As indicated earlier, the first treaty of protection was with the Abraka on 9 May 1892. 
This was not surprising given that Abraka was a principal Urhobo market town, situated in 
the heart of the Urhobo country and noted for its oil palm production and supply. This much 
was said of this settlement as a center for palm oil production and supply by Macdonald in 
his despatch to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
323
Though the processes of 
the negotiation of the various treaties are not clearly discernible, but an analysis of the 
contents and a look at the events prior to and follow up actions can be deduced to understand 
better how peaceful the colonisation process was and, how the protectorate treaties were used 
as instruments for the eventual transfer of political sovereignty of the indigenous people to 
the British Empire. As earlier noted, Gallwey’s and Macdonald’s visits to the Urhobo 
hinterland were met with enthusiasm by the Urhobo people, who were long desirous of 
British presence in their domains. This attitude by the Urhobo was engendered by Nana; the 
Itsekiri Governor of the Benin River’s overbearing influence on trade along the Ethiope 
River which was the gateway to the Urhobo hinterland. This welcoming disposition of the 
Urhobo, a reflection of indigenous agency in the contact process, combined with Gallwey’s 
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survey of the Urhobo hinterland in 1891, as an Intel-gathering and knowledge process, paved 
the way for treaty-making and the eventual annexation of Urhoboland into the British 
Empire. 
“Treaty with Chiefs of Abrakar” was negotiated by Gallwey, then Deputy 
Commissioner and Vice-Consul of the Benin District. The treaty had nine articles and opened 
with the following words in its first Article:  
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, in Compliance 
 with the request of the Chiefs, and people of Abrakar, hereby undertakes to extend to 




The wordings of this first article of the treaty resonate with the legal foundations of 
colonialism discussed in chapter two. It implied that the Chiefs had given their territories in 
which they originally had authority and jurisdiction to the British, for Her Majesty’s gracious 
favour and protection. This clearly amounted to a subtle and peaceful way of taking over the 
territory and imposing British political authority on the Urhobo chiefs and people. There is 
an important point worth noting in relation to this treaty. Whether the Chiefs of Abrakar 
actually made the request to the British for protection is a matter for debate, but given the 
events of the episodes with Nana and the enthusiasm of the Urhobo to trade directly with the 
British, it is unlikely that they objected to any aspect of the treaty provisions, even though 
their understanding of the contents and character of the treaties could at best be taken as very 
minimal in terms of the political implications of their actions. Nevertheless, the Urhobo most 
likely regarded the treaty-making exercise as a way to better opportunities of trade with the 
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Notably, the British treaties with the Urhobo were of the same pro forma standard, 
each made up of nine articles, done in triplicate, witnessed by one or two persons, having the 
marks of the local Chiefs which varied in numbers in each case, having the signature of an 
interpreter and lastly attested to by a Protectorate government official, who ostensibly must 
have been the facilitating or negotiating officer of the process. The contents of the other 
Articles of the Abrakar treaty deserve to be outlined and analysed in detail for a better 
understanding of how the colonisation process was peaceful and how treaty-making was used 
by the imperial power for gaining political and sovereign rights from the indigenous 
leadership to achieve colonialism. 
Article II: “The Chiefs of Abrakar agree and promise to refrain from entering into any 
correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power, except with 
the knowledge and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government.” 
Article III: “It is agreed that full and exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over 
British subjects and their property in the territory of Abrakar is reserved to Her 
Britannic Majesty, to be exercised by such Consular or other officers as Her Majesty 
shall appoint for that purpose. The same jurisdiction is likewise reserved to Her 
Majesty in the said territory of Abrakar over foreign subjects enjoying British 
protection, who shall be deemed to be included in the expression “British subject” 
throughout this Treaty.” 
Article IV: “All disputes between the Chiefs of Abrakar, or between them and British 
or foreign traders, or between the aforesaid Chiefs and neighbouring tribes, which 
cannot be settled amicably between the two parties, shall be submitted to the British 
Consular or other officers appointed by Her Majesty to exercise jurisdiction in the 
Benin and adjoining territories for arbitration and decision, or for arrangement.” 
Article V: “The Chiefs of Abrakar hereby engage to assist the British Consular or 
other officers in the execution of such duties as may be assigned to them; and, further, 
to act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, the 
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development of the resources of the country, the interest of commerce, or in any other 
matter in relation to peace, order, and good government, and the general progress of 
civilization.” 
Article VI: “The subjects and citizens of all countries may freely carry on trade in 
every part of the territories of the Chiefs parties hereto and may have houses and 
factories therein.” 
Articles VII: “All ministers of the Christian religion shall be permitted to reside and 
exercise their calling within the territories of the aforesaid Chiefs, who hereby 
guarantee to them full protection. All forms of religious worship and religious 
ordinances may be exercised within the territories of the aforesaid Chiefs, and no 
hindrance shall be offered thereto.” 
Article VIII: “If any vessels should be wrecked within the Abrakar territories, the 
Chiefs will give them all the assistance in their power, will secure them from plunder, 
and also recover and deliver to the owners or agents all the property which can be 
saved. If there are no such owners or agents on the spot, then the said property shall 
be delivered to the British Consular or other officer.  The Chiefs further engage to do 
all in their power to protect the persons and property of the officers, crew, and others 
on board such wrecked vessels. All claims for salvage dues in such cases shall, if 
disputed, be referred to the British Consular or other officer for arbitration and 
decision.” 
Article IX: “This Treaty shall come into operation, so far as may be practicable, from 
the date of its signature. Done in triplicate at Abrakar this ninth day of May 1892.” 
The closing sections of the treaties usually addressed the witnesses that signed on behalf of 
the imperial power and the affixed marks of the indigenous Chiefs of the people, while the 
consular officer, who most likely negotiated the treaty also signed. In this instance with the 
Abrakar, the treaty was signed by Gallwey. The very last portion contained, a declaration and 
signature by the interpreter that, he had fully interpreted and explained the contents of the 
treaty to the Chiefs in question, and that they fully understood its meaning (see, appendix II). 
 An analysis of some of the articles in the treaty with the Abrakar throws up some very 
interesting points which underscore the central argument of peaceful colonisation of this 
study. By the wordings of article II, Great Britain claimed the sovereign rights of the people 
to independently enter into any agreement with other powers without her consent. Articles III 
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and IV equally empowered Great Britain to acquire the sovereign rights of the people to 
legislate and adjudicate on civil and criminal matters within their domain in relation to 
Europeans, their neighbours and within themselves. This was clearly, a subtle way of taking 
away the peoples political, diplomatic and judicial independence without force. Article V 
cleverly subsumed the Chiefs and elders of the peoples under the direct authority of British 
Consular or other officers, while article VI sought to make provision in line with the terms of 
the Berlin Conference, allowing the freedom of navigation and trade for nationals of other 
European powers. In turn, article VII provided grounds for the consolidation of the Christian 
faith and missionary enterprise, whereas article VIII exerted a moral burden on the Chiefs 
and people to be of good behavior. As demonstrated in subsequent British actions post treaty-
making, the provisions of the treaties bestowed on the officials of Great Britain political and 
legal rights to establish administrative machineries for effective control, for maintenance of 
law and order, leading up to the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates of 
Nigeria in 1914. 
 A significant point to note is that this pattern of colonisation, using treaty-making in a 
peaceful manner, was devoid of gun-boat diplomacy. Clearly, the British did not coerce the 
indigenous peoples to give up their territories and sovereign and political rights by force of 
arms or threat of its use. Even though subsequently, an instance of use of force, ostensibly to 
maintain law and order was witnessed in the process of consolidation, the initial move from 





6.4 Post Treaty-Making Developments 
As discussed earlier, the jurisdictional dispute between the two imperial agencies would 
partly slow down the establishment of British administrative organs in the Niger Basin as a 
whole. This situation in Urhoboland was further compounded by Great Britain’s distractions 
towards containing the Benin Kingdom by 1897, and by further instructions from the FO to 
Ralph Moor, who succeeded Macdonald in 1896 as Consul of the Niger Coast Protectorate, 
to maintain the status quo with the Company and avoid any action likely to create friction 
between both agencies. Ralph Moor dutifully obliged the FO’s directive by directing his men 
to take as little action as possible, even though he frowned at the FO’s position, considering it 
as a reversal of progress made so far.
326
Thus, from the time of the last treaties with the 
Urhobo groups in 1895 up to 1900, both the restrictions by the FO on the Niger Coast 
officials, the event of the sacking of Benin in 1897 and the eventual winding up of the RNC 
in 1899 combined in the intervening years to delay the establishment of effective British 
administration in Urhoboland. But this state of affairs did not stop the protectorate 
government from sustaining payment of subsidies to treaty chiefs.
327
 This was clearly a move 
which further attests to a desire by the imperial power to have good and peaceful relations 
with the indigenous peoples. 
However, with the liquidation of the RNC in 1899, the Niger Coast Protectorate 
proceeded to take over its assets and organized to establish effective governance all over the 
Niger and Urhobo areas in particular. Ralph Moor consequently posted officers to all Urhobo 
oil markets, and sent a despatch to the Colonial Office, which by this time had replaced the 
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Foreign Office as the overseer of Consular Affairs, informing that all Urhobo settlements and 
other adjoining territories were now under the government of the Niger Coast Protectorate.
328
 
With this action, clearly achieved on the strength of the concluded treaties which were 
arrived at peacefully, Ralph Moor moved to place Urhobo areas under British control and 
governance. As the man on the spot from 1896, shaping and driving the imperial enterprise, 
Ralph Moor like other imperial agents before him was dedicated to the expansionist cause as 
the one tasked with consolidating Great Britain’s presence first in the Niger Basin and later 
throughout southern Nigeria up to the 1900s.
329
His entry into Crown service began in 1891 
when, he raised a constabulary of Hausa and Gold Coasters under the Oil Rivers Protectorate, 
and later, he was appointed as one of the vice-consuls by Macdonald in 1892. J. D. 
Hargreaves has noted that when Moor succeeded Macdonald as commissioner and consul-
general in 1896, he recorded his intention of extending British influence into the hinterlands 
by peaceful expeditions and collaborations with indigenous rulers.
330
 
Subsequent developments in the Western Delta from 1900, rests on the emergence of 
the Southern Nigerian Protectorate and the Proclamations of the Native Courts and Supreme 
Courts Ordinances of 1901. These provisions led to the establishment of several Native 
Courts in Urhoboland which effectively served as local government administrations under 
the supervision of British District Officers. In effect, these local government institutions, 
styled after British political systems, took over the political and judicial sovereignties of the 
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indigenous leadership, who from this time became subsumed under the control of British 
District Officers. 
Some salient points worthy of note in Urhobo-British encounters includes: first, the 
treaties with the Urhobo groups of the Warri District were in contents and character the same 
with those of the Sobo country. On the whole, a common attribute of the articles in the 
treaties was that they conferred on the British Consul, political and jurisdictional powers over 
the indigenous Chiefs in all matters, thereby undermining not only the sovereignty of the 
African rulers, but also taking over full control of their territories and land. Secondly, there 
were a few instances of Great Britain’s show of power or force in relations with the Urhobo 
of the Warri area. The examination of this is imperative in view of the emergence of Warri as 
a township, where a Native Court had been established earlier in 1896. This was the punitive 
actions of Great Britain against the Agbassa for their support of the Itsekiri chief Nana. The 
Urhobo settlement of Effuru (Effurun) was also sacked just two months after concluding a 
treaty with the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1894. Its fate was also linked to Chief Nana of the 
Itsekiri, for the head Chief of Effuru was believed to be sympathetic to the plight of the 
Itsekiri Chief over his travails with the British, in the process stopping trade in his domain in 
solidarity with Nana. Stopping trade was regarded by the British as a challenge to the 
provisions of the treaty, so action was taken against the chief.
331
These isolated cases of 
military action against some Urhobo groups, are not enough to ascribe a blanket application 
of conquest, in Great Britain’s colonisation of the Urhobo as a whole. Rather, the process of 
colonisation was achieved through a more peaceful treaty-making diplomacy, involving 
indigenous agency, and British bridgeheads. 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the primary task was to explore and investigate how Great Britain colonised 
the Urhobo people of the Western Lower Niger. The emergent picture was that the process 
was generally peaceful, beginning with when the Urhobo had contact with the agents of 
Great Britain in 1891. H. L. Gallwey became the first European and Briton to have contact 
with the Urhobo when, he embarked on a tour of the Urhobo country, getting to Sapele in 
1891.  A Vice-Consulate was subsequently established in Sapele in 1892, after the Urhobo 
enthusiastically welcomed the British agents. Sapele subsequently served as a staging post 
for further inroads into Urhobo hinterlands where, from 1892, series of treaties were 
concluded with various Urhobo settlements beginning with the Abrakar.  
 The palm oil trade ensured that, the political fortunes of both the Itsekiri and Urhobo 
were inextricably tied together in the age of empire, one as coastal middlemen, and the other 
as hinterland dwellers who produced the trade commodities required by the Europeans. But 
by the 1890s, the Urhobo openly expressed interest in dealing directly with the British, so as 
to benefit from the trade. This was clearly a case of indigenous agency in the colonisation 
process and resonates with suggestions that Great Britain’s expansionist ideas alone could 
not account for colonisation, but that, in some instances local conditions encouraged and 
facilitated colonisation. Thus, following Vice-Consul Gallwey’s visit to Urhoboland in 1891 
and the subsequent mapping out of markets and commercial interests by the British, 
Urhoboland was opened up to directly participate in trade relations with the British, who 
gradually proceeded after the first treaty of 1892 to conclude further treaties with other 
Urhobo groups and established administrative control on the area. The fourteen treaties, 
concluded peacefully, contained provisions which, though the indigenous people clearly did 
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not understand, served the imperial interest of the British to acquire the sovereign and 
political rights of the indigenous peoples, bestowing on the officials of the imperial power 
rights to exercise dominion and imperium over the indigenous peoples. The British relied on 
and referred to the various treaties concluded with the chiefs of the areas to proclaim their 
Protectorates of the Niger Districts, the Oil Rivers, and the Niger Coast in 1885, 1891 and 
1893, respectively. 
The chapter took cognizant of the fact that despite the largely peaceful nature of the 
colonisation process through a wide use of treaties, there were a few cases of use of force, 
after treaties had been concluded. But this does not represent a prevalent trend of forceful 
colonisation. 
On the whole, it was evident that a combination of soft power approach through 
treaty-making and use played a far more significant role in bringing about the territories of 
the Urhobo under the control of the British Empire. As has been noted, it is doubtful if the 
chiefs who signed these treaties on behalf of their people knew exactly the import of their 
contents. Nevertheless, following the streamlining of the rules of engagement on how best to 
approach the Scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884/85, the British expedited 
their treaty-making processes in the Niger Basin, so that the various treaties concluded with 
the chiefs became the tools for introducing and consolidating Great Britain’s power and 
authority in the various areas. It is safe to say that in the light of the evidence here, treaty-
making diplomacy, directed by the men on the spot, and local indigenous conditions which 
spurred indigenous agency, characterised a more peaceful colonisation of Urhoboland by the 
British between 1892 and 1914. 
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Chapter Seven: Treaty-Making and Clashes in Isoko 
 
The temper and convictions of the Consul-General continued to determine the 
character of British policy towards the groups with which British rule came into 
contact. Military expeditions dominated the history of the period 1896-1906 because 
Ralph Moor believed in the efficacy of punitive expeditions, and … the local 





This chapter discusses how the Isoko territories were colonised by Great Britain. In line with 
the central theme of this dissertation, a reconstruction of the means employed by officials of 
Great Britain in the pacification and eventual colonisation of the Isoko people has become 
imperative in the face of the existing dominant historiography of Nigeria which suggests the 
central place of use of force by Great Britain. The colonisation occurred relatively late, in the 
1890s, a period described by one Nigerian historian, J. C. Anene, as particularly violent, 
thanks to Ralph Moor.
333
This modus operandi, according to Anene, was in variance with the 
earlier operational style of Macdonald, Moor’s predecessor, who attached greater importance 
to treaty-making and who had prioritised goodwill with the natives.
334
But in contrast to such 
a narrative by historians of Nigeria, Ralph Moor, also prioritised diplomacy, not violence, in 
extending Great Britain’s influence, and had already demonstrated this (see chapter 5).
335
 
                                                          
332
 J. C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition 1885 – 1906, Theory and Practice in a Colonial Protectorate 
(Cambridge: University press, 1966, P. 181). 
333
 It was Macdonald himself who recommended Moor to be his successor, see, TNA, F. O. 84/2194, 
Macdonald to foreign office, 20 May 1892. 
334
  The bulk of Consul Moor’s expeditionary and punitive actions from the closing years of the nineteenth 
century against some groups in the Niger Coast Protectorate were precipitated by a desire to stop what were 
considered evil practices such as human sacrifices, murder of twin, and trial by ordeal. See, NAI, CSO 26/2 No. 
11857, Niger Coast Protectorate, Report for 1898 – 9, 289, Ralph Moor to Chamberlain, Pp. 22 – 24. 
335
 J. D. Hargreaves, ‘Moor, Sir Ralph Denham Rayment (1860-1909),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: University Press, 2004). 
174 
 
 Once again, the problem seems to be which examples historians have used. This 
study does not deny instances of punitive actions by Great Britain against the people based 
on different circumstances, but these should not be used as a typical first step by which the 
imperial power gained control. In the wider Nigerian historiography, punitive actions by 
Great Britain against other Niger Delta groups such as the Brass, Benin, Okrika and areas of 
the Upper Cross River have been used as the basis for a blanket ascription of the use of 
coercion in the whole Delta.
336
Again, this dominant narrative by historians of Nigeria are 
wont to suggest that Great Britain pursued a paradoxical policy of extending control by 
means of military expeditions even after treaty-making.
337
However, the example of the Isoko 
once again makes clear that, British-indigenous interactions were more complex than such 
dominant narratives suggests, with over violence rarely used. 
The chapter also outlines the early history of the Isoko people, focusing on their 
origins, migrations and settlement patterns, a necessary background to understand the nature 
of the interactions which occurred on the ground. Early ties with neighbouring groups are 
explored in relation to links between the coastal and hinterland peoples and the impact such 
inter-group contacts had on the Isoko. Changes in their socio-political institutions engendered 
by external stimuli in the form of contact with the Europeans, the slave trade, and the 
consequences of its abolition in the nineteenth century are also examined in relation to 
British expansion into Isoko territories. Lastly, British consolidation through treaty-making 
and establishment of control by means of peaceful and diplomatic measures, shaped by the 
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men on the spot are examined, indicating how documents rather than guns transferred 
sovereign and political rights to the imperial power. 
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7.1 Precolonial Isoko: Origins and Socio-Political Structure 
In the Western Delta hinterland, availability of dry land played a pivotal role in the 
settlement patterns of the people. For the Isoko, the nature of the terrain determined that, its 
settlements were not only small and scattered but some located around and at the head of 
navigable rivers and estuaries. In pre-colonial times, the majority of Isoko settlements were 
largely rural communities in dispersed village and hamlet settings. In tandem with the 
general characteristic of the overall Niger Delta cultural setting, the typical Isoko community 
comprised compounds with compact spaces housing groups of families often of same 
kinship. These communities were usually located along water courses, bush paths and 
radiates towards markets and where other functions were situated.
339
 Linguistically, the Isoko 
language like Urhobo belongs to the Edoid family of languages, clearly suggestive of affinity 
with the Benin kingdom.
340
 The Isoko are bounded on the south by the Ijo, the Urhobo on the 
west, and Benin in the north, while the Ukwuani borders them on the east. The description of 
the peoples early history, and social and political structures are gleaned from, linguistic, 
ethnographic, and archaeological sources.
341
The evidence indicates that the Isoko are a 
distinct people from the Urhobo, even though officials of Great Britain erroneously grouped 
them together with the latter before having contact with them. This explains why, as 
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demonstrated in this chapter and the next, officials of Great Britain had to later conclude 
separate treaties with the Isoko and the Ukwuani. 
Unlike the Itsekiri, but more like the Urhobo, Ijo and Ukwuani of this study, 
precolonial Isoko was organised into autonomous clans, with each clan consisting of a 
number of settlements that share a common tradition of origin from an eponymous ancestor. 
These autonomous clans differ in origins, are separated in dialects, but share similarities in 
social and cultural traits. There remains considerable disagreement about how many clans 
make up the Isoko. For instance, J. W. Welch has identified ten clans and others as sub-clans. 
However, in their later study of the group, Bradbury and Lloyd put the number of Isoko clans 
at seventeen, including the following: Erowha; Ozoro, Ofagbe; Aviara; Iyede; Emevo; 
Enhwe; Igbide; Emede; Uwheru, Owe; Olomoro; Uzere; Iri; Elu; Oleh; and Okpe.
342
 The Ijo 
call the Isoko ‘Biotu’, - people of the interior, while the Ukwuani refer to them as ‘Igabo,’ 
but, these are essentially regarded by the Isoko as derogatory references.
343
 
Overall, Isoko origins and the populating of its territory is shrouded in myths and 
contradictions, made up of versions from the various clans. Five migratory episodes have 
been suggested as the basis of the formation of the Isoko nation, anchored on a mixing of 
peoples involving elements from Ijo, Ibo and Benin migrants.
344
 This theme of multiple 
origins is also inherent in the accounts of the various clans as contained in the colonial era 
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Irrespective of these varied accounts, a trend common in most accounts 
is the preeminence of the Erowha group, believed as the early Isoko settlement around the 
Patani Creek area, from whence migrations northwards to all other Isoko speaking areas 
occurred.
346
Benin was clearly a prominent polity with impact and influence on the other 
peoples of the Western Delta. Benin’s better documented history, which overshadowed other 
local histories and thus influenced European perceptions of the peoples of the Western Delta, 
has been recognized by historians. In this sense, it is not uncommon to hear of sections 
within indigenous groups referring to Benin as a place of origin. This is as much a factor in 
Isoko origins as it is with aspects of the Ijo as indicated in chapter five and with the Ukwuani 




In summary, two distinct migratory groups, and a third that claim autochthony appear 
to have metamorphosed into the Isoko ethnicity. The first, trace their origins to Benin and 
includes the clans of Aviara, Emevo, Iyede, Okpe, Owe, and Uzere. The second migratory 
legend, trace origins to Iboland east of the Niger, and the clans of Enhwe, and Ume fall into 
this group. The last legend refers neither to Benin nor to Ibo ancestry, but rather emphasizes 
autochthony with Erowha considered as a place of early settlement and a primary dispersal 
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point. It has been suggested that, it was not uncommon to note references to Erowha by 
elders of other Isoko clans as the Okpako (elder clan) of all the Isoko, just as the oral 
traditions of other Isoko clans refer to Erowha in terms which suggest that the Erowha were 
in the Isoko area long before the arrival of other groups.
348
Isoko early history was therefore, 
a pattern of new migrants from adjoining territories moving into the Isoko area, mixing up 
with earlier groups to over time form, the Isoko identity. Thus, the Isoko could be said to be 
newcomers to the Western Delta environment compared to the coastal Itsekiri and Ijo. 
The ecology of the Isoko abode allowed for relatively large-scale farming activities. 
Despite the occasional annual flooding of the creeks and streams engendered by heavy 
rainfall, Isokoland was drier and higher compared to the coastal and swampy Itsekiri and Ijo 
territories.
349
Thus, the people were essentially agriculturalists with the intensity of farming 
activities determined to a large extent by the dry nature of the land, while trade was a 
subsidiary reinforced by commercial ties with the neighbouring Urhobo, Ijo and Ukwuani 
groups with whom they exchanged commodities. The vegetation of the Isoko area is 
dominated by the oil palm tree. Thus, with abundance of the oil palm tree, and as oil palm 
producers, the internal long distance trade routes which traversed the riverine Delta 
encouraged linkages and channels for trade between the Isoko and the other groups of this 
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 In later years, external stimuli came first in the form of the slave trade and thereafter 
in the palm oil trade, culminating in contact with and colonisation by Great Britain. 
Isoko socio-political organization was a fragmented political system anchored on clan 
basis, and characterised by three institutions namely, the Ovie – (Priest-King), the Edion – 
(legislative council), and the Itu – (age-grade system). Within the clan political unit which is 
an association of numerous settlements, these three institutions were responsible for the day 
to day administration of the typical Isoko settlement as they addressed matters of general 
governance, issues of justice, land allotment and use as well as the general well-being of all 
members of the settlement. J. W. Welch has suggested that the prestige and powers of the 
Ovie varies from clan to clan, such that, in clans with origin links to Benin, it was not 
uncommon for a new Ovie to have his investiture confirmed by the Oba (king) of Benin. On 
the other hand, in non-Benin related clans, the Ovie was either a king with great authority or 
one who was a priest-king limited by constant consultation with the Edion – clan legislative 
council to govern effectively. In each case, the kingship was hereditary for life
351
 The Edion 
(legislative council)was made up of nine to twelve members headed by the Odion Ologbo(the 
oldest man), who keeps custody of the clan fetish on which all oaths related to public matters 
were taken. Essentially, the functions of the Edion as a legislative body consulted by the Ivie 
(plural of Ovie) included apportioning out clan lands to different families year to year for 
agricultural purposes; adjudication of all cases; appointing of the close season for fishing, 
                                                          
350
 E. J. Alagoa, “Long Distance Trade and States in the Niger Delta.” Journal of African History, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(1970): 319-329. 
351




palm-nut cutting and upkeep of the roads and bush paths.
352
On the whole, the clan socio-
political arrangement was the final authority in the decision making process, handling 
together the separate judicial, executive and legislative functions. However, the clan socio-
political system was replicated at the individual village level, so that in essence, precolonial 
Isoko governmental system was one in which each village or settlement was governed by the 
oldest man assisted by a village council and together, they were responsible for law and 
order. It was at the village level that, the day-to-day process of ordering the lives of the 
peoples of each community was performed. 
Religious beliefs and practices also played a significant role in Isoko society, with 
oracles and malevolent spirits having abodes in trees, ponds, lakes and the forest, thought to 
be interested in the affairs and welfare of man, and thus requiring regular propitiation 
through offerings of various kinds, including human sacrifice.
353
The mention here, of Isoko 
religious practices is significant in relation to their encounters with the British as indicated 
hereafter. The two dominant belief systems in Isokoland when the British arrived were 
witchcraft and the Eni Witch finding Oracle.
354
 Witches were thought to be in contact with 
evil forces, and imbued with powers to visit their supposed enemies in spirit form, at night 
and either kill or inflict ailments on such enemies through their witch powers. To tackle this 
ordeal of witchcraft, precolonial Isoko relied on the Eni Oracle at Uzere clan. It was part of 
the local people’s political and social value system. It was a problem solving one, which 
invariably suffered as the imposition of British colonialism accelerated in the nineteenth 
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century. When the British arrived in Isoko areas, this witch-finding and punishing oracle, 
which performed on the shores of Lake Uzere and attracted Isoko believers and pilgrims 
from neighbouring Ijo, Urhobo and Itsekiri areas was in full bloom.
355
The witch-finding 
process involved the Ovie of Uzere, who played a central role as its priestly-king directing 
affairs. As demonstrated later in this chapter, the twin matters of witchcraft and witch-finding 
and punishing were the catalysts for punitive actions of Great Britain in the Isoko country. A 
need to stamp out this practice, which was considered repugnant and inhumane, influenced 
British use of force against the Uzere in the early twentieth century. However, this came 
about only after the British had earlier used the sole treaty with the Owe clan as a first step to 
gain control and consolidate their grip with the establishment of Native Courts in several 
aspects of the Isoko territory. At this point, understanding early Isoko contacts with Great 
Britain illuminates the discourse in relation to the subsequent episodes of treaty-making, 
consolidation, and punitive actions. Doing so will show that violence was a final, but largely 
isolated British strategy in the region as a follow up measure to enforce treaty obligations, a 
treaty which was largely concluded peacefully.  
7.2 British Contact and Influence 
The essence of understanding Isoko early contacts with Great Britain in particular, was to 
contextualize why it took long for officials of the imperial power to visit the territories of the 
Isoko in their treaty-making episodes. Early contact and subsequent influence of Europeans 
on such a decentralized people as the Isoko did not follow a similar trajectory as that of her 
neighbours, particularly the Itsekiri and the Ijo, which began from the late fifteenth century. 
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Unlike the Itsekiri and Ijo, the Isoko as hinterland people did not attract early visits by 
European travelers; as such traveler accounts in the forms we know of the other two groups 
are scant.  
 For instance, in ‘Up the Niger,’ the narrative of Major Claude MacDonald’s mission 
to the Niger and Benue rivers in 1889, reference is made to the Isoko as ‘about the Agabos, 
little is known at present. They are not a large tribe…they speak a distinct language and 
appear to be industrious agriculturalists and oil producers.’
356
 In this instance, MacDonald 
and his party did not visit the Isoko country. Most likely, they must have derived this 
information about the people from the Ijo and Aboh along the banks of the Forcados and 
Niger Rivers. Moreover, even though the territory of the Isoko is traversed by numerous 
creeks and streams, these did not provide direct access to the coast. Because of this, in the 
slave trade era, the Isoko essentially remained an unknown hinterland group, without having 
had direct contact and dealings with Europeans, and only came into the picture of contact as 
the palm oil trade and colonisation gained prominence.  
In the slave trade era, the Isoko suffered in the hands of the Ijo, who raided them for 
slaves and sold them to Europeans at the coast. Some details of such slave raids are 
recounted in the oral traditions of the clans, as recorded in the intelligence reports on the 
riverine Erowha group close to the Patani area. Wars with the Mein Ijo and the Kumbowei 
and Kabowei Ijo over slave raids are given as reason for the movement of Isoko groups 
inland away from the shores of the Forcados River.
357
The Isoko were also engaged in inter-
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community wars and raids against one another in the slave era. The plausibility of this 
somehow rests with the Aboh Kingdom to the east of the Isoko which was one of the leading 
trading states of the Delta both in the slave and palm oil eras, and it was likely that the Isoko 
clans and their settlements close to it such as Aviara and Uzere had commercial relations 
with Aboh. Indeed, Whitney Forster has noted that the Olomoro (Isoko) after a successful 
foray against Owe (Isoko), sold captives at Onya, an Aboh settlement.
358
This is more likely 
because, Asaba-Ase, an Aboh settlement on the mouth of the Ase River and close to these 
Isoko clans and the Ijo settlement of Abare are bilingual even today, speaking Aboh and 
Isoko languages. There is no doubt that contact between the two groups must have been 
robust and of considerable antiquity.
359
 
The change from slave to palm oil in the nineteenth century brought with it, both 
economic benefits to the Isoko and increased interest and exposure to Great Britain’s 
imperial machinations. Isokoland harboured the oil palm tree growing in wild profusion, and 
with their expertise and dexterity in climbing up the palm tree, collecting the palm nut and 
processing it into oil and kernel, the Isoko played a relatively considerable role in the 
emergent palm oil trade as producers. Essentially, Isoko oil and palm kernel found their way 
to the trading stations of Aboh and Patani.
360
Nevertheless, in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century, with the gradual decline of the slave era and the onset of the forest trade 
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era, it was not long before the Isoko people and their territory experienced both intrusion and 
later greater influence of Great Britain’s officials in their affairs. 
7.3 Treaty-Making and Establishment of Control 
The Isoko became like the other groups of this study, victims of Great Britain’s shift from 
informal to formal empire. The need to open up the interior for raw materials and 
international trade assumed the dimension of acquiring and annexing territories, buoyed in 
part by inter-European fears and rivalries. The wider background to an understanding of 
Whitehall and Westminster’s disposition to look more favorably than hitherto to colonial 
acquisition has been discussed earlier in chapter one.
361
Nevertheless, as indicated next, the 
imposition of Great Britain’s political control on the Isoko from1896 affected the traditional 
social and political structures and norms of the people. However, in this instance as with the 
other groups of this study, treaty-making, and the subsequent establishment of governance 
institutions in the form of Native Courts by Great Britain in Isokoland, subsumed the 
political and judicial sovereignty of the people under the total control of Great Britain. As 
demonstrated, instances of military patrols and punitive actions were post treaty-making 
developments ostensibly embarked upon by representatives of Great Britain to achieve 
consolidation by bringing a few trouble spots under control in line with earlier concluded 
treaty obligations. 
The accelerated inroads made by officials of Great Britain into the hinterlands beyond 
the coasts in the Western Delta continued unabated after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, 
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which provided for effective occupation as one of the resolutions for the imperial powers. 
Consequently, and as has been discussed concerning the Urhobo in chapter five, officials of 
Great Britain craved to deal with hinterland groups directly. With the appointment of Claude 
Macdonald as Commissioner and Consul-General for the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1891, the 
tone was set for the extension of Great Britain’s influence into the hinterlands beyond the 
coastal Itsekiri and Ijo territories, with visits by officials of Great Britain to Isoko and 
Ukwuani territories. These visits were encouraged by the FO as a means to gain the trust and 
confidence of locals, to develop good relations, foster trade, and for treaty-making.
362
They 
were also designed to bypass the middlemen Itsekiri and trade directly with the oil producing 
groups to which the Isoko belonged.
363
As discussed in chapters four and five, British desires 
to trade directly with hinterland groups in the case of the Urhobo, strained relations with the 
Itsekiri merchant Nana, who saw his control of the hinterland oil markets slipping out of 
hand, and subsequently reacted by disrupting trading activities on the Ethiope River. The 
consequence of Nana’s action was the punitive expedition against him in 1894 by the 
constabulary of the Niger Coast Protectorate, which in the eyes of the agents of Great Britain 
was a move to safeguard the treaty of 1884. The provisions in this treaty stipulated the 
development and safeguard of the resources and commerce of the Itsekiri 
country.
364
Subsequent explorations into the Western Delta hinterlands under Macdonald 
followed the establishment of Warri and Benin River Vice-Consulates. These two districts 
and together with Sapele in the closing days of 1891 became the staging posts for not only 
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penetration but the gradual establishment of administrative structures, as the various vice-
consuls preoccupied themselves with peaceful tours to map out and have better knowledge of 
the interior as part of a wider cultural project, conclude treaties with the peoples and 
convince them to trade directly in oil palm produce with the agents of Great Britain.
365
 
As indicated in chapter five, Vice-Consul H. L. Gallwey emerged as a key figure in 
the hinterland push. As the man on the spot driving the imperial process at this time, he was 
the first official to establish contact with the Urhobo and later with the Isoko when he toured 
their territories in 1891. As has been noted, the purposes of these visits were to gain 
knowledge of the hinterlands and its peoples, assess trade opportunities and prepare grounds 
for treaty-making. The conclusion of numerous treaties in the case of the Urhobo, beginning 
from 1892 with the Abrakar group underscores the importance of these visits. For the Isoko, 
it seems the visits were brief and superficial, given that by 1896, the British still had little 
knowledge of the social structures of the people. Thus, it took much longer for any form of 
consular and administrative presence to be established in Isoko areas. This delay may also 
have been due to the boundary and jurisdictional disputes which reared up between the 
protectorate government and the Royal Niger Company between 1889 and 1894 over who 
had the right to administer certain territories on the Forcados and the hinterlands.
366
In the 
event, further visits to Isoko and Ukwuani areas were suspended until the differences 
between the RNC and the protectorate were resolved after Sir John Kirk’s investigation. He 
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suggested boundary adjustments, which placed the territories on the right bank of the 
Forcados River under the protectorate, and those on the left under the Company.
367
 
From indications, the presumptions of officials of Great Britain that the hinterland 
was all about the Urhobo areas also delayed further movements into the interior. Little was 
known of the Isoko as a separate people even though their palm oil was already finding its 
way as earlier noted, to the trading stations at Aboh and Patani. The various tours from the 
vice-consulates at Warri and Sapele in the intervening years got to only one Isoko town, Owe 
(Owe clan), where a protection treaty was concluded on 31 August 1896. Essentially, the 
treaty-making party consisted of an interpreter, a messenger, a guide, all of whom were 
Africans and who in most cases signed as witnesses, and one or two consular officials who 
directed the process. It is debatable like in the other treaty-making episodes of this study if, 
the chiefs and leaders of the Isoko understood the contents of the treaty they signed given 
that it is probable that the African interpreters may not have been able to convey the full 
meaning and import of the substance of the words inherent in the treaties to the people. It 
seems likely that the people understood the treaty as a trade document. Nevertheless, such 
challenges and irregularities did not affect and stop the processes of treaty-making with the 
groups of this study by the agents of Great Britain within the period under review.  
Thus, in 1896, visits were arranged into the hinterland Urhobo and Ukwuani (Kwale 
country). In one of these visits, Hugh Lecky, an Assistant District Commissioner under Ralph 
Moor, as another man on the spot, shaping the colonisation process, got to the Isoko 
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settlement of Owe in August, and concluded a treaty with the people.
368
 This treaty remains 
the only treaty with any Isoko group. Why the agents of Great Britain concluded only one 
treaty with the Isoko cannot be easily explained. However, one can conjecture that it may 
have been connected with their failure to recognise the Isoko as a distinct group, and the 
much farther journeying required getting to the Isoko areas from the Consular posts at Warri 
and Sapele. The British clearly assumed that the Isoko and Urhobo were one and the same 
people, due to the close relationship of the two languages and cultures. Whatever 
shortcomings there were, it did not stop the agents of Great Britain from taking steps to begin 
the process of bringing the Isoko under their control. Importantly though, the failure to know 
more about the people and engage in robust treaty negotiation may be a key factor in later 
violence. 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, treaty-making in itself and with all the 
legalities of sovereign and political rights it bestowed on officials of Great Britain, did not 
lead to the desired achievement of the end which was to subsume the people totally under the 
control of Great Britain. Immediate follow up actions by the imperial power was always the 
establishment of administrative and governance machineries in the form of Native Courts to 
regulate affairs of the people. The attendant effect of the establishment of these courts was 
that, it marked the second step after treaty-making on the consolidation of imperial political, 
judicial and religious institutions on the Isoko, and the gradual but effective reduction of their 
independence, as their social and political structures were altered as formal 
institutionalization of imperial rule took roots. But the significant point to be noted here and 
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in the other cases of this study is that, the provisions of the treaties which contained clauses 
directing the people to not only place their territories under the protection of Her Majesty, the 
Queen, but also to refer local matters and disputes of social and political nature to the 
officials of Great Britain for settlement, represents an erosion of the independence of the 
people and their ultimate subjugation, and colonization by Great Britain.  
At this point, it is imperative to examine the treaty with Owe in relation to how it was 
concluded and provisions therein within the context of the discourse of peaceful colonisation 
through treaties. The treaty with the Isoko Clan of Owe, was the only one concluded with any 
Isoko settlement by officials of Great Britain. Obaro Ikime has suggested and quite plausibly 
so that, the rest of Isoko country could said to have come under the eventual control of Great 
Britain through default.
369
 This treaty, quite typical in form with the earlier treaties concluded 
with the Itsekiri and Urhobo groups, begins with a title and contained nine articles as follows: 
The title of the treaty was ‘Treaty with Chiefs of Owe’. In similar pattern as the 
treaties with the Itsekiri and the Urhobo, Article one as usual expressed the desire of Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India to comply with the request 
of the Chiefs and People of Owe to extend to their territory the authority and jurisdiction of 
Her Majesty, and also Her gracious favour and protection. Given this was a set treaty form; 
this does not mean that the Owe or the Isoko as a group, asked for the protection of Her 
Majesty the Queen. Article two expressed the agreement of the Chiefs of Owe from entering 
into any form of contact, bond and Treaty with any other foreign power without consulting 
first and getting approval from Her Majesty’s government to do so. Again, as with the other 
treaties with the other groups of this study, this clause clearly subsumed the diplomatic, 
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political and sovereign rights of the Chiefs of Owe and placed them under the authority of the 
agents of Great Britain. Article three gave powers to imperial agents to exercise full and 
exclusive rights over criminal and civil matters, and over matters concerning British subjects 
and their properties, including foreigners enjoying British protection. This clause was 
interesting in view of the later actions of the agents of Great Britain as it concerned matters 
of criminality and attempts made to stamp out so called trouble areas. Article four, requested 
the natives to submit all internal and external disputes which cannot be settled amicably to 
British Consular officers for jurisdiction, arbitration and decision. Clearly, this was a subtle 
way of taking over the judicial powers of the indigenous chiefs and the subjugation of their 
traditional institutions under the control of the agents of Great Britain. Article five further 
stressed, matters of administration of justice, development of the resources of Isokoland, 
development of peaceful trade and the enthronement of general peace, order and good 
government for the progress of civilization. In this instance, the Chiefs of Owe supposedly 
agreed to assist British Consular Officers in achieving the set objectives. Article six provided 
for citizens of all countries to freely carry on trade in very part of Owe, where they also had 
the right to own houses and build factories. Article seven addressed matters of the Christian 
faith, permitting all ministers of the religion to reside and exercise their calling within the 
territories of the Owe unhindered, and with full protection guaranteed by the Chiefs of the 
territory for the said ministers. It goes further to advocate for the free exercise of all forms of 
religious worship and beliefs within the territory without hindrance. This last clause was 
quite interesting in relation to subsequent developments in Owe and Isoko land in general. 
Clearly, this provision was not designed to consider the religious beliefs and practices of the 
indigenous peoples. Article eight was crossed out. This was done ostensibly because; it 
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pertained to matters of shipwreck and the obligation of the people to safeguard crew and 
goods. As an inland people, the British obviously felt this proviso did not apply to the Isoko. 
The last article nine, outlined the effective date of operation of the treaty, and was followed 
with the place and date of conclusion which was at Owe on the 31 August 1896. Hugh Lecky 
as Assistant District Commissioner, Benin District, signed on behalf of the Protectorate 
government. From all indications, he must have negotiated the conclusion of the treaty with 
the people. A Captain Crawford also signed for the Niger Coast Protectorate Force, while 
nine indigenous chiefs, including Ogwara, Afajoma, Bedwa, Egbeda, Amotieruwa, Anofani, 
Afetuja, Amugelie, and Ojoya signed on behalf of the Owe, affixing their X marks. A 
corporal Opwenia also affixed his X mark as witness to the events. He was most probably an 
African non-commissioned soldier of the Niger Coast Protectorate Force.
370
 The treaty with 
Owe, in content and character was similar to earlier treaties concluded with the Itsekiri in 
1884, and with the Urhobo of Abrakar in 1892.Apparently, with this single treaty Isokoland 
was subsumed under the control of Great Britain and effective colonisation was achieved 
through the gradual establishment of civil institutions. The significance of this single treaty 
with a few powerful local leaders’ rests on the knowledge that it imbued imperial officials 
with the needed tonic to interfere in the internal affairs of the people.  
As in the case of the other groups of this study, conclusion of treaties was often 
followed with increased British presence administratively. Thus, by 1896, Natives Courts 
with Africans presiding had replaced earlier Courts of Equity and Consular Courts in the 
Warri and Benin River Districts of the Niger Protectorate, while by 1905, ninety one Native 
Courts were established and operating in the whole of the Protectorate of Southern 
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 In Isokoland in particular, a Native Court was established at Uzere, the home of 
the Eni Oracle in 1904, while another was established at Iyede in 1905.
372
 In doing this, the 
British admonished the people to settle their disputes in the European way rather than in their 
own indigenous ways, thus further taking away the peoples’ political and judicial rights and 
placing them under the control of the institutions of Great Britain.  
It must be noted that by 1899, the Charter of the RNC was revoked and the territories 
it formally administered in the Lower Niger were handed to the Niger Coast Protectorate, so 
that henceforth from 1900, all of the areas of this study were subsequently placed under the 
new Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with Sir Ralph Moor as High Commissioner. Also, the 
Protectorate was subsequently divided into Western, Central and Eastern Divisions with the 
study areas under Western and Central divisions. In particular, Isokoland was placed under 
the Agberi District of the Central Division with headquarters at Warri. 
373
In April 1900, 
twenty proclamations were enacted which were considered essential for effective 
administration of the protectorate. This followed the repeal of the Africa Order in Council of 
1889, which was the existing instrument of administration of the Niger Coast before the 
inauguration of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900.
374
 Amongst these twenty laws, 
the Native Courts Proclamation legalized and also formalized the earlier existing Consular 
and Native Courts, while a Supreme Court Proclamation Law established a Supreme Court 
for the Protectorate, having the same jurisdiction as far as local circumstances permitted, as is 
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vested in the High Court of Justice in England. Though, evidence is not available of any kind 
of negotiations with local chiefs on the constitution of the Native Courts, some interesting 
points with direct bearing on British – Isoko relations and by extension the other groups of 
this study are discernible from the provisions of the Native Courts and Supreme Court 
Proclamations. In the first instance: 
The native courts were constituted to exercise jurisdiction over criminal and civil 
matters in which cases wherein natives only are concerned can be disposed of by 
natives under the supervision of a District Commissioner who is ex officio President 
of all Native Courts in his district.
375
 
In the second instance, regarding the Supreme Court, it contained provisions to the effect 
that: 
Its terms should not deprive the court of the right to observe and enforce the 
observance, nor should deprive any person of the benefit of any law or custom 
existing in the Protectorate and not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience. This law was supplemented firstly by the ‘Commissioner’s 
Proclamation,’ by which subjects to limits therein specified, the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court was conferred on District Courts, and secondly by the Criminal 




What can be deduced from both provisions above was that first, the Native Courts 
functioned not only as judicial organs, but were defacto local government authorities vested 
with powers to institute policy, prevent crime, maintain law and order and initiate and 
implement other programmes for the well-being of its areas of jurisdiction. This much was 
captured in Ralph Moors despatch to the colonial office in 1903.
377
 Secondly, the need for 
the district officer to supervise the Native Courts removed whatever independence 
indigenous leaders would have had. Clearly, the focus on Native Courts by this time, unlike 
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earlier treaties with the Itsekiri and Ijo, reflects wider changes in the colonisation process 
since the 1860s. From the 1900s, trade had been consolidated, so that, more energy and 
resources were put into actual colonisation in the form of establishment and strengthening of 
institutions such as, justice systems to achieve total political and sovereign domination which 
hinged on the treaties. 
In its powers and operations and guided by the district commissioner, the Native 
Courts subsumed the judicial, executive and legislative functions of indigenous social and 
political system under the control of the officials and institutions of Great Britain. It was a 
reflection of the transposition of the legal, judicial and political ideas of Great Britain and 
indeed Europe discussed in chapter two, on the indigenous people. So that, with the 
conclusion of treaties and establishment of administrative organs in the form of the courts, 
the indigenous peoples were expected to conform with European ways by dispensing justice 
not through traditional means which meted out punishment in such ways as blinding thieves, 
and killing of witches.  
British authority to set up courts came from the 1896 treaty, which, in article three, 
provided for the officers of Great Britain to have full control over civil and criminal matters. 
Thus, together, the provisions of the Native Courts and Supreme Courts Proclamations of 
1900, gave the officials of Great Britain the needed leverage and tonic to put in place 
appropriate institutions for the effective colonisation of Isokoland. In this context therefore, it 
is not out of place to suggest that the cases of punitive actions taken against aspects of the 
Isoko were ostensibly to put stops to what were regarded as repugnant practices such as the 
Eni witch finding Oracle and the blinding of thieves. Indeed, as A. E. Afigbo has noted, the 
British believed that the traditional social and political systems and processes of different 
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Nigerian peoples contained many abuses and obnoxious practices which could not be 
tolerated by them, and thus such practices could only be abolished under the guidance of 
their officials who oversaw local administration.
378
 Clearly, such British perspectives at a 
time colonisation was being consolidated resonated with the European ideas of racial, 
cultural and legal superiority discussed in chapter two as the foundations of imperialism. To 
all intents and purposes, the patrols of the early twentieth century in Isokoland were 
instituted not necessarily as a first step towards bringing the Isoko areas under British 
control, but were follow up measures taken after treaty-making and the establishment of civil 
institutions for control and administration of Isoko territories in line with British judicial and 
political practices. 
7.4 Post Treaty-Making Developments in Isoko 
There is no doubt that during expansion, clashes were bound to occur between indigenous 
systems and the imperial imposition. While such confrontations varied in each of the case 
studies, its dimension in Isoko – British relations was noticeable in the aspect of the socio-
cultural practices of the people.  As noted earlier, in some Isoko settlements, the fusion of 
political and social authority was vested in the priestly Ovie (king), as was the case with the 
Uzere Clan. Thus, in the encounters between the Isoko and officials of Great Britain, it was 
not long before the processes of indigenous religious and other practices of some clans 
pitched indigenous authority against the expanding British as they set out to acquire and 
effect control and consolidate their hold on the areas. In this case, the treaty processes also 
suggest that British control might have been more superficial given that only one treaty was 
concluded with the Owe, and non with the Uzere, a different clan. Inherent in the socio-
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religious system of the Isoko were, vital ritual and judicial practices prominent amongst 
which was the witch-finding and punishing oracle called ‘Eni’ at Uzere clan.   
 In the case of the Isoko, military action was engendered by reactions to treaty 
violations (as were the instances with the Patani and Nana episodes of 1887 and1894 
respectively).It must be emphasised that, the treaties the officials of Great Britain concluded 
with the various peoples of this study contained clauses which laid down terms for free trade, 
peace, order, administration of justice, good government and the general progress of 
civilization. Even though these were apparently European ideas, alien to the indigenous 
peoples, and understood only by the officials of Great Britain, once concluded, the treaty 
provisions imbued imperial officials on ground with legal and political rights to assume 
control of the affairs of the indigenous peoples at different times in the colonisation process. 
It was in this vein, that officials of Great Britain took actions against the Isoko of Uzere, to 
abolish their indigenous religious practices, which in the estimation of the British, as has 
been noted by Afigbo, were considered obnoxious, against efforts to enthrone order and 
inimical to the administration of justice in line with British practices. Clearly, such self-
imposed rights ostensibly derived from the treaties, were exercised freely in British relations 
with the various indigenous groups not excepting the Isoko.   
 In precolonial Isokoland and by extension the land of the neighbouring groups to be 
accused of wizardry and witchcraft were considered heinous and was a tag that was dreaded 
by all and sundry. In his study of the Eni Trials using the oral traditions of the Isoko, Felix E. 
Oghi has suggested that, to be indifferent to accusations of witchcraft and wizardry meant 
that the accused had accepted guilt, but that where the accused pleaded innocence, then trials 
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had to be conducted.
379
Thus, in the late nineteenth century, trial by ordeal of supposed 
witches and wizards at Eni-Lake of Uzere clan in Isoko had become popular, attracting 
adherents from the neighbouring Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ijo groups.
380
What was playing out in 
pre-colonial Isoko and other Delta groups was an age old indigenous religious practice. It 
was a practice in which, divinities and gods – considered as infallible, especially in matters 
of adjudication concerning witchcraft and wizardry - functioned as guardians and protectors 
of the people. Matters of witchcraft and wizardry were considered impossible to be unraveled 
by mere humans. As such, the Uzere Eni Oracle, a social institution for detecting witchcraft 
and wizardry operated as a bridge between the people and the gods, with the Ovie (priest-
king) at the apex of its operations, as has been indicated earlier in the social and political 
system of the Isoko. 
Essentially, the operational process of the Eni witch-finding and punishing oracle 
involved a one stop judgement without room for appeal, in which the accused persons were 
transported in a boat to the center of a lake at Uzere. The accused were then asked to jump 
into the lake and swim towards the Ovie (priest-king) who was ashore and directing the 
whole process. It was believed that those who were innocent would swim successfully 
towards the priest, while the guilty ones would drown and die, drawn to the bottom of the 
lake by the power of Eni, believed to inhabit the lake. This trial by ordeal also involved a 
payment of a certain amount by those accused but claiming innocence, as cost for undergoing 
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 Thus, the process was somewhat one of money making for the custodians of the 
tradition, in this case the priestly class of Uzere. When District Commissioner, Copland 
Crawford visited Uzere in 1902, he condemned the witch-finding practice, calling it a fraud, 




By 1902, formal administration had been consolidated in Isoko territories through the 
Native and the Supreme Courts Proclamations of Southern Nigeria. By this time, officials of 
Great Britain were keen on stopping the Eni ordeal which was considered inimical to the 
administration of European style justice. This British perception of the Eni ordeal may be 
connected with what scholars have characterised as late Victorian and Edwardian attitudes to 
race, and specific imaginations of African society; a perception of barbarity and human 
sacrifices which informed the sacking of the Benin Kingdom in 1897.
383
As explained, race 
and class were employed by imperial powers to mediate relations with indigenous people, in 
which indigenous cultures were regarded as degenerate, and this was used to justify violence. 
Hence, in the case of the Isoko and the British, one of the measures considered was the 
sending in of a patrol to the hinterlands to contain supposed trouble giving areas.
384
Thus, in 
his capacity as High Commissioner, Ralph Moor made efforts to enthrone order and good 
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governance in the protectorate with the abolition of the Eni ordeal as a prime target. 
Consequently, in Copland Crawford’s second visit to Uzere in 1903, this time as Acting 
Divisional Commissioner of the Central Division, he employed a carrot and stick approach to 
persuade the Ovie of Uzere to abolish the Eni ordeal. In this instance, the king was offered an 
annual pension on the one hand, while threatened with punitive action if he failed to abolish 
the practice on the other hand. The king capitulated and on the ninth of December, the Eni 
ordeal was declared abolished with a signed resolution to that effect. The resolution 
abolishing the Eni ordeal was signed by elements from Isoko, Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ijo 
areas.
385
Subsequently, a proclamation outlawing the practice of trials by ordeal, which was 
found to be a pervasive trend in many parts of the protectorate, was enacted.
386
 
Significantly, the Eni ordeal was eliminated through peaceful diplomacy, and not by 
military force. Copland Crawford mooted the use of threat, and the Isoko must have been 
aware of the military power of the British over neighbouring groups such as Nana and the 
Benin Empire, which perhaps had the effect of persuading the leadership of Uzere to 
capitulate. Nevertheless, Copland Crawford did not press on with the use of force as a first 
option to secure the acquiescence of the Ovie of Uzere to agree to the abolition of the Eni 
ordeal. Tact and diplomacy were employed by Crawford to avoid violence.
387
Indeed, 
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Copland Crawford was rewarded for his peaceful diplomacy in bringing about the abolition 
of the Eni ordeal by his elevation to the position of substantive Divisional Commissioner.
388
 
Subsequently, the British deployed force in other aspects of Isokoland to bring 
trouble spots under control. These took the form of military and police patrols from 1904 to 
1910. This practice of patrols followed the gradual amalgamation scheme and the 
streamlining of the military forces of the Southern Nigerian Protectorate after the revocation 
of the Charter of the RNC in 1899. In Isoko areas, the military patrols and actions were of so 
mild a nature that to regard them as full military operations is an over-statement. In fact, they 
were not grave enough to warrant inclusion in the annual colonial reports up to the 
amalgamation and creation of Nigeria in 1914.As such, Ozoro was partially burnt down 
when a chief refused to hand over to the agents of Great Britain, men who had been 
implicated in the murder of a man, while in 1908 a patrol visited Iyede and partly burnt down 
the town over the driving out of a political officer attached to the Iyede Native Court.
389
 
Subsequently, between 1909 and 1910, further measures were taken by patrol units to stamp 
out continuous practice of blinding thieves through pouring of boiling oil into their eyes.
390
 
The settlements of Owe, Ozoro and Oleh were notorious for this practice.
391
 
It would be tempting from the foregoing episodes of the abolition of the Eni ordeal 
and the cases of punitive actions cited to conclude that Isokoland was brought under the 
control of Great Britain mainly through coercion. Clearly, in this one case, treaty-making was 
superficial, given that only one treaty was concluded with the Owe, and non with the much 
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prominent Uzere clan, which posed a bigger challenge to British machinations. In this vein, 
perhaps, violence was necessary as a follow up measure after treaty-making to achieve 
consolidation in relation to the events in Ozoro, Iyede, and Oleh in the early twentieth 
century. Significantly, the episodes above were all engendered by a need to stamp out what 
was regarded as repugnant in respect of the Eni ordeal and in the other cases, bringing under 
control a few trouble areas still engaged in practices considered inimical to order and good 
governance. Indeed, the one and only protection treaty with Owe clan and the subsequent 
establishment of Native Courts in Isokoland to all intents and purposes, achieved 
colonisation of Isokoland for Great Britain in 1896, after which steps, hinged on treaty 
provisions, were taken to stamp out the Eni ordeal and other vices. 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the central task was to draw out how the Isoko of the Western Delta were 
colonised by Great Britain. The chapter demonstrated that the means by which Great Britain 
gained control of the Isoko was through initial treaty-diplomacy, followed by establishment 
of governance institutions in the form of Native Courts. These were British styled political 
and judicial institutions introduced after treaty-making, which legally and effectively took 
over the political and legislative functions of the indigenous social and political system that 
had been in place. The need for maintenance of law and order necessitated the deployment of 
military patrols to pacify trouble areas between 1904 and 1910.When examined within the 
context of the general Nigerian historiography of British expansion in Nigeria which tends to 
emphasize Great Britain’s use of force or calculated conquest as the overriding means, the 
evidence indicates that a more peaceful approach was the case in Isokoland, and indeed in the 
other examples of this study. 
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 Officials of Great Britain did not establish contact with the more hinterland dwelling 
Isoko as early as they had done with the Itsekiri, Ijo and Urhobo and this perhaps affected 
how locals responded as they did, compared to other groups. Nevertheless, after the Berlin 
Conference, contact was inevitable in the face of heightened imperialism and subsequent 
increased British push into the hinterlands of the Western Delta. Consequently, from the late 
1890s, Isokoland was visited by Consular Officers for purposes of mapping out the 
territories, knowing its land and peoples and ultimately concluding treaties with them. It was 
in one of such visits by Hugh Lecky in 1896that, a treaty, which turned out to be the only 
treaty with the Isoko was concluded with the Owe clan. This treaty set the stage for Great 
Britain’s subsequent occupation of Isoko areas, as the British proceeded to establish other 
administrative bodies in the form of Native Courts in several parts of Isokoland for greater 
formal control. Despite having not concluded treaties with other clans, the British extended 
control to other Isoko settlements on the basis of the Owe treaty. The British clearly just on 
the strength of the treaty with Owe, incorporated other parts of Isoko under their control by 
default. Officials of Great Britain regarded the treaty as a transfer of sovereign rights by the 
chiefs and peoples of Isoko to the British Crown, and subsequently proceeded to establish 
institutions for formal administration and maintenance of law and order. 
 The chapter also demonstrated why some military patrols and actions were taken 
against aspects of the Isoko by the beginning of the twentieth century. The evidence revealed 
that, as Great Britain consolidated its presence in Isoko territories after the treaty of 1896, it 
was not long before the traditional systems of the people clashed with the imposed judicial 
and political systems of the imperial power. This was mainly exemplified in the Eni Oracle, a 
witch-finding and punishing ordeal at Uzere, one of the clans of the Isoko country. This 
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practice and others such as the blinding of thieves with boiling oil were considered by the 
colonialists as repulsive and repugnant. So that, in the spirit of the provisions of the treaty of 
1896 and other administrative machineries hinged on the maintenance of law and order 
which had been set up following the inauguration of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the 
British stepped in with police and military patrols to stop, what were considered as barbaric 
practices in trouble giving aspects of Isokoland. 
 Finally, the summary is that, within the central argument of this study, of the role of 
treaties as a central means of colonisation, Isokoland came under the effective control of 
Great Britain in the age of empire not by a calculated and enforced means of conquest 
through military forces, but by a systematic application of diplomatic means of treaty-
making, the employment of tact by officials in dealing with explosive indigenous matters, all 
designed to legitimize the process and achieve the objective of colonisation peacefully. This 
was followed quickly with the establishment of political and judicial structures, which 
represented a transposition of metropolitan laws and governance systems, to which the Isoko 
were compelled to abide with. In this circumstance, the indigenous political and social 
structures were subsumed under the control of imperial officials and institutions, losing in the 
process, their sovereignty and liberties. From the evidence, the conclusion is that, in relation 
to the epithet to this chapter, the temper and convictions of Consul-General Moor in carrying 
through expeditions in respect of the Isoko areas at the beginning of the twentieth century 
were, dictated by a need to check a few trouble spots and place them effectively under the 




Chapter Eight: The Ukwuani: A Case of Indigenous Agency in Colonisation 
 
In March 1904, a military column patrolled the Kwale country to open it up for trade. 
This was successfully accomplished by the beginning of May…The patrols and 
operations were essentially suppressions of risings and troubles against natives, and in 






Earlier case study chapters have shown clear economic and political reasons why locals 
chose to cooperate with the British, especially in the era of the palm oil trade. Economically, 
hinterland groups desired to trade directly with the British to profit from the lucrative trade. 
The Urhobo (chapter 6) exemplified this in their relations with the British. Politically, Itsekiri 
internal situation fostered closer links between local chiefs and representatives of the British 
(chapter 4). Despite been regarded as pirates, the Western Ijo also took advantage of the palm 
oil trade, with Patani emerging as a trade hub of the RNC, receiving goods from the 
hinterlands (chapter 6). Even though violence was used in aspects of Isoko in the early 
twentieth century to curtail what the British regarded as trouble spots (chapter 7), treaty-
making followed a similar peaceful process as earlier cases, with cooperation of the 
indigenous leadership, whom the British through tact, persuaded to abolish the Eni witch 
ordeal. For the Ukwuani reasons of greater share in the palm oil trade and local internal 
conditions engendered a need to have direct links with the British, underscoring the 
suggestion that in some instances, locals facilitated the colonisation process. 
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 Historiographical representations of Ukwuani encounters with Great Britain in the 
age of empire by historians of Nigeria often begins with episodes of military patrols by the 
forces of Great Britain and the establishment of administrative offices at Kwale and the Aboh 
Kingdom under the Native Authority system of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria between 
1901 and 1905.
393
Such representations are mainly derived from reports of the military patrols 
from the early twentieth century designed to contain, trouble areas and disturbances in some 
Ukwuani settlements.
394
This would seem to support the dominant Nigerian narrative of 
conquest and represents a portrayal of the people putting up massive resistance to Great 
Britain’s forceful colonisation. But the evidence in this case, as in the other case studies, does 
not support such a view as a fitting representation of the general pattern of British contact 
and expansion in Nigeria. Thus, this chapter, shows specifically how Ukwuaniland was 
colonised by Great Britain, using treaties as a first step and military force as a follow up 
action to enforce treaty obligations and bring peace to trouble spots. Significantly, it was a 
process that also involved indigenous agency, a fact that has been intentionally or otherwise 
untold in the dominant Nigerian historiography, but which is the focus of this chapter. 
As in the case of the Isoko in the preceding chapter, Great Britain established contact 
with the Ukwuani very much later than with the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijo groups of this 
study.
395
 Great Britain’s expansion into Ukwuaniland only began in the late nineteenth 
century. This late British contact with the Ukwuani in part, rests on the scant understanding 
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of the ethnic and topographical composition of the hinterlands of the Western Delta by 
officials of the imperial power. It was also shaped by the fact that the upland Ukwuani, 
unlike their riverine cousins and neighbours, the Ndosumili, with their Abo (Aboh) kingdom, 
are located in a more difficult terrain on the deltaic swampy tropical rain forest further away 
from the Niger River, and therefore difficult to reach. This affected colonial contact as well 
as potential trade. Thus, as has been indicated in chapter five, with the establishment of the 
Sapele and Warri Vice-Consulates in 1892, these two stations became the staging posts for 
subsequent inroads into the hinterland Isoko and Ukwuani territories.  
Following the deposition of Nana, the Itsekiri chief in 1894, the Niger Coast 
Protectorate administration naturally set its sights on areas that were still yet to fall under the 
control of Great Britain. This desire and determination to bring such groups under British 
control and to open up their territories for trade and tap the economic resources of such areas 
intensified from 1896 in the form of visits to the Isoko and Ukwuani areas where treaties 
were concluded with the indigenous chiefs and peoples.
396
As in other cases, the conclusion 
of treaties bestowed on the officials of Great Britain both sovereign and political rights to 
function as overlords over the indigenous peoples, in accordance with the provisions inherent 
in the treaties.  However, as has been emphasized in previous chapters, the general 
historiography of Great Britain’s expansion in Nigeria is given as a process of attacks, 
conquest, defeat, and eventual colonisation of the people by the military forces of Great 
Britain. Again, while this study does not set out to dispute the use of force or threat of its use 
by the agents of Great Britain in some instances of their encounters with the Ukwuani and 
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other indigenous groups in the Niger basin as a whole, it argues that treaty-making and use 
was a first and central step employed by officials of Great Britain for the colonisation of the 
Ukwuani as it was with the other groups of this study. 
Such a distinction is important, as the Ukwuani case exemplifies. Any question as to 
why the Ukwuani cooperated in concluding treaties with the British should be understood 
within the context of indigenous agency and conditions on ground in the periphery as factors 
in the encounter and colonisation process which has been suggested by some scholars in 
chapter one.
397
In this instance of the Ukwuani, it was not a case of fear of the military might 
of the imperial power that influenced them to exert their agency on the colonisation process. 
Rather, the people like the case of the Urhobo in chapter five, consciously welcomed officials 
of Great Britain to their domain and concluded treaties with them. In this encounter process 
between the Ukwuani and the British, all subsequent imperial actions after treaty-making 
were moves by officials of the imperial power to consolidate their grip in territories that were 
already considered part of empire. Indeed, as the epithet at the beginning of this chapter 
indicates, the Kwale country was visited by the military forces of Great Britain in the early 
twentieth century, and as shall be demonstrated more later, these military patrols were 
mounted ostensibly to restore law and order up to 1914 when the colony and protectorate of 
Nigeria was eventually proclaimed. Thus, these military patrols must be evaluated within the 
context of the evolving administrative structures of the Niger areas following first, the 
takeover of the whole area by the Niger Coast Protectorate government after the abolition of 
the Charter of the RNC in 1899. From 1900, as the Southern Nigerian Protectorate came into 
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being, a need to firm up greater control of all the territories necessitated the establishment of 




 Significantly, the establishment of judicial institutions and the subsequent military 
patrols must be regarded as moves by officials of Great Britain to function already as de facto 
political and judicial overlords of the people, who, having signed treaties earlier in 1896, and 
embraced the Native Courts, ostensibly gave officials of Great Britain the leeway towards 
repudiating indigenous practices and actions considered repugnant and anti-British. 
Therefore, it is within the context of this understanding of treaty-making and subsequent 
British actions that this dissertation evaluates Ukwuani relations with Great Britain in the age 
of empire, and to establish the place of colonisation through treaty-making and the setting up 
of governance institutions as central to pacification, rather than the use of force as suggested 
in some quarters. For a broader understanding of the discourse, the chapter provides an 
understanding of the early history of the Ukwuani and their precolonial social and political 
organization. This is to help us gain insights into how their precolonial system related with 
the British in the encounter process. As in the other cases, the role of the man on the spot 
shaping the colonisation process as well as knowledge of the people as a way of peaceful 
colonisation is highlighted to underscore the central place of treaty-making as a non-violent 
process of Great Britain’s colonisation of the Ukwuani within the period under review. 
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8.1 Ukwuani Precolonial Foundations 
The early history of the Ukwuani is essential to understanding the early socio-political 
systems of this group, the peoples’ relations with other neighbouring groups, especially the 
Benin kingdom, and later with Britain. Benin had some influence over the Ukwuani and 
posed as rivals to the British. The Ukwuani area is located to the north-east of the Urhobo 
and is bounded by the Benin in the north, the Isoko and Ijo to the south, and their Ndosumili 
cousins which incorporates the Aboh kingdom to the east. The Ukwuani area is within the 
deltaic rain forest belt, making the land suitable for farming and fishing, practices the people 
have been engaged in from time immemorial. Plantain, maize, cocoyam, yam, and cassava 
were widely produced staple food crops, while fishing activities were confined to settlements 
close to rivers and streams such as the Ethiope and Adofi rivers. Fishponds, both natural and 
man-made, owned by lineages, also served as sources for fish production. Subsistent 
livestock keeping was also a feature of the local agricultural system with chicken, goats and 
pig as the domesticated livestock. The people also engaged in rubber and palm oil extraction 
as major economic activities.
399
 
 Linguistic and ethnographic studies relating to the early history, inter-group relations 
and the social and political organization of the Ukwuani have suggested that the Ukwuani 
share heritage with the Aboh kingdom, but that whereas the Aboh are known as Ndosumili – 
meaning people of the rivers, a reference to their location close to the Niger River, Ukwuani 
refers to upland dwelling people.
400
Cultural and identity formation remains a constant feature 
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in intergroup relations in Nigeria. Even though both groups, the Ukwuani and Ndosumili, 
speak a dialect of the Igbo language, the Igbo being a larger ethnic group to the East of the 
Niger River, they identify separately as different ethnicities.
401
In this linguistic 
categorization, Barbara Grimes and Joseph Grimes have noted that the Ukwuani language is 
a cluster within the Igbo language cluster, but that it is considered as a separate language 
because of its admixture of Ibo and Benin elements.
402
 This fact is discernible from the origin 
patterns of the clans that make up the Ukwuani nation as indicated hereafter. 
Ukwuani legends as recorded in the colonial intelligence reports of 1931 and 1934 by 
G. B. Williams and R. S. Mallinson respectively, mentions places of origin and migrations of 
founder heroes from as far as Igala country in the north, Benin, Igbo across the Niger and 
even nearby Ijo areas. The varied accounts identify more with origins and waves of 
migrations from Benin around the fifteenth century and subsequent origins and movements 
from the Ibo country across the Niger River from the sixteenth century. These waves of 
migrations probably gave the Ukwuani the admixture of Benin and Igbo traits which 
characterised their language and political system.
403
There is still a third legend of 
autochthony, reminiscent of the pattern with other groups in this study, and such, refer to 
proto founders dating into antiquity, suggestive of the notion that, the Ukwuani were among 
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the earliest inhabitants of the Western Lower Niger. In the intelligence reports, the people are 
referred to as ‘Kwale’, a corrupted version of ‘Ukwuani’, and the Kwale would remain a 
feature of how the people are addressed in colonial records and accounts by European writers 
up to and even after the independence of Nigeria.
404
The Ukwuani are made up of fifteen 
clans namely: Abbi, Akoku, Amai, Ebedei, Emu, Eziokpor, Ezionum, Obiaruku, Ogume, 
Onicha-Ukwuani, Umuebu, Umukwuata, Umutu, Utagba-Ogbe, and Utagba-Uno.
405
 
In precolonial times, the Ukwuani practiced slavery and later engaged in the emergent 
slave trade. Slaves were procured or captured from the Igbo areas east of the river Niger and 
sold to merchants at Aboh. The domestic practice of slavery and the subsequent overseas 
demand for slaves fostered intergroup conflicts between the Ukwuani and their neighbours. 
However, by the nineteenth century, it appeared that the demise of slavery and the alternative 
mercantilism of the oil palm trade created broader and more positive intergroup relations 
between the Ukwuani and other groups, particularly the Isoko and Urhobo. In their studies of 
the Ukwuani using oral traditions and ethnographic data, E. O. Okolugbo and Alexander 
Nzei have suggested that, by the time of the palm oil trade, Ukwuaniland attracted Isoko and 
Urhobo migrants, who with their expertise in oil palm collection and procession, settled in 
different parts of Ukwuaniland to exploit the emergent trade which flourished and enriched 
the people. In this process, the contact groups engaged in inter-tribal marriages which 
fostered cultural diffusion, to the extent that the Urhobo and Isoko languages were spoken 
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fluently in many parts of Ukwuaniland.
406
 It is perhaps, this characteristic of the linguistic 
link between the Urhobo, Isoko and the Ukwuani that influenced the agents of Great Britain 
to categorize the people as one and the same, which most likely, delayed proper visits to the 
Ukwuani areas until much later, and like the case of the Isoko in the previous chapter, might 
have led to ignorance on the part of the British on the true identity and social systems of the 
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It has been suggested that precolonial Ukwuani was an acephalous community, 
organized around sovereign autonomous settlements weaved together by common kinship 
and origins.
409
This political system of the Ukwuani was not one in which a single monarch or 
chief superintended over all the clans. Thus, despite their affinity with the Benin and its 
powerful Oba (king), the Ukwuani were generally a segmentary people more like their Ibo 
neighbours to the east of the Niger where the ordinary folks played significant roles in the 
day to day administration of the community, predicated upon a pattern of community life 
revolving around age grade systems, elders and women groups, in which much power was 
not vested in any particular aspect or group.
410
 In such indigenous segmentary political 
structures, Basil Davidson and F. K. Buah have suggested that its operation involved families 
made up of grandparents to grandchildren who came together to form a settlement, and as 
time went by, expanded and broke up into numerous autonomous communities, but were still 
held together by common descent and loyalty to founding ancestors and forebears. Such links 
with the eponymous ancestry were maintained by sharing a common group religious belief 
system, which reinforced togetherness and gave force to common indigenous laws and other 
mores.
411
 The significance of such descent and affinity connections between settlements, 
played out in Hugh Lecky’s treaty-making episodes with the Ukwuani as indicated in the 
ensuing section. 
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 Essentially, as has been noted recently, in precolonial Ukwuani, there were two levels 
of political organization: the village setting and that of the village group. In the former, the 
family constituted the basic unit of political organization whereby, male siblings of lineages 
and their wives and children made up the household group called ebo or imusu with the 
eldest man as the head who kept the ofo, a symbol of the family kinship and also as a form of 
authority.
412
 In turn, groups of families congregated to form a village, community or 
settlement claiming common descent and headed also by the oldest man in the lineage known 
as Okpala-Uku, who doubled as not only the embodiment and representation of the common 
group leader, but also as the living spirit of the lineage ancestors. When the various families 
congregated at the village level, it was the Okpala-Uku who presided over affairs for the day 
to day administration of the village.
413
 
 At the village group or clan level, the structure of political organization was the 
coming together of groups of villages or settlements that share common ancestry, 
congregated in a loose federation where matters common to the group  were handled  by the  
oldest among the Okpala-Uku from amongst the component villages that make up the group 
or clan. The Okpala-Uku remains the head of the socio-political structure in such instances. 
However, whether at the village or clan levels, the Okpala-Uku wielded both spiritual and 
temporal powers.
414
But, both at the village and village group levels of administrations, the 
Okpala-Uku lacked absolute powers, and he functioned in tandem with other institutions of 
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the society such as the Nde-Okwa- council of elders, Onotu-Uku- Premier, and Ugo- 
spokesman of the group at the clan levels to take and arrive at decisions after consultations 
with the people. Consensus building and binding decision making were integral aspects of 
the indigenous political system which also carried the hallmark of robust debates, with 
arguments and counter arguments before decisions were arrived at based on majority views. 
 Women’s groups also featured in Ukwuani political system in which the Ada, leader 
of the women of the community in the person of the oldest female of the community, and a 
council of female elders called offashi, played prominent roles in the administration of the 
settlement or group.
415
(This pattern of governance, of gerontocracy and of the role of women 
groups was discernible in Lecky’s meetings with the people in his treaty-making as shall be 
highlighted subsequently).Overall, in pre-imperial days the central functions of the Ukwuani 
indigenous socio-political organization centered on duties which had to do with settlement of 
internal disputes between and amongst individuals, groups, and villages that made up the 
clan. The detection of crime and passing of judgment on offenders were also aspects of the 
responsibilities of the Okpala-Uku and his council of elders and monitoring of the functions 
and activities of the various age grade groups, which were integral aspects of the governance 
system of the Ukwuani, in addition to numerous other day-to-day tasks. In sum, this was the 
structure of Ukwuani political and social system in place during the arrival of the agents of 
Great Britain to Ukwuaniland, and it was this structure that dictated the patterns of 
diplomatic and other relationships that transpired between the people and officials of Great 
Britain in the age of empire. 
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8.2 Encounters with the British and Treaty-Making 
In their contacts with officials of Great Britain, precolonial Ukwuani socio-political system 
manifested in how the various parts of society perceived and received the imperialists. How 
the various structural divisions of Ukwuani society welcomed officials of Great Britain was a 
unique feature of the contact and colonisation process in this instance. On the other hand, 
officials of Great Britain were always conscious of establishing links with centers of 
population with greater political control. This was the case as demonstrated hereafter in the 
treaty-making episode with the Equaiku which the British found out from the people as a big 
and important settlement.
416
 Importantly, within the context of the central argument of this 
study, these episodes represent forms of colonisation in which the imperial power strived to 
know more about the people by engaging them diplomatically. 
Early inroads by Europeans to anywhere near Ukwuaniland were, the Niger 
Expeditions of 1841, 1854 and 1857.
417
In these instances, the Expeditions only reached 
communities close to the Niger River, particularly the Aboh Kingdom, which as noted earlier 
remains cousins of the Ukwuani, known as the Ndosumili (riverine people).
418
Ukwuani 
territories remained incommunicado to the agents of Great Britain until the late nineteenth 
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century when contact was established in the form of consular visits. Indeed, the penetration 
and subsequent influence of the agents of Great Britain into Ukwuaniland began in April 
1896 with the visits of Assistant District Commissioner Hugh Lecky, who, as the man on the 
spot, facilitated a diplomatic colonisation process through treaties. 
 As indicated earlier, with the inauguration of Sapele and Warri as district offices, 
both stations became staging posts for journeys into the hinterlands beyond the coasts. These 
journeys were in line with the emergent British FO policy of the time, which directed 
officials on ground to strive towards winning the trust and confidence of the indigenous 
peoples for purposes of developing trade with them.
419
This FO policy could be interpreted as 
a desire by the imperial power to engage more diplomatically with the indigenous peoples 
through contact and negotiation rather than by force. As has been discussed in chapter seven, 
with the appointment in January 1896 of Ralph Moor as Commissioner and Consul-General 
of the Niger Coast Protectorate, he set out immediately to extend Great Britain’s control into 
Ukwuaniland. Moor subsequently gave approval for and directed assistant district 
commissioner Hugh Lecky to visit Ukwuani area and open it up for trade.             
The incidents embodied in the report by Lecky to Moor on his visits to the ‘Kwali’ 
country, and Moor’s own report to the FO, outlining the successes of Lecky’s visits, makes 
for interesting reading and provides a clear and comprehensive evidence of the application of 
diplomacy as a first step by officials of Great Britain towards the eventual colonisation of the 
Ukwuani. From the report, Lecky’s dealings with the Ukwuani connotes a soft power 
approach, whereby diplomatic means rather than conquest by military forces was the central 
means adopted by Great Britain in the pacification of the people. However, it should be noted 
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that, it remains a limitation to rely only on Lecky’s report of his encounters with the Kwali 
country as sacrosanct given that the peoples’ version of events is not available for 
comparison and validation. Nevertheless, the imperial reports remain most important in 
establishing the point of colonisation through treaty-making and use within the context of 
this study. They cannot be regarded as solely hagiographic and unreliable. Significantly, the 
reports reveal the colonial knowledge and diplomatic intents of the imperial power in relation 
to the people and their environment.  
In this instance, unlike in earlier encounters with the Itsekiri and the Western Ijo 
before the Scramble, Great Britain’s encounters with the Ukwuani were a bit different, given 
that this time, there was a focus on deliberately using certain tools such as knowing the 
geography of the people and their other characteristics as a form of cultural project to achieve 
peaceful colonisation. Lecky’s report opens as follows: 
According to instructions I proceeded to the Kwale country on the 8
th
instant with 
Capt. Ringer and an escort. Before leaving, I sent Toway on to arrange carriers and 
send messages to the people of Obiariku and Umutu to tell them I was coming. On 
arrival at Eku, Toway informed me the people of Obiariku would not believe it for a 
long time, but at length they sent a messenger through to the people of Umutu, who 
sent word back that they would be very pleased to see me.
420
 
From this opening statement, clearly Lecky did not embark on the trip out of zeal, to impress 
his superiors, but rather, was deliberately directed to do so, and proceeding from Sapele, he 
passed through Urhobo towns already under treaty obligations beginning from Eku.  Also, it 
was clear that Lecky’s trip, as shall be demonstrated in his interactions with the people, was 
in line with the policy of the FO, which had earlier advised officials to endeavour to engage 
the people, win their confidence and explain the intents of the imperial power in a peaceful 
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manner. Significantly, the body of the report reveals that the people of Obiariku would not 
believe it for a long time that, the British were finally coming to visit them. As in the case of 
the Sapele Urhobo in chapter five, they were clearly enthusiastic about receiving the white-
man as exemplified in the response of the Umutu, and this perhaps indicated how, unlike 
previous encounters with other groups, the British recognised their own ignorance of locals. 
As indicated further in Lecky’s report, the people of Umutu exhibited warmth and welcomed 
Lecky and his party. This further strengthens suggestions by scholars that in some instances, 
indigenous agency was a factor in European expansion. 
Furthermore, in the report, activities of internal interethnic problems in and between 
Ukwuani and Urhobo settlements were reported to Lecky. This was suggestive of the fact 
that both groups, the Urhobo and the Ukwuani were already aware of the white man’s 
political influence, understood as a mediator between locals. It was a case of recognizing the 
capacity of the British official to help to resolve local squabbles and issues within and 
between towns. The significance of this must be understood within the context of ‘agency’, 
of locals freely inviting the British to interfere in their internal matters. Indeed, in Lecky’s 
words: 
We proceeded on the 9
th
 from Eku in three canoes with escort, provisions, & c., and 
arrived at Ajulumi that morning. Feto, the Headman (sobo), said he would like to 
have a talk to me, and he told me that the people of Meyes Town and Dumagbassa 
were always seizing people and preventing the Sobo and Kwales from trading with 
each other….Left Ajulumi on the 10
th
 … and arrived Meyes Town. I saw Meyes and 
told him that I had heard he had been seizing people and produce and that I should 
want to see him on my way back. He promised to come to Ajulumi.
421
 
Though Lecky’s mission to the Kwale country was ultimately successful in terms of the two 
treaties concluded with Obiaruku and Equaiku (most likely Akoku), but from the above and 
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from Moor’s despatch to the FO on the outcome of the journey, it remains clear that Lecky 
was not hesitant to carry out the central parts of his mandate which included opening up 
friendly communications with the people and assist in the settlement of squabbles and 
differences between and amongst them considered inimical to the development of trade.
422
 In 
this regard, Lecky solved several palavers between and amongst several settlements, but 
especially, complaints involving one Meyes and the people of Dumagbassa, who apparently 
were engaged in seizures of goods and peoples. Here was an imperial official, the man on the 
spot, immersing himself peacefully, in the internal affairs of the people, akin to what Consul 
Beecroft did in his relations with the Itsekiri in the 1850s. In this vein, the people of Umutu 
complained to Lecky about how the people of Umoquota (most likely Umukwuata) stopped 
the (Umutu people) from coming to trade. These incidents of seizures in the Ukwuani 
country seemed akin to Ijo raids of trade canoes and goods earlier highlighted in chapter six, 
and they were pernicious practices which affected intra and inter groups relations in the 
Ukwuani areas prior to and within the period under review, and which extended up to the 
early twentieth century, warranting punitive actions from the protectorate government 
ostensibly to safe guide trade and contain trouble areas. 
 There is no doubt that the significant point of Lecky’s journey to the Ukwuani 
country remains the treaties he concluded with the people. Up to the time of Lecky’s mission, 
the Ukwuani seemed politically connected to the Benin Monarch. This much was revealed to 
Lecky by his guide Ikpoh who informed Lecky that yearly, the king of Benin visits the source 
of the Ethiope River to make human and other sacrifices, and that Solugbi, a town on the 
other side of the river and about two hours march from Obiariku, belonged to the king of 
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Again, according to Ikpoh, at an earlier time when he (Ikpoh) was guiding Ajaie 
(likely a local agent of the Niger Coast protectorate) through Umutu on his way to the Chief 
of Agabbon (most likely the Ika settlement of Agbo, east of Ukwuani), the peoples of Umutu 
reported him (Ikpoh) to the king of Benin who sent to catch him and kill him, and they had to 
pay (10) bags of cowry (the local currency) to get him off.
424
Clearly, Benin influence was 
paramount around these areas before the events of the 1897 expedition against the kingdom. 
Indeed, in his meeting with the people of Obiariku on the 11 April, the people complained to 
Lecky that the Benin people of Solugbi always gave them – Obiariku, a lot of troubles as all 
their farmlands were on the other side of the river. This narrative of Benin influence on the 
area most likely influenced Lecky’s determination to quickly conclude a treaty with the 
people as a means to stem any further overlordship Benin exercised in the area, curtail the 
advances of the RNC, which by the accounts of Ikpoh had been trying to negotiate for a 
treaty with Obiariku, and also as a measure to stamp the presence and authority of the 
protectorate government in Ukwuani territories. In the words of Lecky in the body of his 
report he affirmed this: 
He (Ikpoh) also said that the Niger Company had been trying to negotiate for a treaty 
at Obiariku but that they did not want to make one with them…I held a meeting with 
the Chiefs of Obiariku on the 11 April…As the Obiariku people are a mixture of 
Kwali and Sobo I made a treaty with them, thinking that the king of Benin would 
leave them alone when he know they had one.
425
 
Again, it remains clear that, concern for the influence of the Benin Empire on the Ukwuani 
was of importance to the agents of Great Britain in their bid to bring the territory under their 
control, and perhaps, this was also likely an influence in the way the locals received Lecky 
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and his party. This much was emphasised in Ralph Moor’s despatch to the FO explaining the 
purpose and outcome of Lecky’s visit in which he outlined that, the general objective of the 
journey was to establish friendly relations with the chiefs and peoples of the Ukwuani 
country around the territory of the king of Benin in order to open up the country of king of 
Benin through peaceable means if possible.
426
Whether the activities of the king of Benin 
ceased in and around the Ukwuani areas after the treaty with the Obiariku is not known. 
However, by 1897, officials of Great Britain had ample cause to visit Benin, leading to the 
renowned Benin Massacre and the consequent punitive expedition mounted against the Benin 
Kingdom.
427
 The issues and events of that encounter between the Benin Kingdom and Great 
Britain are outside the purview of this study. 
 In the body of Lecky’s report, the negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty 
with the Obiariku are not stated, it is safe to conjecture that as with other treaty-making 
episodes of this study, the people were gathered and the intents of the imperial power were 
explained to them through interpreters who were often the escorts and guides of the British 
party, while Ikpoh, and Toway affixed their marks as witnesses to the treaty. 
The terms of the Obiariku treaty were the same as the Treaty concluded with the Owe 
of Isoko in chapter seven. It had nine articles addressing issues of sovereignty, external 
relations, jurisdiction, trade, and religious matters. As was the case with other treaties 
examined in this study, article one assumed that the Chiefs and people of Obiariku requested 
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her Majesty, the Queen’s protection, and undertook to be under her authority and jurisdiction. 
Once concluded and affixed with the marks of the indigenous chiefs, this article and its 
wordings significantly bestowed on the officials of Great Britain legitimacy to assert 
sovereignty and control over the indigenous peoples and their territories.  
 Further developments from the body of the report shows that, Lecky was apparently 
not satisfied with the sole treaty concluded with the Obiariku as a guaranty for strengthening 
the control of Great Britain over Ukwuaniland in the face of the perceived rival imperial 
machinations of the Benin Empire. Consequently, having been informed by the people of 
Obiariku and Umutu respectively that Equaiku (apparently Akoku), was the largest as well as 
chief town of the Ukwuani, Lecky resolved to meet with the chiefs and peoples of the largest 
settlement in Ukwuaniland and conclude a treaty with them. In the words of Lecky: 
Having heard that Equaiku is the largest place in this part of the Kwali country and 
that Umutu was a village belonging to it, I thought it advisable to go there via Umutu, 
so left Obiariku on the 12
th
 to Umutu. As we reached (Umutu), Adonisakar 
Emizawar, the Headman informed me when I asked him to come on to Equaiku to get 
all the chiefs to sign the treaty for that part of the country, that all the towns were 
continually fighting with one another, so I told him I would make a treaty with 
Equaiku and try and make them all friendly and if that did not answer would make 
treaties with all the principal towns when I have the time and call a meeting of the 
different chiefs of these towns to a place to be agreed upon, to settle their palavers.
428
 
A pertinent point deducible from Lecky’s submissions above was that, from the account 
given by Adonisakar Emizawar, who was most likely the chief of Umutu, there was apparent 
inter-communal fights or wars which had one way or the other led to the breakdown of inter-
community relations and engendered security problems. Moreover, the gravity of the 
situation could be gleaned from the refusal of the chiefs of Umutu to have anything to do 
with Equaiku in their meeting with Lecky, even when they acknowledged Equaiku as their 
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chief town. Another point to note was Lecky’s desire to bring the fighting or warring parties 
together for settlement after a treaty with Equaiku and where such a single treaty does not 
achieve the objective, to go further to conclude treaties with all the major towns and even call 
a meeting of all the stakeholders with the intent to resolve their differences. Lecky was 
clearly following through the FO’s directive to win the trust and confidence of the locals 
through diplomacy and not force. On the other hand, in bringing their problems before the 
imperial official, the locals were exhibiting agency in the encounter process. This fact of 
Lecky negotiating peace (mediation) between different local groups remains germane and 
very interesting within the context of peaceful colonisation of this study. Importantly, within 
the context of the dominant existing historiography by historians of Nigeria, clearly, from 
Lecky’s mediation efforts, British reputation was less about gunboat diplomacy, but more of 
trade and treaty diplomacy in this case. 
 Lecky and his party left Umutu on the 13
th
 and arrived Equaiku (Akoku) where, he 
called a meeting of the chiefs, but the session could not hold because the chiefs were not all 
ready to meet with him on that day. On the next day, Lecky met with the chiefs, presented 
them with gifts and concluded a treaty with them, whereby the chiefs affixed their marks to 
the treaty. Lecky and Captain Ringer signed on behalf of the protectorate government, while 
Ikpoh signed as witness after having explained the contents of the treaty to the supposed 
understanding of the people.
429
This treaty in its terms were the same with the one concluded 
with the Obiariku. It addressed territorial, sovereign, juridical, and trade issues as well. The 
point to emphasize remains that, its conclusion as in the other treaty-making episodes of this 
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study, conferred on the officials of Great Britain political and sovereign rights to claim and 
effect control over the indigenous peoples. 
There are some significant points in Lecky’s visit to the Ukwuani country in general 
and the treaty-making episodes. For purposes of driving home the argument of peaceful 
colonisation of Ukwuaniland by Great Britain, these need to be highlighted. In the first 
instance, it remains clear that the people were enthusiastic to receive Lecky and his party. 
This was demonstrated at Equaiku where on his arrival on 13 April, the people brought 
presents to him and gathered all the small children in the town to dance for his entourage. 
Again, it is discernible that, on the next day when the treaty was concluded, the people 
showed further enthusiasm by welcoming his party with a grand reception and said that they 
were pleased to see the officials of Great Britain in their domain. Lecky and his party spent 
two nights at Equaiku, departing on the 15
th
.This welcoming disposition of the people 
resonates with suggestions that internal circumstances within indigenous societies aided the 
colonisation process in some cases. Clearly, this instance of Lecky’s encounters with the 
Ukwuani fits into this wider view of indigenous agency as a factor in the colonisation 
process. Indeed, the narrative of the events that transpired further after the conclusion of the 
treaty between Lecky and the people makes for interesting reading:  
After signing the treaty and receiving the present they (people) said they were 
ashamed to take it (present), as to see the white-man was enough for them, and when 
they were going away gave us a big shout for which in return we gave them a general 
salute. In the afternoon all the Headsmen came and gave us a goat as present, and 
virtually the same thing was said as in the meeting and also gave a big dance of all the 
women in the town in our honour. One very old woman evidently the widow of a big 
chief called us to her house and said how pleased everyone was that the Consuls had 
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come to see them at last. The chiefs said they hoped we would more often come there, 
and that they would do anything they were told.
430
 
As earlier said, it remains a limitation to rely solely on Lecky’s report on his encounters with 
the Ukwuani, given that the version of the people is not available for a comparative analysis. 
Nevertheless, as has been noted in chapter five, the people of Sapele expressed similar 
enthusiasm and sentiments when Consul Macdonald visited their area in 1892.
431
 Thus, this 
trend of welcoming officials of Great Britain by indigenous groups was not new and 
surprising. Indeed, the outcome of the journey sits firmly well with its objective which, as 
has been pointed out involved opening up friendly communications with local groups, and 
where possible assist them to settle disputes and other problems inimical to the free flow of 
trade.  
 This desire to immerse themselves in the affairs of the people and settle differences 
between and amongst the indigenous groups considered damaging to the free flow of trade in 
Kwali country seemed of great concern to the imperial officials. Again, as a second instance 
of interesting developments from Lecky’s journey, it is noticeable that even after the treaties 
with Obiariku and Equaiku, and upon departing Equaiku, Lecky’s disposition and activities 
in the towns he visited on his return journey exemplified a show of great interest in ensuring 
peace and order in the Ukwuani territories for trade and empire-building. As recorded by 
Lecky, he stated that: 
We left Equaiku on the 15
th
 and passed Ebedi, Amajagori and arrived at Umaquata 
(Umukwuata), the people there say that their head town is two hours south of that 
place and that the name of the head town is Ekou, Umaquata and Ebedi are fighting. I 
promised to come back and try to settle their palavers as they seemed very anxious 
and make treaties with Ebedi and Ekou town. These two towns hold all the roads to 
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the waterside and there is a quantity of produce in then waiting to get through. We 
arrived at Obiariku, noon, found several small palavers to settle and stayed next day. 
Arrived at Ajalumi on the 17
th
 and held a palaver. Ayetopo the chief of Abakar 
country sent his messenger through to complain about Meyes and the people of 
Dumagbassa…Meyes promised to come to Ajalumi and also the people of 
Dumagbassa, but failed to do so, although a lot of their people did, there were about 
fifteen cases of seizures against these people ranging from 1 month to 10 months old. 
I inquired into them and told the people that if they did not give back the seizures 
before I returned, they would be severely punished. As both these towns (Meyes town 
and Dumagbassa) belonged to Uria, I would suggest their subsidy be stopped as they 
do not trade and appear to live on what they can seize from other people.
432
 
Clearly, from the above, Lecky’s mediation efforts underscores the desires of an imperial 
official to establish peaceful relations with locals and enthrone peace between and amongst 
different indigenous groups on the one hand, and to also protect British trade interests, in the 
process showing locals that the imperial power could enforce rule of law if the need arises.  
An intriguing point is why the Ukwuani communities were quick to refer their 
internal and inter community problems and palavers to the British official for settlement 
upon his visit? Was this suggestive of a possible breakdown of indigenous socio-political 
systems of governance in these places or indicative of the respect the people had of the 
British having already heard of their dealings with neighbouring groups such as the Urhobo? 
These questions remain imperative in view of the fact that in the instances of inquiring into 
the cases of seizures, Lecky averred that the perpetrators would be severely dealt with. This 
was suggestive of the fact that, the agents of Great Britain were already even without having 
established formal instruments of administration, exercising some form of political and 
judicial control on the peoples merely on the strength of having concluded treaties with a few 
of their prominent towns. While there is no evidence to indicate that Lecky returned as 
promised to settle other fighting groups, or to conclude a treaty with Ekou and Ebedi as a 
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way of settling their differences, to all intents, the two treaties concluded peacefully with the 
Obiariku and the Equaiku served Great Britain’s imperial designs in relation to the 
colonisation of Ukwuaniland. 
A last point to be noted in Lecky’s report was that, the missions also served as a 
means to plot and chart the geography of the Kwali country. On various occasions in the 
course of the expedition and in his interactions with various groups, Lecky asked about the 
sources of the Ethiope and Jamieson rivers, and upon his return journey he affirmed that the 
country was fertile with good roads and plenty of fallow trees.
433
This was clearly a case of 
colonial knowledge of the people and their environment within the context of peaceful 
colonisation. 
 It is interesting to note that after these treaty-making episodes by Lecky with the 
Ukwuani, not much follow-up activity on the part of the protectorate government was carried 
out in these areas. In the intervening years between 1896 and 1900, there was a pause on the 
part of the protectorate government in setting up appropriate machinery for administration 
and day-to-day governance. Two developments may have informed the slow pace of setting 
up administrative machinery in place in Ukwuani after the conclusion of treaties. First, by 
1897 the need to tackle the mighty Benin kingdom arose. As has been explained earlier, 
Benin emerged as a rival imperial power in the Ukwuani areas, and thus preoccupied the time 
and resources of Great Britain. The pausing of setting up governance institutions in 
Ukwuaniland for administration to tackle Benin might have made the British more popular in 
the eyes of the Ukwuani. It could have been a message to the locals that the British have the 
power but are not using it against the Ukwuani, but rather using it against a recalcitrant 
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Benin. Secondly, this period also coincided with the revocation of the Charter of the RNC in 
1899, so that, both developments bestowed on the protectorate government enormous 
responsibilities which had to be sorted out one after the other, before addressing other issues 
of administration and governance.  
8.3 British Consolidation 
In chapter seven, it was indicated that by 1900, Great Britain introduced new administrative 
and judicial measures to streamline its control over its newly inaugurated Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria. The takeover of the former territories of the RNC by the protectorate 
government and the proclamations establishing Native Courts and a Supreme Court in April 
1900 for the Southern Nigeria Protectorate set the tone for effective administration in the 
protectorate.
434
 The Native Courts in essence functioned as local government units involving 
the local people, but superintended by an official of Great Britain who as District 
Commissioner, oversaw all Native Courts under his jurisdiction. A salient provision of the 
Native Courts Proclamation germane to British administrative plans was Clause XII which 
stipulated that anywhere a Native Court was established in the district, the civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of the Native Court would supersede all other native jurisdictions in such 
places.
435
 Now, the significance of this clause must be understood in legal and political terms 
as it affected later developments in Ukwuaniland and other aspects of this study. This Clause, 
presupposed that the Native Courts, though manned by indigenous chiefs, would dispense 
justice according to British law. This was clearly a transposition of European ideas on 
indigenous peoples as indicated in chapters two and three. 
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 The dominant view by historians of Nigeria on British acquisition of the Ukwuani 
areas begins generally from 1900, a time of British military activities in the area. The 
accounts speak of intensified use or threat of force on the part of the officials of Great Britain 
as the biggest and most important factor which enabled the British to colonise the peoples. 
This narrative also speaks of the peoples’ dogged resistance to European intrusion into their 
abodes.
436
While this dissertation does not dispute the use of force by the agents of Great 
Britain for colonisation in other parts and even aspects of the study areas of Nigeria, the 
evidence points to the fact that use of force was not the preferred first choice and central 
means employed to achieve the objective of colonising the Ukwuani. Where force was used, 
it came much later after peaceful treaty diplomacy had been used to gain territorial and 
sovereignty rights. Thus, beginning from the early years of the twentieth century up to the 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914, instances of military 
patrols by the military forces of the protectorate government were responses to contain 
trouble spots, so as to open up the interior for free trade to flourish. Importantly, as indicated 
in ensuing sections, the military patrols of the British in Ukwuaniland were greatly 
influenced by developments further away in the Asaba area, north-east of Ukwuaniland, 
where a local uprising had begun against the imperial power. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that, while the imperial power did use force against aspects 
of the Ukwuani in the early twentieth century, the colonisation process began as already 
indicated, much earlier in 1896, long before the military patrols were commissioned. This 
remains so because, British political and administrative control through Native Courts only 
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became a feature in Ukwuani areas from the 1920s when the Kwali and Aboh Divisions were 
created, much more later than expected after the treaties with the Obiariku and Equaiku.
437
As 
has been noted in the course of this study, officials of Great Britain regarded the treaty 
signing episodes as a transfer of indigenous sovereign and political rights to them. Even 
though indigenous understandings of the contents of these treaties were deemed irrelevant 
within the circumstance by the imperial power, given that the Africans affixed their marks on 
the treaties was enough to effect transfer of political rights from the indigenes to the officials 
of Great Britain. Subsequently, in all cases, officials of Great Britain did not hesitate to rely 
on such concluded treaties as excuses for interfering in the political, economic and social 
systems of the indigenous peoples. Indeed, in the case of the Ukwuani, their fortunes were 
not different from those of the other groups of this study. Like the other groups, the treaty-
making episodes and Lecky’s self-imposed role – discussed earlier - as a neutral peace maker 
in the internal and inter-group palavers of the people must be seen as a desire by the imperial 
power to explore and use diplomatic means rather than force in incorporating the Ukwuani 
under British control. It must be emphasised that all subsequent developments and actions by 
officials of Great Britain followed earlier efforts of treaty-making with the chiefs and 
peoples, and should be taken as attempts by officials of the imperial power to enforce 
provisions of the treaties. It is in this light that subsequent developments in Ukwuaniland by 
the beginning of the twentieth century deserve closer examination. 
There are two keys issues which need to be understood to make sense of British later 
military actions in Ukwuaniland. These two developments were the sacking of the Benin 
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Empire in 1897, and the Ekumeku uprising amongst the Asaba Igbo groups, north east of the 
Ukwuani. Both events clearly had some effects on internal dislocations within Ukwuaniland 
in the form of, outbreaks of brigandage and seizures which invariably affected trade and inter 
group relations and ultimately attracted military responses from the imperial power with the 
intent to contain trouble spots.  
 As indicated earlier, in the course of his treaty-making episodes, Lecky was inundated 
with reports of the influence of Benin on the Ukwuani as a rival imperial power. By 1897, 
the agents of Great Britain had cause to deal with Benin leading first to the Benin Massacre 
and subsequent punitive action against that Kingdom.
438
 Now, the Benin episode took much 
of the attention of the imperial power, including its military forces and personnel, so that 
little or no attention was given to Ukwuaniland between 1896 and 1900 after, the treaties 
with Obiariku and Equaiku.
439
Almost at the same time when Lecky was concluding treaties 
with the Ukwuani, an incipient anti-colonial movement began to develop among the Igbo, 
North-East of the Ukwuani in the Asaba territories. The Ekumeku War, between the forces of 
Great Britain and the indigenous Western Igbo groups of the Asaba hinterland began to fester 
from about 1893 and lasted up to the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern 
Protectorates in 1914.
440
In this instance of British expansion in the Asaba areas north-east of 
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the Ukwuani, it was a case of employing coercive means openly to bring the people under the 
effective control of the imperial power. Again, like the case of dealing with Benin, the 
Ekumeku uprising took the attention of the civil personnel and military forces of the 
protectorate government away from other matters for some time. Thus, when troubles were 
reported in the Ukwuani hinterlands, it was a military column returning from the Asaba areas 
that was dispatched to deal with it in 1904.
441
 
As indicated in the epithet to this chapter, the military column of 1904 and others that 
followed were ostensibly to patrol the areas and open trade routes which were disturbed by 
the general malaise within Ukwuaniland, brought about indirectly by the sacking of the 
Benin kingdom, and the Ekumeku uprising. As has been noted, during Lecky’s treaty-making 
episodes, several tales of seizures of peoples and goods as well as fighting between towns 
were brought before him as palavers, prominent amongst which was the reports involving 
Meyes and Dumagbassa. Recall that in these instances, Lecky promised to return and settle 
all, but could not do so immediately.  
Despite the treaty-making episodes of Lecky, during this one example of British 
encounters with the Ukwuani, the imperial power was willing to apply force given the 
rampant cases of seizures of goods and inter-community wars, as indicated in Lecky’s report. 
This was violence which might have been welcomed by some locals in the wake of seizures 
of peoples and goods. Clearly, British actions reflected the much later period of post treaty-
making in which, the twin issues of the Benin episode and the Ekumeku uprising accentuated 
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brigandage in Ukwuaniland. Thus, it is bad to use the post-treaty cases of British military 
patrols to generalise, as has been done in the standard Nigerian historiography, that British 
colonisation of Ukwuaniland was achieved mainly through violence. The evidence just does 
not support such a view.  
In all, between 1904 and 1914 up to four military patrols were dispatched to Ukwuani 
areas to stop seizures and fighting between towns and to generally achieve lasting peace. The 
first operation in April 1904 under Major Hogg secured control of the Utagba-Uno areas 
without firing shots or bombardments, evidence that locals either were scared or partly 
supported the military action. Except for the village of Etua where a little altercation 
occurred, the rest of the territory appeared to willingly succumb to the imperial forces.
442
 
Between 7 and 15October1905, the imperial power had cause to send in another military 
patrol into Ukwuani hinterlands again. This time, two British officers, one British non-
commissioned officer, and seventy rank and file soldiers supported by a Maxim gun were 
sent in to curtail what was described as local disturbances.
443
Again, from 31 October 1905 to 
27 January 1906, another regiment was dispatched to patrol the Kwale areas made up of six 
officers, two British non-commissioned officers, 212 rank and file soldiers, one 2.95 inch 
gun, and two Maxim guns under the command of Captain Margesson.
444
 Lastly, in early 
October 1914, due to the murder of forty one persons in Kwale including two Native Court 
officials and five messengers attached to the Abraka Native Court, and seventeen Hausas, the 
imperial power sent troops and police to the scene to arrest the trouble makers. This suggests 
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a lot of local internal conflicts, not necessarily directed at the British. What led to the killings 
is not readily available, but, the imperial power dealt with the supposed killers in a severe 
manner. All the murderers were tried by the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria with forty 
two of them condemned to death.
445
 Clearly, this was an imperial power already exercising 
metropolitan style legal jurisdiction on a territory it had acquired earlier through peaceful 
diplomacy. Again, such a show of Britain’s ability to enforce peace might have been 
welcomed by some in the face of brigandage and seizures within the period. 
A few observations from these patrols deserve consideration. In the first place, from 
1905, the military columns sent in to Ukwuaniland became substantial in number of military 
personnel and military hardware deployed. This perhaps reflects the magnitude of the 
disturbances, which warrants a bigger and stronger force to deal with. Secondly, what can be 
really made of the 1914 action of the Kwale in killing forty one persons? Was this a casual 
act of defiance or a probable concerted reaction to alien rule? Given the treaty-making 
episodes earlier discussed and the outbreak of insecurity engendered by the issues of dealing 
with the Benin kingdom, the Ekumeku War and internal seizure of peoples and goods that 
were inherent in Ukwuani areas, it was clear that the various unrests and troubles which 
warranted the sending in of patrols by the imperial power were more or less stirred up by 
these elements. There is no evidence to support any assumption that the people organized and 
presented a common front or active resistance or opposition against the expansion of Great 
Britain into their territories. No major wars such as those with the Benin and the Ekumeku 
were fought with the Ukwuani, and the few military patrols were despatched to quell 
symptoms of unrests and troubles.  
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8.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated how the Ukwuani were colonised by the British Empire. 
Evidence clearly indicates that like the other groups of this study, peaceful treaty-making was 
the initial means employed by the British as a central instrument in the acquisition of 
Ukwuani territories. Though, the popular historiography presents a narrative that suggest the 
Ukwuani territories as an unquiet and troublesome area with perpetual disturbances and 
indifference to British expansion, which warranted the use of force by the British to subdue 
them, the evidence reveals a contrary paradigm. What has been indicated was that as with 
other cases of this study, the British in their characteristic style desired peaceful relations 
with the people and proceeded to conclude treaties with the Ukwuani as a first diplomatic 
step towards colonisation. In doing so, the concluded treaties provided the leeway for Great 
Britain to exert her political authority on the people and all subsequent developments became 
anchored on the provisions of the treaties earlier concluded. 
 It has been demonstrated that Lecky’s visits to the Ukwuani hinterlands in 1896 set 
the tone for the initial and gradual penetration of Great Britain into Ukwuaniland. The two 
treaties subsequently concluded with the Obiariku and the Equaiku to all intents and purposes 
bestowed on officials of Great Britain political and sovereign rights needed to get involved in 
the affairs of the people. Indeed, as seen from Lecky’s report, the people indicated 
enthusiasm for the visit of the white man to their areas and without prompting, referred their 
internal and intergroup palavers to him for settlement. This was a clear testament of 
indigenous agency in the colonisation process. 
Customarily, the British set up administration after treaty-making. For the Ukwuani, 
It was not until the 1920s that proper administrative structures in the form of Native Courts 
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and Native administration were established in Ukwuani areas. Before then, the Ukwuani 
were lumped into such Native Court system that had been established at Abraka, a 
neighbouring Urhobo treaty town. From 1901 when the Native Courts Proclamation was 
enacted, the imperial power had already started the process of establishing Native Authorities 
in centres of power amongst the various groups, so that by 1905, ninety one Native Courts 
were set up in the whole of Southern Nigeria. This Lugardian system of indirect rule, using 
the existing political structures of the indigenous people as a tool for governance would later 
dictate the establishment of the Kwale-Aboh Native Administration in 1928. In doing this, 
the officials of the imperial power considered Aboh as a more centralized political unit with 
the inherent characteristics equivalent to that of the Benin, Itsekiri and the Emirates in the 
north of Nigeria, essential for effecting wider political and juridical control. But, what the 
British failed to realize was that despite the tenuous connection the Ukwuani had with the 
Aboh kingdom, the former was never under the direct influence of the latter. In future, this 
fact was realized, and reorganization was effected to separate the Ukwuani from the Aboh 
under different Native Authorities.
446
 
Subsequent developments in Ukwuani territories such as the military patrols and the 
late establishment of Native Courts were as a result of internal and external factors. The 
external factors border on the actions of the imperial power in dealing with the Benin empire 
to the north of the Ukwuani and the Ekumeku uprisings against the British mounted by the 
Igbo groups North-East of the Ukwuani. The various military patrols in the early twentieth 
century were directed at curtailing trouble areas. They did not represent a first step by the 
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imperial power for forcefully colonising the people, nor did it amount to measures against 
indigenous forces resisting colonialism as the standard historiography portrays. Indeed, Great 
Britain’s colonisation of Ukwuaniland did not follow a traumatic path of military conquest 
like some other aspects of Nigeria. This position in this study represents a shift from the 
dominant narrative by historians of Nigeria which emphasizes the arms superiority of the 
imperial power as the major factor that led to the subjugation of the people. The evidence of 
treaty-making, the friendly disposition of the peoples in welcoming the imperial agents, in 
which they exercised their agency – a free capacity to initiate and direct relations with the 
British, helps the analysis of this study to transcend the use of force thesis, and contend 
strongly that a combination of diplomatic means characterized and shaped Great Britain’s 













The objective of this dissertation was to contribute to the discourse on Great Britain’s 
colonisation of Nigeria. It has drawn attention to aspects of the colonisation process ignored 
or glossed over by the standard historiography. The aspects of wide use of treaties and 
African agency which shaped the encounter process between the case study groups and 
officials and agents of Great Britain within the period under review remains a positive 
contribution of this study. Evidence of the encounters between the case study groups – the 
Itsekiri, Urhobo, Western Ijo, Isoko, and Ukwuani- and Great Britain, derived from archives 
and other primary sources revealed that the colonisation of these few aspects of what became 
Nigeria was achieved mainly through diplomacy. It involved a combination of treaty-making, 
the role of men on the spot driving the imperial process peacefully, immersing themselves in 
the internal affairs of the people, and engaging in colonial knowledge of the groups as a form 
of cultural and diplomatic project. The process was also characterised by a high level of 
indigenous agency in some instances, in which conditions in the indigenous societies 
engendered locals collaboration with the imperial power, leading ultimately to colonisation.  
In examining the extent to which treaties were used as a central and peaceful means 
by Great Britain to gain control of these groups of the Western Lower Niger between 1884 
and 1914, the study explained the earlier philosophical and legal ideas behind European 
expansion. This use of treaties in the process of colonisation has not received adequate 
attention in the Nigerian historiography; rather, the existing standard historiographies often 
emphasised the theme of violent conquest, focusing on a few incidents. By grounding these 
incidents within the wider histories of local-British encounters, a much more nuanced 
understanding of colonisation is provided, one in which trade, diplomacy, and treaties were 
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key, not the rare use of violence. The revisionist argument of this study, by focusing in-depth 
on these regions, has shown how misleading it is to use a few cases of Great Britain’s use of 
violence in Nigeria to generalise as the standard pattern of the colonisation process in all 
instances. 
 A closer look at the encounter processes between the indigenous peoples and officials 
of Great Britain indicated that the numerous treaties of protection concluded between parties 
served as a peaceful first step for the British towards colonisation. The problems associated 
with the treaties in terms of whether the people understood the implications of affixing their 
marks on them were noted. Indeed, treaties have often been dismissed because of this issue, 
but as other studies in other parts of the world (Canada, New Zealand, etc.) have indicated, 
treaties can still tell us a lot about the colonisation process. Thus, this study has added 
Nigeria to this important wider scholarship on treaty-making as a key part of the colonisation 
process. While we may never know how African signatories understood what they signed, 
there are still important clues to be gleaned from such an evaluation. Clearly, one of the keys 
ways in which treaties were significant was that once concluded, they conferred on officials 
of Great Britain sovereign, political and legal rights which were exploited by the imperial 
power to impose dominium and imperium over the peoples. It was a case of, as Steven Press 
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 This dissertation also supports the findings of recent studies, such as Belmessous’s 
broader investigation of European expansion through treaties from 1600-1900.
448
Thus, this 
dissertation notes that the history of European expansion globally predates the Scramble for 
Africa. Specifically for Great Britain, expansion has been expressed in acquisition of 
colonies in the New World, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand long before the age of 
empire. In these places, the application of treaty-making as a means of territorial acquisition 
played out significantly, so that by the time of its application in Nigeria, it was a tradition 
that was simply carried forward from earlier times. Again, this study has shown that in the 
process of expansion, imperial officials and companies played significant roles, producing 
and using hundreds of deeds, purporting to acquire political and sovereign rights from 
indigenous peoples who as has been indicated, did not understand the contents and imports of 
the legal and political implications of the treaties they affixed their marks on. Nevertheless, 
this last fact was usually considered irrelevant as far as the imperialists felt they were 
operating within the ambits of their understanding of the prevailing notions of international 
law. 
Indeed, the legal precedent of treaty-making and use for territorial acquisition which 
had been tested elsewhere before the Scramble was concretized at the Berlin Conference of 
1884-1885, where the principle of effective occupation provided for powers to indicate 
legitimacy of their occupation of a particular territory by establishing institutions of 
governance. In this process, attention was not given to how Africans might view the actions 
of the Europeans. This was not surprising given the fact that, colonial rule was predicated on 
one group imposing their will upon another culminating eventually in a situation of 
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domination and dependence, with the dominant group exerting its political, legal, cultural 
and social norms on the subordinate group. As indicated, this colonisation of others by 
European powers for economic and political gains was not peculiar to Africa and indeed 
Nigeria. But its intensification in the nineteenth century in what Eric Hobsbawm termed ‘the 
age of empire’ signified, a concerted interest on the part of European powers towards Africa 
leading to its partition and colonisation.
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How did treaty-making and use become a pivotal aspect of European expansion and 
imperialism in general? As chapter two reveals, treaties were considered valid within the 
context of European international law prior to and in the age of empire, so that by the time of 
the Scramble, they became significantly useful in legitimizing the process of territorial 
acquisition. As evidenced, earlier treaty-making with non-European peoples before the 
Scramble were templates which were carried forward. These legal templates which had 
grown from Roman times were expanded through the ages by legal theories, opinions and 
attitudes and ultimately employed for empire-building. Indeed, in the age of empire, the 
validity of treaty-making and use for expansion were reinforced and given credence by 
pseudo-legal postulations and treatises by publicists who emphasized the universalism of 
European notions of law in their relations with others.  
In this vein, European notions of international law, including treaty-making and use 
for territorial acquisition became potent instruments in consolidating and legalising 
colonialism, as they were viewed as veritable tools considered even more virile than the 
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 Thus, in the hands of the officials and agents of Great Britain, colonisation 
was achieved by means of treaty diplomacy, as the treaties served as Saadia Touval has 
suggested, to support claims for international recognition of territorial acquisition in 
negotiations with rival European powers.
451
Again, as Akin Oyebode has pointed out, the 
treaties were more or less like crude diktats ostensibly designed to herald British colonial 
rule.
452
Most importantly, the treaties served to impose upon the Europeans some form of 
obligation to so called,‘civilize the barbarians.’ Ultimately, in the age of empire, and within 
the prevalent notions of international law as M. F. Lindley has noted, cession based on treaty 
whether obtained by force or willingly was taken as a legitimate means of territorial 
acquisition.
453
 This was more so considering, as Saadia Touval again has suggested that, 
whenever a European power referred to treaties concluded with African rulers in support of 
its territorial claim, the argument was often that it had acquired sovereign rights through the 
treaty and also that the treaties with the indigenes had obligated it toward the Africans which 
it – the colonial power would have to honourably uphold. In any event, despite any form of 
criticism that may be labelled at the treaties – in terms of whether the natives fully 
comprehended their true meanings or otherwise, the treaties served the self-interest of the 
European power in legalizing, pacifying and aided in the eventual takeover of the political 
and judicial rights of the territories of the signatories to these treaties. The important point to 
note in relation to the central theme of this study is that, the treaties concluded through 
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peaceful processes with the various peoples of this study were resorted to by Great Britain to 
justify and achieve colonialism. 
Equally importantly, the close examination of treaties and surrounding diplomatic 
efforts has indicated the crucial role of the bridgeheads, or men on the spot, who shaped the 
imperial enterprise, often through a focus on trade and diplomatic engagement with 
indigenous peoples. Also, it has been shown how the collection of colonial knowledge of 
local people by imperial agents helped ensure a more peaceful colonisation than is normally 
recognised; when violence did occur, the lack of colonial knowledge is telling. Such an 
examination also illuminates the conditions on ground in the indigenous societies which 
influenced the peoples in some instances to warmly welcome officials of the imperial power 
to their abodes: violence and gunboat diplomacy were factors, but so were trade, protection 
from rival powers, and British mediation skills. Colonisation was not just about Great 
Britain’s desire to colonise, for while there were power imbalances, indigenous peoples were 
not altogether passive victims in the colonisation process. 
Furthermore, the role of a chartered company acting on behalf of an imperial power 
in the form of the Royal Niger Company resonated with a trend that had been applied 
elsewhere in Great Britain’s global expansion. Significantly, the company’s treaty-making 
enterprises on the Niger Basin prior to the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 played a major part 
in securing the Niger areas for the imperial power. These dynamics of the encounter process 
between the indigenous peoples and the agents of Great Britain in the age of empire deserved 
attention and provides fresh insights into our understanding of Great Britain’s imperial 
machinations in Nigeria. In the case of the Western Ijo as evidenced in chapter five, their 
encounters with Great Britain were facilitated by the Royal Niger Company, which between 
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1884 and 1898 concluded up to thirty treaties with various Ijo settlements along the left and 
right banks of the Forcados River. In this process, the RNC acted just like other trading 
companies such as the East Indian Company, the New Zealand Company, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company of Canada, which earlier, had all acted similarly on behalf of the British Crown 
through Charters. In the case of the RNC, it began its treaty-making episodes with the Ijo 
long before its Charter was granted in 1886. When by 1899 its charter was abrogated, its 
territories, which it gained in the first place through treaties, were all handed over to the 
Niger Coast Protectorate in 1900. 
Perspectives about the use of force or threat of its use by the imperial power in 
colonisation often generalised the extent to which coercion was applied as a means of 
territorial acquisition. Even though evidences abound of Great Britain’s use of force in her 
expansionary enterprise in other aspects of what became Nigeria, this study has not tried to 
suggest on the basis of the case studies used here that, the colonisation process was altogether 
peaceful. It gives credence to arguments that violence was used in several cases in Nigeria, 
but specifically for the case studies, a more complicated picture emerges. In these areas, 
colonisation through treaties defined the character of Great Britain’s expansion between 1884 
and 1914. While there were instances of use of force by the imperial power, but as 
demonstrated, these were always after treaties had been concluded, so that, the reaction by 
the imperial power was often influenced by and geared towards enforcing treaty clauses or 
containing ‘trouble’ areas. Therefore, to ascribe a blanket ascription of military conquest on 
the basis of the recorded few cases of punitive actions and military patrols negates the central 
place of colonisation through a combination of soft power, embodied in treaties, negotiation 
and diplomacy through, men on the spot and indigenous agency. 
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Furthermore, this study has revealed that there were no concerted reactions by any of 
the groups, whether individually or as a unit, against the encroachment of Great Britain into 
their territories. Any reason for this cannot be established given the reliance on British 
records alone. However, the cases of punitive expeditions and military patrols evidenced in 
this study does not amount to a reaction by the imperial power to crush or stop a unity of 
purpose by the indigenous peoples against imperial expansion. Nor does such isolated cases 
represents pictures of major confrontations between brave but poorly armed indigenous anti-
colonialists against the single-minded imperialism of Great Britain.
454
 Instead, while the 
records are scant and clearly biased, there are suggestions that use of force often 
accompanied support from at least some local factions. 
For instance, in chapters four and eight, the British punitive action against Nana and 
the military patrols in Ukwuani areas to contain troubles and seizures of goods received tacit 
support from locals. Clearly, as highlighted in chapters four and five, the appointment of the 
Governorship of the Benin River was a manifestation of indigenous agency. Later, Nana’s 
stoppage of trade and the punitive action against him revealed a mix of internal Itsekiri 
political instability, local rivalries and economic concerns of the Urhobo to trade directly 
with the British. In all cases, the British simply manipulated these economic and political 
elements to its imperial advantage diplomatically. In Ukwuani areas, Lecky’s visits revealed 
worries by locals about brigandage. Their entreaties to him to resolve palavers and tackle 
seizures, was also a reflection of indigenous agency in the encounter process. Given these 
instances, violence is a far too narrow characterisation of British expansion in Nigeria. 
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Clearly, colonisation was a complicated affair, a process that was shaped by numerous 
factors. 
Further Research 
The case study design and methodology employed in this study engendered collation of 
substantial quantity of evidence on Great Britain’s imperialism in the Niger Basin, using 
primary sources from Britain and Nigeria. Given that no two groups of this study 
experienced exactly the same scenario in their interactions with the imperial power, it would 
be helpful to conduct a further study of the conquest of other indigenous groups in Nigeria 
and their dealings with the officials and agents of Great Britain in the era of the Scramble for 
Africa. In particular, how were treaties and colonial knowledge used in such places? This has 
become imperative given the existence of the dominant narrative by historians of Nigeria that 
pictures colonialism in Africa as a process of violent conquest and subjugation of the 
indigenous peoples by the military forces of the imperial powers, while little or no attention 
is paid to non-coercive forms of imperial pacification and domination. Specific case studies 
are a valuable method of exploring exactly what happened on the ground and restoring a 
clearer agency to the Africans who lived in Nigeria at the time. 
 Another area for future research is a study of the legal system introduced by the 
British after treaty-making to achieve consolidation. The Native Courts served as legal and 
administrative institutions. Again, specific case studies would reveal how the different 
groups in Nigeria reacted to the new judicial and governance system. Significantly, given 
that the Native Courts were constituted of locals, but overseen by British District officers, 
studying this could reveal African agency in the post treaty phase colonial administration and 




On the basis of the discourse, analysis and findings in this study, it remains evident that to a 
large extent a combination of treaty-making, the imperial men on the spot driving the process 
and indigenous agency in some instances ensured Great Britain’s colonisation of the Itsekiri,  
the Western Ijo, the Urhobo, the Isoko and the Ukwuani indigenous groups of the Western 
Lower Niger between 1884 and 1914.  The widespread use of treaty diplomacy by the 
imperial power, as a tool to gain control of the areas of this study was not unconnected with 
Great Britain’s proclivity for form and legitimacy in its endeavour to impose its hegemony 
over the peoples of this study in the age of empire.  
Indeed, it is a known fact that a major characteristic of the European Scramble for 
Africa was the need for imperial powers to indicate legal titles to territories to other powers. 
In this vein, the treaties served the purpose of evidence of title for a particular power over 
and above the claims of other imperial powers. But more importantly, the treaties served the 
other purpose of bestowing on the imperial power, political and legal rights to impose its 
hegemony on the indigenous peoples through the various clauses inherent in them and upon 
which the leadership of the indigenous peoples affixed their marks on. The process of 
gathering treaty signatories also seems to have been an important part of the process for 
ensuring local indigenous cooperation with colonisation and trade. It is on account of the 
foregoing that, this study contends that peaceful colonisation through a combination of 
factors beginning with treaty-making remains the preponderant and central instrument in the 
colonisation of the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, the Western Ijo, the Isoko and the Ukwuani by Great 
Britain in the age of empire. 
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Finally, the results of this study agree with existing studies that contend that, in the 
process of the Scramble for Africa, the means adopted by some imperial powers was not 
restricted to the violence option alone. What must be noted is that, the other possibility of 
treaty diplomacy was available and that in this case, Great Britain exploited it in its 
colonisation of some groups in the Western Lower Niger of Nigeria, the groups that 
constitute the case study of this dissertation. Any attempt to fully understand how Great 
Britain colonised the whole of Nigeria should take into cognizance the numerous treaties 
concluded with the various peoples and also study further the negotiation processes that led 
to the treaties, because the treaties, together with force served as the legal and diplomatic 
tools for Great Britain’s empire-building enterprise and eventual ascendancy in Nigeria. Use 
of force alone should not be studied in isolation, as there are numerous aspects of Nigeria 
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